A Player in Transition

With immense wealth, a novel brand, and a distinctive foreign policy agenda, Qatar has emerged as a rising power in the Persian Gulf. Abetted by 13 percent of the world’s total natural gas reserves and the preeminence of its national news outlet, Al-Jazeera, Qatar has demonstrated a unique capacity for promulgating its own soft power. Indeed, with traditionally dominant states such as Egypt and Syria engrossed in internal conflicts and political turmoil, Qatar is taking advantage of a shifting geopolitical landscape. Because Qatar’s agenda and strategic objectives remain ambiguous, one must wonder whether its current prominence is merely a transitory phenomenon or if it signals the arrival of a new dominant force in the Middle East.

Activism in the Arab Spring

A catalyst for the Arab League’s support for intervention in Libya, Qatar was also the first Arab country to recognize the Transitional National Council established by rebel forces. During Gaddafi’s overthrow, Qatar not only supplied financial and logistical support to insurgents, but also put several hundred special-forces personnel on the ground. These instances of intervention mark a substantial departure from a Qatari foreign policy that traditionally exhibited a neutral disposition. However, according to Dr. Ibrahim Sharqieh, Deputy Director of the Brookings Doha Center, this agenda emerged from an ideological shift among neighboring Middle Eastern states whereby most governments are increasingly less averse to interventionism.

Elsewhere, Qatar, both independently and through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), has undertaken an activist role. Within the GCC, sustained rapprochement and close collaboration between Qatar and Saudi Arabia have allowed Qataris to act with unprecedented strength. Although they are traditional rivals, the two nations have been bound by mutual interests. Justin Dargin, currently a Research Associate with The Dubai Initiative and a Fulbright Scholar studying the Persian Gulf, characterized these states as, “less willing to allow intra-Gulf issues” to impede cooperation. The GCC-brokered deal that eased Ali Abdullah Saleh out of power in Yemen and pro-monarchy intervention in Bahrain exemplify this. More recently, a meeting with the Friends of Syria opposition movement in Istanbul resulted in a joint pledge by Qatar and Saudi Arabia to provide financial aid and weaponry to rebels.

Reconciling the Irreconcilable

Through its newly acquired position in international politics, Qatar has been able to develop strategic partnerships with many actors, balancing relationships between seemingly irreconcilable groups. Indeed, Qatar has long enjoyed U.S. protection and friendship, even hosting several American military bases. Simultaneously, Qatar maintains amicable relationships with groups conventionally opposed to U.S. interests. Qatar’s support of Islamist movements including the Muslim Brotherhood has been viewed with suspicion by U.S. administrations. Qatar also has close and relatively congenial relations with Iran and, partially stemming from its connections with Taliban leadership, it facilitated the proposed Taliban office in Doha, encouraging now stalled negotiations to end the Afghanistan conflict. In Egypt, Qatar has close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and is a substantial, yet opaque source of funds to affiliated political parties.

Qatar has long used economic tools to establish and maintain alliances outside of traditional political or diplomatic frameworks. Previously, due to rivalry with Saudi Arabia, Qatar sought to form independent relations with its neighbors in what Dargin described as an “alternative power bloc.” In the Dolphin Gas Project, initiated in 1999, Qatar spearheaded the construction of a natural gas pipeline to establish closer ties with the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Qatar has also improved friendships with its Gulf neighbors by selling natural gas below market price. Paralleling this, with goodwill accumulated from its economic and military aid during the Libyan Revolution, Qatar has moved toward establishing strong partnerships with Libya’s energy sector.

Strategy or Sentiment?

In general, Qatar’s objectives are framed as a combination of security concerns and symbolic considerations. Dr. Michael Herb, author of All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, tells the HPR that Qatar’s primary security interest is defending its petroleum wealth. In addition, he notes that the vast natural gas field shared with Iran, “adds another dimension to the necessity to cooperate,” facilitating the maintenance of generally amicable relations.

However, Qatar’s policies have gone beyond what is necessary for ensuring these interests. Herb believes that, “the degree of activity in international politics has something to do with the desires of the leadership to make an impact.”  As Dr. Gregory Gause, an expert on the Persian Gulf with the Brookings Institute, asserted to the HPR, it is, “hard to characterize Qatari foreign policy” because it tends to be “very much driven by the Emir and the Prime Minister…[and] not based on anything you would argue is national interest.” From his perspective, “personality-driven” policies and ambition have driven these leaders to seek status and power for Qatar. For instance, Qatar mounted an aggressive campaign, under the leadership of the Emir himself, to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup and will be the first Arab state to do so. In preparation, massive infrastructure projects, such as an expanded metro system and a Qatar-Bahrain causeway, are being planned. Through domestic infrastructural investment, Qatar is seeking symbolic recognition along with geopolitical dominance.

Yet, simultaneously, Qatar has ample reason to seek alliances. As a small nation in an ever-perilous region, Qatar faces fundamental challenges to its security. In particular, the escalating confrontation surrounding Iran’s nuclear program puts Qatar at risk. As Gause points out, while the U.S. base in Qatar does provide protection, this could also drag Qatar, however unwilling, into a future confrontation or make it a target for retaliation. He characterizes the presence of air bases as a “double-edged sword” as it has the potential to make Qatar collateral damage in a massive geopolitical conflict.   For instance, a potential U.S. air strike on Iran could best be launched from these bases, yet recent statements by Qatar have expressed strong opposition to such an attack. Dargin describes Qatar as, “attempting to serve as a moderating voice in the conflict” by seeking, “to balance various forces in the region.”  Yet ultimately, as Sharqieh warns, “When great powers fight… small players would be likely to pay the price.” Thus, Qatar’s use of financial and soft power to build influence and goodwill are likely fundamentally motivated by concerns for its security.

The Honest Broker?

Although Qatar has only recently garnered a central role in Middle Eastern power politics, the nation has long played the part of intermediary and problem-solver. Past successes include brokering a solution to political gridlock in Lebanon and facilitating the entente between Fatah and Hamas. Through maintaining and further developing relationships with emerging power centers, Qatar could fulfill the increasingly essential role of an honest broker in the Middle East, even if these initiatives are driven by personal ambition and self-protection. Ultimately, although Qatar’s privileged geopolitical position may not be sustainable, its liminal position and critical role will make it integral to the future stability of the region.

Iraqis protesting the potential explusion of refugees from Camp Ashraf.

With the closing of Camp Ashraf, one of the most remarkable untold stories of American involvement in Iraq is concluding. With support from the United States and United Nations, the Iraqi government has begun moving long-time residents of Ashraf, the Mujahedin e-Khalq in Iraq’s Diyala province, to another location called “Camp Liberty,” potentially the first step in allowing them to leave the country. Composed mostly of Iranian dissidents, the population of Ashraf has consented to the transfer, fearing a crackdown by pro-Iranian elements in the Iraqi government that emerged with the U.S. military withdrawal.

Without much evident consideration, the international community has trusted this very government as the primary overseer of the relocation process. In response, a growing movement is speaking out against perceived irresponsible trust in the Iraqi government. In American circles, many are questioning the extent to which the U.S. is responsible for the saga of Ashraf’s imperiled residents, a problem that demands a deeper exploration of the base, its history, and its future.

Camp Ashraf: A Community of Exiles

Amidst the arid desert of Iraq’s Diyala province, an area stretching northeast from Baghdad to the Iranian border, Ashraf lies on the Tigris River. Despite the surrounding area’s impoverishment, the longstanding base contains schools, parks and trees, swimming pools, mosques, a museum, and a university. Ashraf is a self-sufficient, hermetically-sealed enclave amidst Iraq’s geopolitical chaos.

Ashraf’s origins however, lie across the border in revolutionary Iran. In 1965, Iranian leftists who strongly opposed the Shah founded a group known as the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK), or The People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI). They heavily partook in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, but found their humanitarian and democratic goals at odds with the Shiite Islamist regime that ultimately seized power. Amir Emadi, co-founder of campashraf.org, explained to the HPR that these Iranian citizens were severely persecuted for their political and social beliefs. Out of fear and a desire to continue their democratic struggle, they sought refuge in Iraq, establishing Ashraf in 1986.

Over the last two decades, Ashraf has grown into a community of 3,500 MEK members, sympathizers, and their families, playing an integral role in Diyala’s politics and society. Despite the camp’s partial isolation, Emadi detailed Ashraf’s importance to nearby Iraqi locals: its construction services, shops, museums, and park-like beauty drew those searching for otherwise rare residential and commercial amenities. Moreover, residents of Ashraf, Shiite Iranians under the patronage of Iraqi Sunnis, helped facilitate peace talks between local Sunnis and Shiites during bouts of sectarian violence. Compelled by these experiences, over 525,000 Iraqis showed their support in April 2011 for the residents of Ashraf, declaring, “We, the people of Diyala, view the PMOI as our esteemed guests, and consider their presence in Iraq and in Ashraf as a national imperative against the Iranian regime’s meddling.”

Under U.S. Occupation

Because of its anti-Iranian platform, the MEK had been friendly with Saddam Hussein and his Sunni regime. During the Hussein years, the Iraqi government provided most of the group’s funding, weapons, and protection, directly helping construct Ashraf. However, Hussein’s removal in 2003 quickly ended the MEK’s long standing protection and privilege. Residents were viewed as enemy targets by coalition forces, whose attacks resulted in several casualties and considerable structural damage. According to Emadi, the MEK deliberately did not retaliate, declaring their neutrality to demonstrate their cooperation with the U.S. military. By April 2003, the group signed a cease-fire agreement with the United States, handing over their arsenal of weapons in exchange for guaranteed protection. By 2004, the residents of Ashraf were granted “protected persons” status under the Geneva Convention, ushering in years of continued security and stability.

Since the Withdrawal

When the United States began withdrawing from Iraq, the security of Ashraf was gradually handed over to the new Iraqi government on the stipulation that residents would continue to be protected. However, upon the narrow re-election of Iranian-backed Nouri al-Maliki to Iraq’s highest office, the Iraqi government has dramatically reversed its policy, even conducting organized attacks against Ashraf.  Emadi explains that if the Iraqi government could act without American encumbrance, it would immediately arrest and, “repatriate the residents to Iran, where they would face certain death for their political beliefs.”

Beginning in July 2009, conflict erupted when Iraqi forces entered the camp to establish police stations without the MEK’s consent, leading to a skirmish that killed nine residents. An additional 36 were detained and subjected to harsh beatings and torture. After a series of smaller attacks, April 2011 saw a full-fledged raid by Iraqi forces, leaving 34 dead and over 300 wounded. Although international observers responded negatively, scrutiny was mostly deflected when Iraqi officials claimed that security forces were responding to rocks thrown during a “riot.” Meanwhile, the Iraqi government has maintained a blockade of the camp, depriving its residents of basic services including proper medical care. Though humanitarian groups have begun analyzing the Iraqi government’s conduct for potential human rights violations, the process has been extremely slow and ineffective.

The Current Situation

According to Emadi, although the residents of Ashraf would prefer to remain, “they are not seeking a bloody confrontation with the Iraqi government.” Therefore, their only viable option is resettlement outside of Iraq. Last December, the Iraqi government and United Nations agreed to a phased plan that would transport the residents of Ashraf to a temporary location called Camp Hurriya, a deserted U.S. military base formally known as Camp Liberty. Residents did not anticipate, however, that their lives would once again be controlled by the Iraqi government. The U.S. State Department’s special advisor on Ashraf, Ambassador Daniel Fried, said that, “The Government of Iraq has committed itself to the security of the people at Camp Hurriya, and is aware that the United States expects it to fulfill its responsibilities.”

Reports from the first wave of 400 residents who were relocated on February 18^th this year have demonstrated that Camp Liberty, contrary to its name, is merely a prison that the Iraqi government controls with brutal force. Iraqi police stations surround the camp’s enclosing wall, armed troops are on constant guard, and surveillance devices dominate the landscape. These 400 residents have publicly accused the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), whose responsibility is ensuring that the camp meets “international humanitarian standards,” of lying. Nonetheless, the United States has continued its support for closing Ashraf, trusting the Iraqi government to fulfill its humanitarian responsibility.

The MEK’s “Terrorist” Problem

To complicate the issue further, the MEK was added to the U.S. government’s Foreign Terrorist Organization list by the Clinton administration in 1997. Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School calls the move a “mistake.” Dershowitz tells the HPR that including the MEK on this list was a political strategy used by the Clinton Administration to “open [America’s] doors” to Iran. Published in 1995, the book titled Democracy Betrayed claims that the then-drafted State Department’s report on MEK is, “characterized by innumerable discrepancies, falsifications, and distortions of simple, unambiguous facts.” Furthermore, many American officials have acknowledged that the MEK has provided intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program and the Islamic Republic’s growing influence in Iraq, critical to shaping America’s security policy.

Promises to Keep

American advocates for Ashraf’s residents have been emphatic in calling for the U.S. government to maintain its protection. These backers charge America with two tasks to combat the situation: first, the U.S. must take MEK off the list of designated terrorist organizations. According to Dershowitz, their affiliation with this list has made European countries that would normally accept Ashraf’s residents as refugees reluctant or unwilling to do so. Perhaps Secretary of State Clinton’s recent remarks that, “MEK cooperation…will be a key factor in any decision regarding the MEK’s [Foreign Terrorist Organization] status” signal a shift in American policy. Second, they call on the United States to ensure that the evacuation from Ashraf proceeds rapidly and that the Iraqi government adheres to humanitarian standards. The livelihood and security of these residents depends on whether they can escape stifling repression.

Should the United States fail to act, it will abrogate the promise made to Camp Ashraf’s residents in 2003. Devastating consequences will result for an American-aligned group at the nexus of Iraq-Iran relations. To promote regional stability and human dignity, the international community would do well to pay greater attention.

Eric Hendey: Ignore the Election-Year Rhetoric 

An anonymous columnist from The Economist recently took on the voice of Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in a humorous blog post. In the piece, the Supreme Leader analyzes the hawkish statements of American leaders, discerning whether or not the risk of war is serious. In particular, he worries about Republican candidate Mitt Romney’s purported intent to send more warships to Iran’s shores. Having already experienced two Bushes and one Clinton, however, Khamenei has become familiar with American speechifying:

I’m not convinced. Our intelligence people point out that this Romney is just a businessman from an unloved minority sect. Our own bazaaris tend not to like war. He is probably just pandering to the Zionists, as they all do.

We should certainly take a leaf from the Supreme Leader’s book when analyzing our politicians’ proclamations on Iran. For better or for worse, every public statement made until November will be colored by the upcoming election.

The USS Carl Vinson in the Strait of Hormuz.

Foreign policy with Israel has never been more politicized than it is today. Over the past decade, Republicans have hoped to turn support for Israel into a wedge issue, one that could sway traditionally Democratic Jewish voters. This has led to an arms race with the Democrats over who can seem more pro-Israel.

Just take a look at what has been said this election cycle. In an interview with a Jewish cable TV station, Newt Gingrich called the Palestinians “an invented people” who want to destroy Israel. Politicians on both sides, not just the evangelical Right, have been guilty of making sweeping statements about Israel.

The pro-Israel lobby is powerful. Its capacity to steer campaign contributions to supportive candidates has certainly had an impact on the national discourse. This is part of the reason why President Obama, in a recent address to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, stressed that he would not hesitate to attack Iran to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

The seeming eagerness of American politicians for war could be a cause for concern. However, the result will likely not be an attack by the U.S. military. Despite the saber-rattling, negotiations over the nuclear program have resumed, and we are likely to see the continuation of the current containment system.

Yet it is almost impossible to sell a moderate program of sanctions and negotiations as part of a presidential campaign; we can expect to hear many more threats of warships or worse. This situation begs a bigger question: what effect does the democratic political process have on global peace? On the one hand, elections encourage aggressive rhetoric. On the other hand, drawn-out wars have often undermined support for elected officials. So what we can really expect from situations like this is a lot of talk and little action—another compelling reason to ignore the rhetoric.

Tom Lemberg: Consider the Cyber Option

Economic sanctions and military force are getting a lot of attention these days as ways of halting the purported Iranian drive for a nuclear weapon. Yet there is an under-considered alternative—the cyber option. Relatively low costs and risks make cyberattacks on the Iranian nuclear weapons program an attractive option.

To begin, let’s recall Stuxnet, the computer worm that sabotaged Iran’s nuclear program in 2010, setting it back two years. Cybersecurity firms from multiple countries have concluded that the worm could not have been developed without government support, naming the United States and Israel as its likely creators. Researchers at Symantec, an American cybersecurity firm, recently discovered a new Stuxnet virus, indicating that future cyberattacks are a real possibility.

Cyberattacks have unique advantages. For one, they are an order of magnitude cheaper than the alternatives; trade sanctions can trigger an increase in oil prices, and military force is inherently expensive in terms of both dollars and lives. Secondly, cyberattacks are effective—when they work, they work.

There are certainly drawbacks. Although the attacks occur under the radar, they are not necessarily discrete, and another cyberattack could incite some kind of Iranian retaliation. Reliability is another concern. After all, Stuxnet was the first worm of its kind, and there is no guarantee that another virus will be able to upend the Iranian weapons program soon enough.

Yet assessing ways of undermining the Iranian nuclear program is a comparative exercise, and the alternatives don’t look promising. Though sanctions have reduced Iranian oil exports to Asia, sanctions are unlikely to damage Iran’s economy enough to make its authoritarian leadership reconsider the program. A military strike on Iran would likely unite the Iranian population under an anti-West banner, and it might not even cripple the Iranian weapons program for long.

With Iran’s nuclear program still at least two years away from nuclear launch capability, it seems the cyber option deserves a fair shot, or at least more attention.

Photo Credit: United States Navy

Sanctions: An Ineffective Tool

Despite decades of sanctions, Iran has persisted in its efforts to develop nuclear capabilities. Whether attempting to preserve domestic legitimacy through a longstanding narrative of tensions with Israel, seeking a guarantee of security from perceived foreign threats, or desiring the capacity to exert regional hegemony, Iran has been driven by powerful incentives and imperatives. Ongoing efforts, largely unilateral, often degenerate into cycles of increasingly stringent sanctions without corresponding concessions from Iran. Breaking this unproductive cycle to move towards a sustainable settlement requires an understanding of the flaws of this strategy, in theory and in practice.

Sanctions can be manipulated by elites on both sides for political benefits, and they tend to further polarize already tense situations. Indeed, sanctions establish perverse incentives for leaders to manipulate public sentiment and seek domestic support for aggressive policies. Ultimately, sanctions often bolster the popularity of political figures by creating the perception of a proactive and hardline approach. Imposing stringent sanctions in today’s political climate carries benefits for President Obama, whereas reversing the current trend in favor of a more flexible approach would leave him vulnerable to accusations of naiveté. After facing political scorn after offering to negotiate with Iran “without preconditions” early in his presidency, Obama has taken a progressively stronger stance.

Directly counter to the aim of weakening the current regime through sanctions, these measures instead seem to have strengthened the regime at the expense of civil society and potential opposition forces. The Iranian government’s ability to withstand the challenge of the 2009 popular protests could perhaps be attributed in part to sanctions’ role in perpetuating a preexisting imbalance of resources between state and society. Oil exports, the dominant sector of Iran’s economy and source of half of its government revenues, are exclusively controlled by state-owned companies like the National Iranian Oil Company, which is in turn supervised directly by the Ministry of Petroleum. Such absolute control of economic resources allows political elites to withstand the economic impact of sanctions, leaving ordinary citizens to suffer the brunt of punitive measures. These inadvertent effects often create structural challenges, inhibiting the development of education and the emergence of a stronger civil society. As such, sanctions intended to change regime behavior may only strengthen the position of those elites responsible for current policy choices, enabling them to push ahead in their nuclear quest.

Remembering History

The sanctions imposed on Japan prior to World War II provide a useful analogy with which to view our current situation. U.S. policymakers thought, at the time, that it would be entirely irrational for Japan to attack the United States, and Pearl Harbor was entirely unanticipated. Today, conventional explanations for this sequence of events tend to focus on ideological factors, such as considerations of pride and honor on the part of Japan. However, from an economic perspective, this strategy can be considered wholly rational. As an island nation, Japan’s economy was entirely dependent on the import of natural resources, particularly for its energy needs. The U.S. embargo on oil represented an existential threat to Japanese power, in terms of both economic and military capacity. With oil supplies cut off, Japan would have had to surrender completely, seek oil elsewhere through war, or act quickly and decisively to end the economic stranglehold before its options were further limited.

Now too, sanctions on Iran might create perverse incentives for further aggressive behavior, seen as a last resort in the face of overwhelming international pressure. Completely cut off from the international economy and with pressure increasing, policymakers in Iran may seek short-term aggressive action as a last resort. As such, sanctions could ultimately become more an instrument of war than of peace. With the upcoming negotiations in Turkey, Iran seems to have expressed a tentative willingness to compromise. Although these talks hardly seem promising, this could be the last opportunity for leaders on both sides to reevaluate their policies and the paths ahead.

Niccolò Machiavelli’s Discorsi may have become one of the seminal texts of modern political theory, but it was originally a gift to his close friends Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai. The three of them would talk politics in the Oricellari gardens of Florence and in their equally fertile letters. Prefacing his work in the third person, the author notes how he considers his Discorsi to be “unquestionably the most valuable thing Niccolò Machiavelli could send you. For in it I have put in words all that I know and all have learned from an extensive experience of the affairs of the world and endless reading about them.”

Oman

WHAT HAPPENED

After the Tunisian protests in January 2011, 200 Omanis gathered in the capital city of Muscat to protest government corruption and demand a minimum wage increase. After a series of similar, relatively calm February protests, Sultan Qaboos bin Said increased the minimum wage of private sector workers, raised stipends for college students, and replaced six members of his cabinet. Further protests in the industrial city Sohar left some bloodshed, resulting in further government restructuring, most prominently elevating the role of parliament from advisory to legislative.

WHAT’S COMING

A major source of the country’s peace is the people’s love for the sultan. At age 70 and without an heir however, the sultan’s influence over Oman might not last much longer. Coupled with the country’s depleting oil supply, the source of its recent economic boom, experts are concerned for Oman’s future. Some factors are promising though: the new legislative role of parliament represents a promising move toward democracy, and the country’s friendship with the West and Iran will prove pivotal in future dealings between the two entities. ¶

Jordan

WHAT HAPPENED

Protests here against high food prices early last year eventually developed into a wider call for political reform. Rooted in criticisms of then Prime Minister Samir Rifai’s ineffectual policies and corrupt administration, the protesters’ calls for Rafai’s dismissal by the king succeeded. However, the monarchy remained largely free from criticism. Eventually, King Abdullah II replaced Rifai with ex-general Marouf al-Bakhit, but following additional slow economic growth, Bakhit himself was replaced by Awn al-Khasawneh, a former judge with the International Court of Justice.

WHAT’S COMING

Because the government has largely failed in attempts to placate the people, Jordanians have begun lodging complaints against the monarchy, Amman’s ultimate fount of political power. Interestingly though, these new protesters are different from before. Comprised of tribal members outside the cities, they are typically unwavering supporters of the monarchy. This underlies a shift in attitudes toward the existing power structure, and could pose a far more significant threat. ¶

Algeria

WHAT HAPPENED

Similarly, Algeria’s protests also began in response to food price hikes and evolved into a clarion call about problems including a 10 percent unemployment rate, police state restrictions, and the two-decade long state of emergency that has stifled public protests. Mimicking Tunisian protester Muhammed Bouazizi, ten protesters self-immolated or committed other such acts. In an attempt to counter this trend, the government halved food prices, and then afterwards lifted the state of emergency, allowing protests in all areas outside the capital. Finally, in an attempt to permanently resolve wthis, President Bouteflika, who has ruled the nation since 1999, announced parliamentary elections tentatively scheduled for May 10th this year.

WHAT’S COMING

Last February’s protests were considered ‘a key turning point,’ given the concessions extracted from the government. Indeed, activist Ali Rachedi of the Front of Socialist Forces party explained that protesters broken the ‘psychological barrier’ that previously hindered such popular action. However, the solutions proposed by the government seem are nominal and unsustainable: political concessions aside, continued economic stagnation in a country where 70 percent of the population is under age 30 represents a fundamental challenge to = government’s stability. Coupled with new dissatisfaction of the disbanded Communal Guards, the state militia that has been fighting terrorist forces, Algeria remains a kettle of volatile forces reaching its boiling point. ¶

While Iran’s nuclear program has advanced beyond what the requirements for a civilian nuclear program, the strategic aims of this nuclear quest remain unclear. Does Iran seek simply to deter a threatened military strike or foreign intervention? Or does Iran intend to project its power more aggressively in the Persian Gulf? The stakes and the costs of miscalculation are high. Beyond the media hype though, a balanced and nuanced examination of domestic dynamics surrounding Iran’s nuclear program is needed.

A Legitimizing Narrative

A brief look at the historical context of the political calculus guiding Iranian elites is revealing. Although originally initiated by the Shah with U.S. support, Iran’s nuclear program was revived during, and must be understood in the context of, the Iran-Iraq War. This devastating conflict left over 1.5 million dead and deeply shaped the new Islamic Republic’s perspective on its political, strategic, and military surroundings. The United States’ perceived encouragement of Iraq gave rise to both an increasingly polemical narrative of a Western conspiracy against Iran and the perceived imperative of sophisticated deterrent capacity.

Iran’s nuclear program has become integral to the regime’s character and base of support. Annie Tracy Samuel, a research fellow at the Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs told the HPR, “the nuclear program symbolizes for Iran its struggle for independence from what it perceives to be an unfair and oppressive international system.” Samuel continues, it, “plays an important role in the regime’s overall legitimizing narrative, on domestic, international, and strategic levels… symboliz[ing] Iran’s technological advancement and capabilities, its independence, and its power.”

This overarching narrative was highlighted by the purge of moderate political figures and ascendance of hardliners after the 2009 Green Movement protests against Ahmadinejad’s reelection. Hooman Majd, former advisor and translator for Iranian Presidents Khatami and Ahmadinejad, and author of The Ayatollahs’ Democracy tells the HPR, “It’s become a question of Iran’s national rights.” Because the regime has relied heavily upon this narrative of independence and self-sufficiency, Majd believes, “If they were to give in on the nuclear program, they would lose a tremendous amount of credibility.”

The People’s Program?

With increasing economic pressures and the potential for domestic unrest, social cohesion is deeply entwined with this legitimizing narrative. Examples of strife include protests on the anniversary of opposition leaders’ Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi house arrest. Dr. Djavad Salehi-Isfahani of the Brookings Institute told the HPR, “Iran’s society is polarized. The regime has legitimacy with the lower strata of society, and the reason why it has legitimacy is because it’s against powerful countries, against rich countries.” Substantial popular support remains for Iran’s nuclear program. Even the economic hardships that ordinary citizens have endured because of international sanctions are framed by the regime in terms of a Western conspiracy.

Sanctions thus far have provoked negative sentiments more against the West than against the regime itself. Certainly, the government has been held responsible for earlier economic challenges. In general, according to Majd, public opinion, “criticize[s] Ahmadinejad for giving the West and Israel excuses to get the international community to be anti-Iran with his belligerent rhetoric.” Many believe that this bellicosity has facilitated U.S. efforts to coordinate multilateral support for sanctions and other punitive measures. However, sanctions’ effectiveness on the Iranian street have hardly had the desired effect, engendering renewed bitterness towards the West while weakening the middle class, including reformers and opposition figures, and thus ultimately strengthening the regime further.

Who and Why?

The Islamic Republic of Iran has one of the world’s most opaque regimes, an amalgamation of political and clerical authorities. Powerful actors including the Guardian Council and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps play key roles. Competition among regime elites, even between the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, and President Ahmadinejad, has been ongoing. However, the current crisis has created unity of purpose. Majd, who maintains close ties to key figures in the current administration, believes these, “divisions [are] not on whether Iran should or should not have a nuclear program…but based on how Iran has approached dealings with the West.”

While the Guards Corps theoretically oversees the program and the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization operates day-to-day activities, Majd emphasized, “only one person has true authority—the nuclear weapons program is controlled by the Supreme Leader.” While Ahmadinejad may be willing to extend conciliatory policies with the West, conscious of his legacy, the matter may be largely beyond his control. Ahmadinejad’s influence is questioned, and he was recently summoned before Iran’s parliament to answer charges economic mismanagement.

Intentions?

Day by day, the situation escalates on between Iran and the West, as progressively harsher sanctions have been imposed without measurable progress. Beyond the constantly fervent political rhetoric and threats, the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists and similar attacks on Israeli diplomats in Georgia and India reveal a covert war waged behind the scenes. Meanwhile, further destabilization and even nuclear proliferation in the region seem inevitable. Robert Haddick, who has advised the State Department and the National Intelligence Council on irregular warfare, observes that Sunni Arab neighbors are becoming increasingly “terrified” of Iran’s nuclear program and are enhancing their own military capacity. Haddick tells the HPR, “Iran’s leaders should realize that they have started an arms race that in the end they can’t win and that will hurt Iran’s security.”

However, for these wary neighbors and the international community alike, a question persists. What are Iran’s intentions, and how would a nuclear Iran behave? Nuclear capacity has been credited with forcing greater responsibility upon states and reducing the potential for direct conflict, whether between the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the Cold War or between India and Pakistan. Perhaps, contrary to predominating doomsday predictions, raising the stakes could allow for greater security and stability in the region. Yet, anticipating the full implications and consequences of such scenarios is impossible.

Nuclear capacity could instead become an instrument of Iranian efforts to dominate the Persian Gulf. Haddick suggested that Iran could enhance its security more aggressively, by “lever[ing] its nuclear program to expand its influence in its region, through coercion and stepped-up proxy action.” On the other hand, Majd emphasized the prestige that nuclear capacity would confer, saying, “I don’t think it’s about expansionism. I think its much more about geopolitical power.” Meanwhile, Samuel somewhat paradoxically comments, “The nuclear program is a sign of strength, but the need for a deterrent force is a sign of weakness.” Indeed, Majd believes that Iran seeks will use its program, “to protect the regime from outside force being used against it,” rather than as a means of, “protect[ing] regime longevity.” Perceived national interests hint towards a more aggressive track. Considering ongoing covert measures and that official U.S. policy towards Iran has long been supporting regime change though, Iran has rational reasons to seek security through enhanced deterrence.

Endgames

As the situation continues to escalate, unease prevails in the United States and Iran alike. Patterns of mutual escalation leave little room for compromise. The question now becomes what the endgames of U.S. and Iranian policy are and whether war is inevitable. The United States, according to Majd, “is putting itself into a corner—at some point…war, becomes the only option.” Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, begun cutting off oil from European customers, and publicly unveiled new advances in its nuclear program. While the potential for an Israeli strike with tacit U.S. support is openly discussed, diplomatic initiatives offer potential for rapprochement. The hope, however faint, still remains that a negotiated solution is within reach.

With mounting pressure, Iran has expressed a desire to renew diplomatic talks. Indeed, William Tobey, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center and former Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration, tells the HPR that, “the critical time is now” as, “the window for negotiation is closing.” To prevent worst-case scenarios, leaders must confront deeply-rooted political and policy constraints. This entails that both sides redefine traditional conceptions of acceptable outcomes are. Unrelenting pressures have only perpetuated tensions, and Samuel believes that the regime’s ability to justify such a radical policy reversal to its citizens is central and thus, “if the regime can incorporate its changed policies into its legitimizing narrative, then it could agree to a negotiated settlement.” Genuine dialogue and a willingness to transcend immediate political considerations in seeking compromise have been lacking thus far and are essential at this critical moment.

An Enduring Love: My Life with the Shah

Farah Pahlavi

447 pp. Miramax Books. $24.95

For over thirty years, Farah Pahlavi has been forbidden from setting foot in the country she once ruled. Married in 1959 to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, she reigned alongside him until the 1979 Islamic Revolution made pariahs of Iran’s powerful royal family, forcing them into the nightmare of exile. In her 2004 memoir An Enduring Love: My Life with the Shah, Pahlavi chronicles this nightmare and the years leading up to it with a bias only a proud leader could possess. Her pride in the Iranian people, in the monarchy, and, most all, in her late husband nearly distorts history to describe an idealistic Iran that arguably never existed.

Her memoir’s defense of the monarchy is steadfast to a surprising degree; over the years, the monarchy’s critics have accused the shah of varying degrees of fiscal irresponsibility, censorship, oppression, and subservience to the West, but Pahlavi rarely acknowledges any of these accusations – and when she does, a short justification undoubtedly follows.

The monarchy has historically been lambasted for living in extravagance while other Iranians suffered in abject poverty, but Pahlavi repeatedly insists that the monarchy was careful to avoid excessive costs in all endeavors – including the infamous 1971 festival at Persepolis. Its grand purpose, she insists, was to celebrate the Persian Empire’s 2,500th anniversary and foster a sense of national unity and identity. But even here, Pahlavi hardly admits fault: She justifies the festival by insisting that the high price tag was unintentional on the monarchy’s part because only European businesses could provide services in time for the festival. Foreign journalists and Islamic clerics, she continues, exaggerated the expense and distorted the festival’s meaning.

Even SAVAK, the monarchy’s notorious intelligence agency, nearly escapes Pahlavi’s criticism. Frequently referred to as the shah’s secret police, it is now blamed for the ruthless suppression of any opposition to the monarchy. Pahlavi blames any “indefensible acts” on a few overzealous agents rather than the monarchy itself. For her, the reason behind SAVAK’s redemption is simple: If the king only had enough time, SAVAK would have evolved into Iran’s CIA.

That refrain of a just reign cut lamentably short is repeated throughout the memoir. She credits the Pahlavi dynasty’s tireless efforts and her husband’s six-point White Revolution for leading Iran’s transition from “medieval” to modern, from an underdeveloped country to developing. If the shah had more time, she insists, the monarchy would have nurtured Iran to stand among the Western powers.

To her credit, Pahlavi herself did more than her expected share of nurturing the nation. Striving to be more than just a hostess for royal dinner parties, she was the champion of numerous social causes, including the improvement of the status of women, lepers, and orphans. It seems that her happiest memories come from her efforts to be a people’s queen, humbled by their adoration of her and eager to help as many of them as possible. Entire sections of the book are devoted to the plights of ordinary Iranians, describing how so many of them – especially women – reached out to her with their troubles and how she strove to fix them. Her methods of meeting these Iranians were, at times, endearing and amusing: knocking on the door of a random house in the city Rasht, visiting a small candy shop and having tea with the family who lived above it.

But Pahlavi’s happy years as queen do end with the tide of revolution. She credits a series of misunderstandings – the cost of the Persepolis celebration ranking high among them – and Khomeini’s sly scheming for the monarchy’s demise. Some of Pahlavi’s most potent writing rises from these turbulent years, chronicling her anxiety on the eve of revolution and her depression in its aftermath. She describes the humiliation of exile with a lingering sense of indignation, depicting the royal family? as unjustly ousted from the throne by the people they spent decades working tirelessly to help. Frequently separated from her four children and with her husband slowly dying from lymphoma, Pahlavi recounts her disbelief as the world turned its back on the exiled royal family – presidents and prime ministers, kings and queens, even apartheid South Africa – until Egypt seemed to be the last ally standing.

Reserved even when describing those disturbing months of exile, Pahlavi is finally and uncharacteristically candid about the suicide of her daughter, Leila, in 2001. “I, it is said, can help a whole community expelled from its homeland, yet I was not able to come to the aid of my own daughter,” she writes in the memoir’s final pages. Her pain is amplified by the knowledge of a tragedy yet to come: Her youngest son, Alireza, committed suicide in Boston in 2011, seven years after her memoir was published. It is a grim marker of the violent history that haunts the Pahlavis, revealing just how much death the former queen has experienced – that of her husband, her children, and, as she describes occasionally with great sadness, the many family friends executed immediately after the revolution.

Despite such morose themes, Pahlavi’s memoir details not only an enduring love for her husband, but also an enduring faith in the promise of an Iran free from its ruling clerics. Given the rosy depiction of the monarchy, it seems that the broader purpose of Pahlavi’s memoir is to rally support for her oldest son, Reza, who was crowned shah in a small ceremony in Egypt on his twentieth birthday in 1980; she notes that if the Iranian people ever look to her son for leadership, he will provide it. Just as the gears of revolution turned in 1979, Pahlavi does not dismiss the possibility of them turning again. In the memoir’s last paragraph, she all but guarantees it. “I have boundless faith in the ability of the Iranian people to throw off their chains and find the path of democracy, freedom, and progress,” she writes. “I know that light will triumph over darkness and Iran will rise from her ashes.”

Sherbaz Khan Mazari

650 pp. Oxford University Press. $64.

Sherbaz Mazari’s journey to disillusionment begins as early as 1948, after the creation of Pakistan. Hopes were running high and he was eager to serve his country when he took a group of tribesmen to fight for the liberation of Kashmir. An idealistic young scion of a Baloch tribe, he had an interest in politics and national events at an early age. Hearing stories of the Maharajah’s unlawful treaty granting the state to India and the oppression of Kashmiri Muslims, he gathered volunteers from the Mazari tribe and rode on horseback to the border of Kashmir to join the rebels, some of whom were supported by the Pakistan government.

Upon their arrival, they were refused entrance by the Pakistani army. He remembered, “It was here that I received the bitter news of the true state of affairs in Kashmir.” The rebels, much to the embarrassment of the Pakistani government, indulged in so much rapine and plunder that they even turned the Kashmiri Muslims against them. The soldiers at the border, assuming that Mazari’s tribesmen wanted to join the plunder, turned them away. Seeing what the liberation of Kashmir had become, Mazari returned to his village, disillusioned and disheartened.

His foray into Kashmir was short lived, unlike his long-standing struggle against the major forces that contributed towards Pakistan’s disintegration. Mazari’s memoir A Journey to Disillusionment pulls us into major events in Pakistan’s history through his active involvement in the struggle for democracy and his position as an astute judge of the political game and its major players.  The memoir is rich with detail on all the intrigues behind each shift in power. Using passages from old articles, direct quotes from major commentators and political figures and even documents obtained from intelligence reports, Mazari provides a candid account of the creation of Bangladesh, the many wars with India and the later conflict in Afghanistan. At the heart of all this is the story of another ongoing colonization in Mazari’s home province of Balochistan, comparable to the tragic situation that led to the separation of East Pakistan.

Balochistan borders Iran and Afghanistan and has historically been Pakistan’s major source of gas and minerals. Despite being the largest province, it has the smallest population, which consists mainly of large tribes living in a barren and underdeveloped part of the country. Due to Punjabi dominance from the federal government over Baloch resources, fewer funds allocated to the province and tribal suspicions with the federal government, Balochistan has long remained an alienated part of Pakistan.

Sherbaz Mazari spent a significant amount of his political career as an independent politician, refusing to align himself with major political parties until he formed the National Democratic Party to challenge Bhutto’s autocratic rule in the 70’s. He maintained his career by operating on his own principles, despite his acquaintance with the major politicians and army chiefs he encountered over the years. These included Bhutto and Zia ul Haq, who carried out systematic oppression of him and his fellow politicians. Mazari still maintained cordial and respectful personal relationships, an interesting conundrum when his life was under threat.

“Such is the uniquely peculiar nature of our social culture,” he states when the first democratically elected Prime Minister Bhutto invited him for a private dinner to talk about the political situation. Bhutto he described as “an old acquaintance whose minions were engaged in persecuting me and my supporters […] to the extent of trying to have me killed by members of my extended family.” Aided and abetted by the central government, factions were created within the Mazari tribe and Sherbaz Mazari himself, faced intrigue and opposition.

Yet, he started his public service trying to improve the system in his tribe. The tribe that once prided honor and loyalty above everything was losing its old ways to feudalism, where land ownership became a symbol of respect, thus allowing exploitation of tenants and their families. Interestingly, traditional Baloch culture accords immense respect to the tribal leaders who are given the final say in all matters. Historically, this has meant widespread oppression by these leaders.

However, Mazari outlines traditional Baloch laws as being democratic in principle. The Council resolved disputes and if the heirs to the titles were deemed ineffective, the tribal elders would choose a member of the family who displayed leadership qualities. Mazari’s son Sherazam Mazari told the HPR that the major responsibility of the tribal leader is to arbitrate in disputes. In this way, the head’s word is inscribed into the tribal laws over the years. While in many tribes this led to extensive oppression, Mazari established himself as a rebel, moving away from his family and settling in the village of Sonmiani, starting a private school and advocating for change in the traditionally backward system. Today, his efforts are still ongoing in his district.

From Mazari’s perspective, despite his developments in his village, circumstances prevented the province from ever reconciling with the central government. Bhutto sent the army into Balochistan in the 70’s after differences emerged between him and the provincial government. According to Mazari, a cache of arms was found in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) immediately warned Bhutto. The ISI suspected this was to be sent through Balochistan to destabilize Iran. Since this coincided with the military imposition on Balochistan, Bhutto immediately placed the blame on the provincial government and dismissed them. This dismissal galvanized opposition leaders against him, but also increased the number of disappearances and torturing of political dissidents as well as the murder and rape of thousands of Baloch citizens. Mazari recalls one particular incident with palpable sorrow. He cites Selig Harrison, a foreign writer’s description of the army’s massacre in Mali, a small village in Balochistan. For Mazari this event “would soon become a part of Baloch folklore” when men and women were lined up and shot by invading forces. Throughout the 70’s and 80’s Mazari appealed in the National Assembly for a solution, but to no avail. An insurgency began in Balochistan that persists today.

All the subsequent elected and unelected leaders failed to grant the Balochi community their rights. Mazari predicted the dire consequences of the situation in this memoir, written over a decade ago. Today, his predictions are not far off the mark. Disappearances and target killings of ethnic minorities are a common occurrence in Balochistan. According to the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan mutilated bodies of 225 missing persons were found between July 2010 and November 2011, while in 2011 alone another 107 missing persons have been reported. In Balochistan today, ill will towards the predominantly Punjabi central government is palpable, especially after the army attacked and killed a respected tribal leader and alleged head of the insurgency Akbar Bugti (incidentally Sherbaz Mazari’s brother in law and friend) in 2006.

Mazari makes no claim to greatness, nor does he assume he was the last hope for Pakistan. He recounts how he was offered the position of governor of Balochistan a number of times during his years in the opposition but turned it down because his fellow politicians and supporters were still languishing in jails on various charges. Most of the politicians disappoint him, however, as is apparent in his dedication, “To the people of Pakistan– leaderless and betrayed.” His principled struggle to uphold the rule of law and his continuous protest against undemocratic governments fell on deaf ears until he retired from politics. As chairman of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), his was the loudest opposing voice to the post-Bhutto Zia ul Haq government. However, his efforts were hampered by party infighting and his journey reached its lowest point, when his own brothers turned against him in the 1988 elections in order to shift support to their seats. He retired, knowing that he “had come full circle, “ back to the day he faced his first disappointment at the Kashmir border.

In the beginning of his book Sherbaz Mazari remembers a friend who once told him that political memoirs in Pakistan are largely exercises in fiction. Keeping this in mind, he says, “I have made every attempt to be as honest and candid as humanely possible.” With these memoirs, it is hard to doubt him.