In 2008, President Hu Jintao proposed a new policy in which he asked the state media to take an active role in shaping public opinion. Signaling a government commitment to harnessing the power of the internet, Hu made a point to “exercise supremacy over internet public opinion, master the technique of online ‘guidance’, and use new technology to amplify the effectiveness of ‘positive’ propaganda.”

Although this cyber police method began as an experiment in 2005, the censorship force behind it now employs thousands of Chinese mercenary commentators. Some sources even estimate that there are as many as 280,000 to 300,000 commentators. The Ministry of Culture of the People’s Republic of China even conducts training sessions in which participants are required to pass an exam before they receive job certification to become an official commentator.

Amateur censors come to this cyber police force from all walks of Chinese life. Some provinces have advertised the Fifty Cent Party with propaganda and catchy phrases such as “everyone can make fifty cents.” In a country with enormous income disparity, many citizens would take this opportunity to make quick money. However, other online commentators volunteer their time to the Chinese effort of censoring the web. Hu Yingying, a sophomore at Shanghai Normal University, volunteers several hours a week by assuming a false online identity and introducing politically correct discussions on her university’s online bulletins. She is proud and happy to be a contributor towards creating a “harmonious society.”

These opinion shapers are even speculated to work on foreign language websites. In attempts to sway discourse on foreign websites, commentators criticize Western notions of what is wrong with China and suggest considering the Chinese party line. The effects of the Fifty Cent Party have even reached popular U.S. websites – in 2010, an American blogger at the Huffington Post ascribed comments on her blog posts to members of the party. Not only have pro-state Chinese commentators made their presence felt far and wide, but they’ve also cultivated an extremely short pattern of response. After the riots in Guizhou province in June 2008, the Chinese Internet was inundated with posts that criticized party officials. However, the Fifty Cent Party quickly intervened, deleting posts within fifteen seconds of their publication.

Despite the Big Brother-like control that the Communist Party wields, the effectiveness of China’s policies is questionable. Many comments left by these hired cyber police are often blatantly propagandist messages that are dismissed by increasing cynical Chinese netizens. The infiltration of official views very often disgusts ordinary Chinese citizens, who are reported to mock the Fifty Cent Party. Even Han Han, a famous Chinese celebrity, has posted a satirical training manual for Fifty Cent Party members – which has circulated widely alongside trenchant, critical cartoons. Furthermore, an increasing number of Internet-savvy citizens are able to sneak past censorship mechanisms users by bypassing firewalls and refraining from the use of ‘trigger’ keywords known to set off mercenary cyber police.

Regardless of the long-term impact of the Fifty Cent Party, the entire strategy of mass censorship strives to deceive the Chinese citizens, instead of creating a much-needed open relationship. Given that the Chinese government already controls most media outlets and almost all news providers, the enlistment of anonymous commentators clearly displays the government’s fear of facing the truth. Although legions of amateur censors make it more difficult for Chinese citizens to express their opinions, this is a minor obstacle that Chinese citizens – internet-savvy, cynical, and determined – will waste no time in bypassing.

That’s the prevalence of the Harvard name for you, and part of the reason I feel so privileged to be here. Though there are countless worthy institutions of higher education in the United States, in India, it’s the H-bomb that will elicit those awed eyes or the offering of a business card. India is a country that truly values knowledge, and Harvard has earned the reputation of being at the very pinnacle of knowledge-acquirement. Perhaps it’s because Harvard accepts so few undergraduates from India (the class of 2015 has only six Indian students from India) that their reputation for high standards has become so deeply ingrained in Indian society. College applications and acceptances in Indian high schools is the worst kind of rat race; you compete against kids who have straight 2400 SAT scores, who fight for every mark on every test, and who are truly diligent and hard-working.

Proposed route of the Keystone XL pipeline

On Wednesday, January 18, in a move fomenting consternation within Republican circles and celebration within environmentalist ones, President Barack Obama announced the rejection of the Keystone XL pipeline. Though there is debate over how many jobs the pipeline’s construction and maintenance would actually create—Keystone builder TransCanada posits that 20,000 jobs will be created while a Cornell study puts it closer to 5,000—an infrastructure project like this in a period of high unemployment would almost certainly help improve the economy. For this reason alone the President’s decision to block Keystone was the wrong one. But more importantly, the movement opposing the pipeline, as noble in its ambitions as it may be, is utterly misguided.

The greatest concern surrounding the pipeline is not the danger of polluting the Ogallala Aquifer, a crucial water source in the American Midwest, as surveying is well underway to find a route that bypasses both the Aquifer and the ecologically sensitive Sand Hills region altogether. No, the issue bothering environmentalists about the Keystone XL pipeline is the fact that it is associated with the development of the Alberta oil sands, a move that has been hyperbolically categorized as “Game Over” for the planet by one particularly vocal opponent. When protesters swarmed the White House last year, their logic was simple: end the pipeline, stop oil sands development. But this logic is severely flawed.

The Canadian government and the Canadian energy industry have made clear that development of the oil sands will continue regardless of the ultimate fate of the pipeline. Development is underway, permits have been issued, and a political party eager to promote Canada’s energy resources has recently strengthened its majority in Parliament. The United States is far from the only consumer interested in oil from the Alberta oil sands; growing demand in parts of Asia means that there is no shortage of potential Canadian business partners.

Plans are already being made to transport the oil sands by other means if Keystone falls through, including proposals to transfer the oil to the US by rail or to China by sea. Rail environmental regulations are far more lax than those associated with pipelines, and China’s environmental record is unimpressive to say the least. Environmental protesters opposing the Keystone pipeline fail to understand that stopping it does not change Canada’s economic and political interest in developing the oil sands, and if anything paves the way for more environmentally unsafe means of transporting the oil to prospective buyers.

The moral of the story is this: the controversial development of the Alberta oil sands will continue no matter what, and transportation by pipeline to the United States is far safer and far more likely to create greatly-needed American jobs than any other method. Rejecting the Keystone XL pipeline not only fails to address the potentially legitimate concerns environmentalists have with the development of the oil sands and our continued reliance on fossil fuels, it also throws away thousands of jobs, threatens to derail the United States’ professed goal of energy security, and potentially increases the risk of an oil spill.

Kim Jong Un, "Supreme Commander"

In his new year’s speech, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak claimed that the Korean peninsula was at a “turning point” and that there were “opportunities for change.” While he did not state this explicitly, he was clearly referring to the recent death of Kim Jong Il, the controversial despot of North Korea who ascended to power in 1994. Since Kim’s death last month, the whole world has turned its eyes to the politically isolated country of North Korea and held its breath in anticipation of the arrival of its next leader, Kim Jong Un.

Countless media outlets and diplomats, including former US envoy to North Korea Steven Bosworth, have become optimistic about a potential change in North Korea’s previously belligerent stance toward nuclear weapons and a revival of six party talks aimed at achieving denuclearization. However, such optimistism about a mysterious country with such unpredictable domestic politics is naive, particularly considering the role of communist party bureaucracy and the army. Although the death of Kim Jong Il and the ascension of a young, inexperienced Kim Jong Un has given the world hope for a less belligerent North Korea and a new era of East Asian politics, we should take a less optimistic outlook as the new regime’s stance on nuclear weapons and food aid is unlikely to change.

A Stagnant Government

To begin, three levels of North Korean society will refuse to change despite the succession of Kim Jong Un– the government, the army and the people. A similar wave of hope swept the world in 1994 when Kim Jong Il assumed power following the death of his father Kim Il Sung, who continues to rule North Korea from his grave as its “Great Leader” and “President”. But Kim Jong Il did not foster the expected collapse of North Korea. Instead, he oversaw the death of anywhere between 900,000 to 3.5 million people in a massive famine and played a dangerous multi-decade game of using nuclear weapons to blackmail the world. The transition of power in 1994 demonstrates one thing in particular – simply changing who holds power in North Korea will not radically alter the policies of the North Korean government, because the state bureaucracy is composed of more than just the dictator. Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Jong Il’s sister, Jang Song Taek, the former’s husband, and General Ri Yong Ho, have been selected as a troika of regents for the inexperienced Kim Jong Un. Given that all three of the most important decision makers in the current regime have been long-time confidants and allies of Kim Jong Il, it seems highly unlikely that North Korean policy with be altered in the near future.

A Powerful Military

This pattern also applies to the Korean People’s Army, which wields significant sway over government policy. A group of elite generals benefit significantly from cross-border profiteering, corruption, black markets, social inequality and the mammoth USD$6 billion per annum in funding. The army is notoriously bureaucratic and incredibly stagnant, with a standing army of approximately 1 million and a reserve force of approximately 7 million. Although North Korean officials met US envoys in Geneva with interest to re-start six party talks in November 2011, powerful generals who make up the upper levels of the state bureaucracy will be unwilling to agree to a policy of denuclearization and diversion of funding from the military to agriculture, a key concession demanded by both the US and South Korea. Marcus Noland, a North Korea specialist at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, DC, states that North Korea’s policy is influenced much more by domestic political considerations rather than “punishments and rewards” from abroad. International interference has never succeeded in altering North Korean policy, as demonstrated by Kim Jong Il’s reneging on 1994’s “Agreed Framework” with the Clinton Administration, a proposal which stipulated that North Korea would eliminate its nuclear facilities in exchange for two light water reactors from the US. Kim Jong Il also pulled out of six party talks in 2008, and US sanctions have consistently failed in influencing his regime. While diplomats from China, Japan, South Korea, and America should continue to focus on coordinating their efforts on negotiating with North Korea on denuclearization in exchange for aid, past experience indicates that the military ultimately overrides international influence. North Korean generals have a vested interest in maintaining a huge state military without focusing on alleviating famine, a strategy which will preserve the status quo regardless of how diplomats try to tinker with the new regime.

A Scared People

Finally, the new regime’s policies will remain unaltered due to lack of pressure from the people of North Korea. Immediately following the death of Kim Jong Il, North Korea’s KCNA News Agency released videos of distraught North Koreans weeping and moaning as the news of the death of their “dear leader” broke. Although it remains unclear how much of the mourning was orchestrated, visitors to the country report that a large degree of the reverence towards the Kim family is genuine. Kim Il Sung in particular still commands a large base of hero-worship given his role in freeing North Korea from the Japanese and from fighting back against the Americans during the Korean War. North Korean society has also undergone decades of indoctrination and have embraced the idea of “juche”, or North Korean autonomy. If anything, society is paralyzed by a fear of the regime given that one in twenty of the country’s 23 million people have passed through the country’s gulags. Even if North Koreans wanted change in the form of government reform, there are few tools that might enable them to mobilize. The population is too rural to allow people to coordinate themselves into organized groups, and a brutally effective state-wide system of repression courtesy of the state police and army is in place. The most outstanding piece of evidence for the above is simply that Kim Jong Il, a brutal and merciless tyrant, was allowed to die peacefully and of natural causes. Given the amount of misery he inflicted upon his people, it is obvious that in the case of North Korea, misery does not breed revolt.

Structural vs Voluntary Changes

If anything, Kim Jong Un may feel the need to do something radical and belligerent in order to assert himself as the new leader of North Korea. Despite having 14 years of preparation for his job under his own father, Kim Jong Il spent three years in seclusion after Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994 in order to consolidate his power. Kim Jong Un, on the other hand, has only been acknowledged by Kim Jong Il as the latter’s successor for less than two years, a very short span of time to develop ties to important players in domestic politics and establish his credibility as the next ruler of the country. Jong Un is also armed with something that Jong Il did not have in 1994 – an arsenal of nuclear weapons pointed at South Korea and Japan. Kim Jong Un also helped plan attacks on South Korean targets in 2010. He also issued his first threat of war on South Korea on December 30th, stating North Korea would “smash the stronghold of the puppet forces” in the South in retaliation for “hideous crimes” committed during the mourning period for Kim Jong Il—not very promising statements from a man who carries the weight of the world’s optimism on his shoulders.

This is not to say that the prospects of gradual change in North Korea are completely dismal. The country is more likely to change due to underlying structural factors stemming from Kim Jong Il’s reign rather than because of the role played by Kim Jong Un. Although many Koreans still revere Kim Il Sung, the younger generation of North Koreans did not live through World War II or the Korean War and thus do not share the sense of common struggle for independence and national sovereignty that their parents and grandparents do. In fact, this disconnect is commonly cited as a contributing factor to the collapse of the Soviet bloc, as younger citizens could not identify with the ideology responsible for brainwashing the older generation during WWII and the early Cold War. Moreover, a middle class is developing outside the state economy. Those with relatives in China and South Korea are responsible for introducing imported clothing, high-heeled shoes, DVDs of South Korean dramas and mobile phones with international dialing into the country. These connections are showing an increasing number of North Koreans that the state’s description of the outside world is not wholly accurate. Hundreds of black markets have sprung up across the country in response to the failure of the state-run food allocation system. But once again, more is needed that just a discontent population and a small group of middle class traders to overturn the gargantuan bureaucracy of North Korea.

On December 30, North Korea’s official KCNA news agency declared “on this occasion, we solemnly declare with confidence that foolish politicians around the world including the puppet forces in South Korea should not expect any changes from us.” They could not have put it any better. We should take international optimism springing from the end of Kim Jong Il’s reign with a bucket of salt and expect little change from his son.

]]> http://hpronline.org/world/a-pinch-of-salt-the-case-against-optimism-for-north-korea/feed/ 2 http://hpronline.org/world/china%e2%80%99s-ambitious-future-in-space/ http://hpronline.org/world/china%e2%80%99s-ambitious-future-in-space/#comments Mon, 09 Jan 2012 17:30:50 +0000 Thomas Gaudett http://hpronline.org/?p=17692

As China Announces Bold New Plans for its Space Program, the United States Considers the Possible Militarism of the Space Race

In contrast to a United States that continues to scale back its space program, China last week unveiled an ambitious plan to become a major extraterrestrial power.  This plan includes launching freighters and manned-vessels within the next half-decade, conducting major research on black holes, forecasting environmental disasters, and drafting up plans for future space operations.

This announcement is part of the “rising global power” narrative that the nation’s government is attempting to promote.  Indeed, the bold next steps of China’s space program are not unlike the other major initiatives that the government has already undertaken, such as its massive expenditures on infrastructure projects.  And, this latest announcement out of China has got America worried about the strengthening of China and the possible militarism of space in the future.

Is this a Surprise?

China’s potential ascendency as a major player in space should not come as a surprise given the nation’s booming economy and past accomplishments with regard to its space program.  China, after all, is only the third nation after the United States and Russia to have put a human in space.

Furthermore, China completed a successful space walk in 2008.  In October, China’s first space laboratory module Tiangong-1 was successfully launched.  A month later, in November, the Chinese unmanned spacecraft Shenzhou-8 successfully completed an automated docking and safe return to Earth.  It is believed that during this flurry of activity the seeds of a future Chinese space laboratory were planted.

What is the Danger?

Some have become quite concerned by China’s ambitious goals given that the nation’s space program is run by its military.  Yet, the Chinese military insists that the space program will be used only for peaceful purposes.  After it shot down one of its own dead satellites in 2007, concerns arose regarding possible intentions to militarize space.  While we can only speculate at this point,  recent Chinese military policies and actions have raised questions about whether or not China’s military leaders will attempt to utilize space innovations for military purposes.

China- The Leader or Playing Catch-Up?

Some lament China’s space aspirations, fearing the possibility of China surpassing the United States on this front.  Naturally, this ought to be an important concern for the US, and it would not be unreasonable to suggest that China will eventually  become the a powerful presence in space.

However, China, in a sense, is playing catch-up with the nations that started their space programs back in the 1960s.  And although funding for NASA is not as robust as many might hope for looking into the future, the American space program is already building on the solid foundation of decades of previous work.

What the Future Holds

In the long term, China is hoping to put a man on the moon.  Few doubt that such a feat would be possible for China, given its current economic rise.  However, because China does have a relatively long path to tread with respect to developing its space technology, the future situation in space will largely be a function of how effectively China can execute on its plans.

As China garners this more prominent position in space, it will be strategically important for the United States to bridge the gap in relations with China with respect to their space programs, much in the manner that Washington developed strong space relations with Moscow during the Cold War.  In any case, as China’s space program grows and develops, fostering these space relations between the two powers may be necessary to maintain the peace and security that has characterized space since the dawn of the Space Age.

Photos Credit: Commons.Wikimedia.org

]]> http://hpronline.org/world/china%e2%80%99s-ambitious-future-in-space/feed/ 0 http://hpronline.org/united-states/election-2012/mitt-romney/ http://hpronline.org/united-states/election-2012/mitt-romney/#comments Tue, 03 Jan 2012 05:47:09 +0000 Ross Svenson http://hpronline.org/?p=17801 BACKGROUND

The son of former Governor George Romney of Michigan and Lenore Romney, a 1970 Republican Senate candidate, Mitt Romney comes from a political family. He chose, however, to begin his career in the private sector, first working at Boston Consulting Group, then Bain & Company. In 1983, he co-founded the Bain & Company private equity spin-off firm, Bain Capital, where he accumulated a large fortune and developed a reputation as a skilled businessman. In 1994, Romney dove into politics, running against Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) on his business record, but ultimately coming up short. Romney met political success in 2002 when he won the Massachusetts gubernatorial election. Governor Romney then ran for president in 2008, losing the Republican primary to Senator John McCain (R-AZ). Romney launched his second bid for the presidency in June 2011.

POLL NUMBERS AND MONEY

According to a Real Clear Politics average of national polls taken between January 11 and February 3, Romney leads former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich by just over 3 percentage points. Romney has consistently led or placed second in national polls since the start of the primary season, trading places with Texas Governor Rick Perry, businessman Herman Cain, and Gingrich at different times during the race. Romney finished just behind the former senator and dark horse candidate Rick Santorum in the Iowa caucus, while he blew away his rivals in the New Hampshire primary. Romney’s significant momentum coming off of his New Hampshire win was halted in South Carolina, where Gingrich pulled off a decisive victory. Romney, however, was able to take back control of the race with huge wins in Florida and Nevada, setting him up well for the upcoming contests in February.

According to the Washington Post, Romney has raised $33 million since the start of his presidential campaign, dramatically outpacing his Republican rivals. While Romney may have the advantage over his fellow Republicans, he has his work cut out for him to catch up with President Obama. Obama’s campaign has already raised $157.3 million – an intimidating figure for any challenger.

MAJOR POLICY STANCES

Tapping into the nation’s economic uncertainty, Romney has largely focused his campaign on jobs and the economy. Prior to the President’s unveiling of the American Jobs Act in September, Romney released his 59-point economic plan that included proposed legislation and executive orders that would cut corporate tax rates, work to repeal regulations instated under the Affordable Care Act and the Dodd-Frank Act, aim to boost domestic energy production, restrict labor unions, and reduce non-defense discretionary spending. “Growing the economy is the way to put people back to work and fund our national budget,” emphasized Romney during a speech on his economic plan. Romney’s foreign policy focuses on reversing cuts to defense spending, deterring Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, labeling China as a currency manipulator and applying sanctions, and staying the course in Afghanistan. With regards to social issues, Romney has been pro-life on abortion since 2004 and opposes civil unions for same-sex couples.

STRENGTHS 

With his business background and executive experience, Romney has the ability to make a strong argument that he would be capable of reducing joblessness and growing the economy. His campaign’s focus on economic issues would be the most effective general election strategy in earning the support of voters frustrated with a slow economic recovery. In 2010, voters ranked the economy as the most important political issue, and there is little evidence that ranking will change between now and November.

CHALLENGES

In the Republican primaries, Romney has the challenge of defending his support for an individual mandate in the 2006 Massachusetts health care law – an unpopular provision of the federal 2010 Affordable Care Act. So far he has been able to navigate the issue fairly well, not allowing it to knock him from the top tier of candidates and using a states’ rights argument to defend his support for it. The wealthy Romney must also combat the assertion made by rivals, both Democratic and Republican, that he is “out-of-touch.” Making a $10,000 bet at a debate and characterizing himself as “unemployed,” even in jest, have not helped his image, but it remains to be seen if he will garner working and middle class support.

PROSPECTS

Romney has been the frontrunner throughout the year, leading in the polls and in fundraising. Although his momentum was briefly curtailed in South Carolina, he demonstrated in Florida and Nevada that his superior organization and financial advantage will allow him to compete to the very end.

]]> http://hpronline.org/united-states/election-2012/mitt-romney/feed/ 0 http://hpronline.org/united-states/jon-huntsman/ http://hpronline.org/united-states/jon-huntsman/#comments Tue, 03 Jan 2012 05:45:57 +0000 Alexander Chen http://hpronline.org/?p=17810 BACKGROUND

Jon Huntsman first gained national prominence for becoming the youngest ambassador in 100 years after George H. W. Bush appointed him the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore in 1992. Under George W. Bush, Huntsman served as a Deputy Trade Representatives. Huntsman then served as Governor of Utah from 2001 to 2009, leaving with an approval rating of over 80% and Pew Center recognition of Utah as the best managed state. President Obama appointed him U.S. Ambassador to China in 2009, a position that he left in April of 2011 in order to return to the United States to explore a bid for the presidency.

POLL NUMBERS AND MONEY

Huntsman’s poll numbers are consistently in the low single digits. In the last Des Moines Register poll before the Iowa Caucuses, Huntsman placed last with only 2% of Iowans indicating him as their top choice. In New Hampshire, where he has concentrated most of his effort, Huntsman is polling among likely voters at only 9%, a solid 3rd place finish.

MAJOR POLICY STANCES

Although labeled a moderate among the Republican nominees, Huntsman does have traditional conservative stances on most policy issues. He supports the construction of a wall between the United States and Mexico, though as Utah Governor he signed a law allowing illegal-immigrants to receive “driving privilege cards.” He is pro-life, and is against same-sex marriage (though not civil unions). Huntsman has frequently pointed to simplification of the tax code as a major campaign issue, arguing that closing loopholes could help significantly with U.S. debt reduction. He supports lowering the corporate tax rate, and many of his policy stances are pro-business. In terms of foreign policy, Huntsman has focused mainly on potential U.S. leadership in Asia, particularly emphasizing the benefits of teaming with China to confront a North Korean nuclear threat. Huntsman is perhaps most notable for his belief in global warming, and he has frequently spoken critically of his “anti-science” opponents.

STRENGTHS

Huntsman’s experience both domestic and international is significant. This has helped him frequently in debates, particularly against the less-experienced candidates such as Bachmann and Perry. In general, his greatest strength is his appeal to both moderate Republicans and Democrats dissatisfied with President Obama. However, this popularity is little shown in Republican primaries where the highly conservative base has not warmed to the former Utah governor.

CHALLENGES

The moderate label is a double-edged sword for Huntsman. Instead of running as a reform-minded, conservative former governor and Washington outsider, he embraced the imagery of bipartisanship. His campaign highlighted his recent service as Obama’s Ambassador to China and willingness to cooperate with Democrats rather than the job growth and tax cuts he helped foster in Utah. The GOP electorate, having taken a sharp rightward turn over the past four years, has not embraced these qualities of Huntsman. Additionally, many voters do not see Huntsman as sufficiently socially conservative.

PROSPECTS

Huntsman has staked his entire campaign on a strong finish in the New Hampshire primary next Tuesday. The demographics and strong independent presence are conducive to a candidate of his background. For all the hours logged in the Granite State though, his poll numbers have failed to take off. Unless Huntsman pulls off an incredibly strong second place finish, his slim chance of winning the nomination will disappear.

]]> http://hpronline.org/united-states/jon-huntsman/feed/ 0 http://hpronline.org/world/after-kim-jong-il-the-chinese-take/ http://hpronline.org/world/after-kim-jong-il-the-chinese-take/#comments Wed, 28 Dec 2011 23:30:07 +0000 Jimmy Meixiong http://hpronline.org/?p=17553 By this point, most have probably heard the news that Kim Jong-il is dead, and seen the countless videos of mourning citizens in hysterics. In the wake of the North Korean leader’s death, pundits and governments have been scrambling to reassess their strategy toward the hermit country. Most fundamentally, international observers are concerned with questions of the North Korean government’s future stability and the continuities and changes over which Kim Jong-un will preside.

Kim Jong-un remains an elusive figure since his sudden emergence in the international spotlight last year as Kim Jong-il’s named successor. The unknowns surrounding his personality as well as the stability of the transition of power are issues that plague any attempts to analyze the future of the Korean peninsula.

The new "Great Leader" and other high-ranking military officers

One variable that can be taken into account is the enormous sway that China wields over North Korea, regardless of what happens internally in the hermit state. Although the exact figures of how much aid China provides to North Korea are difficult to determine, we do know that the figure is likely in the hundreds of millions of dollars and that China accounts for 80% of North Korean trade. China has a vested interest in North Korea due to its strategic location and the domestic destabilizing effect that a regime collapse on the peninsula would cause in China. Because of these considerations, Beijing is unwilling to allow the regime to fend for itself.

Professor Malcolm Cook, the Dean of the School of International Studies at Flinders University in Australia, believes that Kim Jong-un’s youth and political inexperience is set to cast North Korea into a new era of geopolitical instability. What he means by this is that North Korea will continue to aggressively pursue its nuclear program, while keeping up its aggressive stance toward the South. The younger Kim, he argues, lacks the political capital to change course from his father’s hard-line policies.

This instability-focused scenario underestimates the importance of China’s influence in North Korea. China’s rationale for its North Korean policy stems from two ideas – first, that China is opposed to the prospect of a united Korea with healthy ties to both Japan and U.S., and second, that China wants a politically stable North Korean state. This second concern would hold China to be as eager as any other nation to prevent North Korea from gaining a nuclear warhead, as evidenced by its recent push for the resumption of six party talks. Beijing has also continuously pressured North Korea to enact economic reforms in the direction of reforms enacted in the Deng years of the early 1980s. Both of these actions show that North Korea’s most important ally will do all that it can to prevent tensions in the peninsula, while keeping in place an agenda of gradual economic change. Considering the fact that Beijing essentially bankrolls the current regime, it will likely get its way in these regards.

China has already shown how the influence it has over North Korea can be used to promote policy change. In an perceived effort to get North Korea to return to six party talks this past September, China completely cut off oil exports to North Korea (dependent on China for up to 90% of its oil), effectively shutting down the country. However, North Korea has also been shown to be capable and willing to openly defy Chinese wishes by testing ballistic missiles this past July despite stern Chinese warnings.

Although Kim Jong-un might not have the political clout to greatly deviate from his father’s ‘military first‘  policies, he also cannot effectively rule without maintaining good relations with China due to that country’s economic stranglehold over the smaller nation. In the absence of Kim Jong-il’s strong leadership, the pendulum will now likely swing towards economic reform and the embrace of a Chinese economic model that has been demonstrated effective. With North Korean leadership no longer politically cohesive enough to openly defy China, the Korean peninsula is due to become more stable under Beijing’s heightened influence.

]]> http://hpronline.org/world/after-kim-jong-il-the-chinese-take/feed/ 0 http://hpronline.org/world/the-canadian-cop-out/ http://hpronline.org/world/the-canadian-cop-out/#comments Tue, 13 Dec 2011 22:35:17 +0000 Zeenia Framroze http://hpronline.org/?p=17269

The Tar Sands are controversial not only because of their potentially disastrous environmental impact, but also because of how they have fueled tensions between the government and the First Peoples of Canada.

What’s wrong with Canada these days? I remember the good old days, when Canadians championed human rights reforms, pushed for the protection of freshwater, and engaged in all those pleasant international good deeds. In light of this history, Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is startling. Since the Conservatives took power in 2006, they have made it explicitly clear that they planned to use their legal right to withdraw, but it wasn’t until their formal notice on December 13^ththat the reality set in.

The Canadian government cited several reasons for their environmental cop-out: First, that the sheer cost of keeping up with Kyoto made their involvement impractical. At a whopping $13.6 billion, perhaps the Canadians have a point. Second, they argue that since the United States and China (the world’s two largest emitters of greenhouse gas) are not members of Kyoto, participation in the Protocol becomes futile and frustrating. Finally, however, what I have contention with is the Environment Minister, Peter Kent’s statement, “’Kyoto is not the path forward for a global solution for climate change.” Then what is the path forward for Canada? The Oil Sands in Alberta? A 50% increase in greenhouse gas emissions in Ontario?

I lived in Toronto for three years, sorted my garbage into all the right bins, and watched my high school adopt an Environmental Sustainability Action Plan and work towards LEED Silver certification. It’s difficult for me to believe that such an environmentally conscious society has so few qualms about the Kyoto dropout. Perhaps it’s the apathy generated by the political switch from the loudly green Liberals to the conservative Harper government. Maybe Canadians just don’t know – after all, most articles in the Globe and Mail or The National Post extol only the benefits that the Alberta Oil Sands hold in store. The Kyoto Protocol is, of course, an ambitious document; but regardless, Canada’s decision to withdraw shouldn’t be viewed as some sort of regrettable reality, it’s just a cop-out of convenience.

]]> http://hpronline.org/world/the-canadian-cop-out/feed/ 0 http://hpronline.org/world/china-and-belarus-a-special-relationship/ http://hpronline.org/world/china-and-belarus-a-special-relationship/#comments Sat, 10 Dec 2011 18:11:06 +0000 Nataliya Nedzhvetskaya http://hpronline.org/?p=17064 China’s history of supporting authoritarian regimes—from Kim Jong Il’s North Korea to Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela—is well established and widely criticized. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has outlined a policy of “oppos[ing] interference in other countries’ internal affairs under the pretext of democracy and human rights,” including trade sanctions in the category of “interference.” Amidst the country’s astronomic rise on the economic worldstage, however, one relationship that has been little explored is that between present-day China and Aleksandr Lukashenko’s Belarus.

Lukashenko has been Belarus’s president since 1994, heading a repressive government with a substantive history of human rights abuse. Not without cause do critics dub him “Europe’s last dictator.” Nonetheless, Lukashenko has forged substantial links with China. Bilateral trade between the nations has grown from $34 million in 1992 to over $2.5 billion in 2010. Further, China stands as involved in Belarus’s politics as it does in its economics. From Minsk to Beijing, evidence of growing economic and diplomatic links suggests a mutually beneficial relationship that will continue to develop in the coming years.

China’s Best Friend

In an interview with the New China News Agency in October 2010, Lukashenko stated that China was Belarus’ best friend. He explained his rationale: “China’s investment has never had any political strings attached, therefore, we are more than willing to see China speed up its investment in Belarus on a larger scale.” Lukashenko’s statement accurately identifies one of the fundamental principles of Chinese foreign policy: an emphasis on economic inter-connectedness and a professed disinterest in domestic politics. This principle allows China to dominate trade with developing markets. In contrast with more demanding Western nations, China appears a non-threatening world power with a no-strings-attached policy.

Money certainly has a role to play in Belarus’s rapprochement. Current estimates place China’s total Belarusian investment at $15 billion, following the extension of a multi-billion dollar credit line. By comparison, total annual foreign investment in Belarus in 2010 was a mere $9 billion. Though Russia remains Belarus’ largest trading partner, accounting for almost half of all foreign trade, China has made tremendous headway, becoming Belarus’ largest non-European counter party. While pursuit of profit may seem to explain China’s investments, the explanation is insufficient. With its inefficient and largely outdated industrial economy and a poor credit rating, Belarus does not fit the profile of an attractive business partner.

It is equally unlikely that Belarus’ natural resources are the answer. The country lacks the natural gas and oil supplies that have brought wealth to neighboring Russia and Ukraine and contains only 20 percent of the pipelines used to transport these goods to the European market. While access to cheap energy drove China to develop relations with Venezuela and Nigeria, the same cannot be said of Belarus. Stronger ties with Minsk will not result in cheaper energy bills for Beijing.

Peas in a Pod

A more trenchant factor may be that of politics. To the annoyance of human rights groups worldwide, China and Belarus have continued to support one another on controversial issues, including the One-China Policy and Lukashenko’s contested election to a fourth presidential term. In 2009, under China’s aegis, Belarus was granted partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, becoming the only geographically European power significantly involved with the Asia-dominated mutual-security group. Lukashenko has visited Beijing on four separate occasions, in 1995, 2001, 2005, and 2010.

China’s outreach may pay the additional dividend of moving Belarus out of Russia’s orbit. In the past years, relations between Russia and Belarus have been strained, the result of unpaid debts and less-than- ideal relations between Lukashenko and Russian President Medvedev. While China and Russia often cooperate, their partnership suffers an element of rivalry. Developing ties with Belarus could be China’s attempt to gain greater influence in Russia’s backyard.

End of the Road?

For the past decade, Lukashenko’s foreign relations tactic has consisted of playing the EU and Russia off one another. With both the EU and Russia deeply mistrustful of Belarus, Lukashenko has changed strategies. Like a miracle drug, Belarus’ relationship with China has the potential to lengthen the lifespan of Lukashenko’s presidency.

Belarus is not North Korea, however. It cannot afford to cut off ties with its European neighbors or become solely dependent on China. Further, in the face of an economic crisis—a 33 percent inflation rate coupled with a 36 percent devaluation of the currency— Belarus requires multiple allies to fall back on. Having procured a $3.5 billion bailout from the Eurasian Economic Community, led by Russia and Kazakhstan, Belarus is still awaiting a verdict on its request for $8 billion from the IMF. China has contributed another $1 billion in trade credits. Even with its growing relationship with China, then, Belarus still depends on the West.

At the moment, however, Belarus stands in a position of supplication. Much of Lukashenko’s current power comes from his control over Belarus’ industries, about 80 percent of which are state-owned. Though the IMF has made it clear it “set no political conditions for its loans,” its economic conditions, requiring Lukashenko to privatize much of these industries, may prove a tough pill. He will likely seek to avoid accepting the terms, if he at all can.

Western Cold Front or Belarusian Spring

If Belarus accepts the IMF’s offer, however, the EU may gain the levers of political power. Unlike Lukashenko, private industry owners will not be willing to risk huge financial losses in order to save an outdated regime, especially one which keeps them from further profits. Should Lukashenko remain in charge, his power would be limited by a business-focused coalition. Neither China nor Russia is likely to oppose Belarusian liberalization, as both states would benefit from a more efficient trade partner. Indeed Putin’s call for a “United Economic Space,” an EU-type alliance between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, would be more realistic with Lukashenko out of office.

Ultimately, Lukashenko’s decision regarding the IMF bailout will likely be determined by the additional offers he receives from Russia and China. If China is willing to risk resentment from the international community, it has the ability to keep Lukashenko in power. It is unlikely that the factors in Lukashenko’s favor—money, natural resources, and international politics—are great enough to warrant such action on his behalf nonetheless.

Yet Lukashenko’s greatest challenge may be within. In addition to facing pressure from the global community, Belarus enjoys a silenced but visible opposition at home. This formula of pressure from the international community and a domestic movement has proven successful in the Arab Spring. It may succeed again in the Belarusian Fall.

Nataliya Nedzhvetskaya ’13 is a Contributing Writer.

]]> http://hpronline.org/world/china-and-belarus-a-special-relationship/feed/ 3