The Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran

In the calculus of Middle Eastern power politics, Saudi Arabia and Iran stand on the opposing axes of power. The nations suffer an ongoing cold war, originating in the Iranian Revolution, and have recently waged a series of proxy wars. Changing levels of U.S. engagement in the region, along with the effects of the recent Arab Spring, have fundamentally altered the rules of the game in the Middle East. In the increasingly polarized Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iran’s responses, combined with the exercise of influence through the use of oil money, ideology, and strategic intervention, have ramifications for the security situation in the Gulf and beyond.

The Bad Neighbors

The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran proves a relatively recent exercise. As late as the 1970s, the Nixon Doctrine labeled both nations the twin pillars of U.S. policy in the region. Nonetheless, the 1979 Iranian Revolution brought to power a revolutionary regime increasingly antagonistic towards its Arab neighbors, as well as the United States. Saudi Arabia’s support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, amounting to an estimated $25 billion, likewise contributes to today’s tensions with Iran. More recently, the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a regional league of Arab monarchies, was intended to contain Iran.

Following Ayatollah Khomeini’s dearth, more moderate Iranian leaders initiated what Mohsen Milani, a Persian Gulf expert, describes as “a charm offensive toward Persian Gulf countries,” in order to end Iran’s international isolation and rebuild its faltering economy. A period of relative détente followed, in which relations between Iran and its former enemies became cordial, if not entirely amicable. However, the U.S. invasion of Iraq created a regional power vacuum. Among the unintended consequences of the Iraq War was the end of a primary counterweight to Iranian power. Milani told the HPR that this was a “decisive moment” because the overall balance of power shifted due to the presence of American troops and Iraq’s transformation from “Sunni- dominated anti-Iran government to a Shi’a-dominated Tehran-friendly government.”

Clash of Civilizations?

Iran’s ascendency in Iraq did not come without struggle. As Saddam’s fall opened Iraq to Iranian influence, Iraq became the site of a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia has funneled funds and fighters to Sunni insurgent groups, while Iran supported both the Shi’a government of President Nuri al- Maliki and more radical Shi’a actors, including the anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

Yet Iraq was only the beginning. Gregory Gause, formerly a Kuwait Foundation Visiting Professor at the Kennedy School, describes Iran and Saudi Arabia as a “very serious rivalry played out mostly in the domestic politics of Middle Eastern states.” In the context of this broader struggle for economic and political power throughout the Middle East, both sides exploit sectarianism. In particular, Iran and Saudi Arabia enjoy Shi’a and Sunni theocracies, respectively, which present themselves as the vanguard of the Muslim world and view each other as illegitimate. Christopher Boucek, an associate in the Carnegie Endowment for Peace’s Middle East Program, emphasizes that “You can’t separate the fact that one’s Arab, one’s Persian, one’s Sunni, one’s Shi’a [and] there’s a lot of chauvinism that goes around on both sides of this as well.”

The New Middle East

Iran and Saudi Arabia have played active roles in the Arab Spring, responding flexibly and pragmatically to the regional upheaval. Both nations have selectively supported autocracies and rebel movements when it suited their geopolitical strategy. Seriously threatened by the popular protests in fellow Gulf monarchy Bahrain, Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in support of the al-Khalifa royal family while accusing Iran of instigating Bahrain’s Shi’a majority. Iran, on the other hand, faces a serious challenge in the revolt against the al-Assad regime and has largely supported their long-standing ally in Syria while the Saudis call for regime change.

As Gause emphasizes, Saudi Arabia is “certainly against spread of democracy in the Middle East [and] in the Arab world, yet it may be willing to tolerate or even support the emergence of democratic regimes where it may be in its strategic influence to do so.” Similarly, Iran, banking on the power of its revolutionary ideology, has tried to portray its own 1979 revolution as the model for the Arab Spring. Nonetheless, Gause points out that Iran in Syria faces the loss of “strategic depth at the heart of the Arab world.” As the Arab Spring progresses, such flashpoints will become more and more prevalent.

Illusion or Stability?

Despite some amount of unrest and pressure for democratic change, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have largely proved able to maintain the status quo. Despite facing double-digit unemployment, both governments have used the continual influx of oil money to alleviate potential economic tensions through governmental redistributions. Saudi Arabia, while recently experiencing the outbreak of riots in its Shia- dominated Eastern province, has yet to face any sustained popular protest. Although the Iranian regime has been strengthened by its survival of the challenge of the Green Revolution, its position may be less secure. According to Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, “The tensions that underlay the 2009 demonstrations in Iran continue, and, if anything, they’ve become… stronger because the economy now is in worse shape.”

Indeed, Iran’s internal struggles complicate its foreign policy. Judith Yaphe, a former senior analyst on Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf issues for CIA, suggested to the HPR, “This could mean the end of the [Iranian] revolution as we know it.” In Saudi Arabia, the upcoming question of succession will necessitate passing power to the next generation. The nation’s recent concessions, most notably offering women certain electoral rights, indicate the regime’s awareness of the need for some amount of modernization. In the context of an uncertain international context and changing domestic dynamics, change is both eventual and inevitable.

Round and Round

The recent emergence of a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, allegedly linked to Iran, only sensationalizes the increasingly charged dynamics between these two countries. On the geopolitical chessboard of the Middle East, the recent alleged assassination plot is but one among many recent moves made by both countries. Regardless of the facts or motives behind Iran’s alleged plot, Boucek told the HPR, “If the Saudis believe it was a serious plot, then it’s a serious plot, and that’s how they’re going to treat it.” Beyond the media firestorm, as Yaphe said, “This is different, you haven’t seen this kind of…outright aggression before between both sides.” Escalation and the increasing heat of this cold war may play a decisive role in regional politics and will continue to shape the future of the Gulf.

Elsa Kania ’15 is a Staff Writer.

The Good Old-ish Days

Beginning with the election of Justice and Development Party in 2002, Israel and Turkey enjoyed a period of unprecedented diplomatic cooperation and economic exchange. Excluding revenues from natural gas and petroleum products, Turkey’s trade agreements with Iran amounted to $2 billion in 2011, while its trade agreements with Israel amount to over $4 billion. Shimon Peres enjoyed several visits to Ankara, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan to Israel, and the countries have exchanged hundreds of thousands of tourists every year.

Erdogan’s reaction to the Gaza War of 2008-2009 catalyzed a break in the quasi-alliance between the two nations. In the so-called “One Minute Scandal” at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Erdogan offered a series of inflammatory remarks regarding the Gaza War, and ignited a verbal sparring match between the two nations. The conflict culminated in diplomatic debacle, in which the Turkish Ambassador to Israel was asked to sit in a lower chair than his Israeli counterparts. Although Israel apologized for the insult, residual resentment lingers in Turkey. A major turning point occurred on May 30, 2010 when nine Turkish activists were killed aboard the Mavi Marmara, a ship attempting to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza.

Controversy over the flotilla continues to sour relations. Turkey demands a formal apology and compensation for the families of the deceased, while Israel defends the legitimacy of its actions. In September, the United Nations’ Palmer Commission released a report declaring that, although Israel used excessive force in the Mavi Marmara raid, its blockade of Gaza is legally justified. The day after the release of the Palmer Report, Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador and suspended all military agreements.

The New Middle East

Despite these diplomatic disputes, the most important factors reshaping the Israel-Turkey relationship may not be these incidents, but rather the unprecedented transition in the Middle East. The revolutionary fervor of the Arab Spring has shifted the balance of power in the region, causing Western influence and regional authoritarianism to fall out, and enabled the ascent of a new order of Arab states, embracing democracy and religious expression.

The effects of Arab Spring have purchased for Turkey a new role in the region. “We are there to set a model that market-economy, democracy, and local cultural values can interact in a positive way,” a Turkish diplomat told the HPR. Prime Minister Erdogan has emerged as a model for the new Arab leaders, and Turkey as the template for secular Islamic democracy. With the falls of Mubarak, Qaddafi, and Hussein, a severely weakened Assad, and diminishing American influence in the Middle East, Turkey has become the standard-bearer of sound governing in the region. While Turkey strives to maintain its traditional domestic policies, its foreign policy has become more active in taking advantage of a distinct power vacuum.

Israel in Isolation

On the other hand, Israel’s position has become weaker and more isolated as popular revolutions overturn regional allies. Dr. Charles Freilich, former Israeli Deputy National Security Advisor and Kennedy School fellow, pointed out that Israelis enjoyed “a strong emotion attachment” to the alliance with Turkey, precisely because it proved Israel’s conflict was based in politics, not ideology. The sudden breakdown of relations has led many to reject this optimistic belief and “feel betrayed” by Turkey. This feeling of betrayal has led to a backlash against Arab states and pushed the Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu further to the right. Uncertainty has created an impasse between the Turkish and Israeli governments, polarizing both sides further. With Turkey’s increasingly belligerent tone and Israel’s continuation of settlement construction and military operations around the Gaza Strip, prospects for reconciliation are fading at an alarming rate.

Neither does reconciliation appear on any near horizon. According to a senior Turkish official, if Turkey’s demand for an apology for the flotilla had been met, Turkey would not have expelled the Israeli Ambassador, and the nations could have normalized relations. Yet, Itamar Rabinovich, President of Tel-Aviv University and former Israeli ambassador to the U.S., believes that an apology would not have made any significant diplomatic difference. Rabinovich argues that Turkey deliberately chose to distance itself from Israel in order to boost its standing in the Middle East.

Transition

The series of unfortunate events between Israel and Turkey has brought simmering tensions in regional relations to a boil. After repeated rejection from European Union membership, Turkey turned its attention back to the East, through increasing trade with its Muslim neighbors and increasing its advocacy for Palestinian statehood. Yet it would be too much to say that Turkey is shifting its axis and severing its ties with the West. Since the creation of NATO, Turkey has served as a poster child for Middle Eastern democracy, and continues to fulfill its duties as a central regional ally. Yet the Arab Spring and Turkey’s tradition of secular success means that Turkey faces a transition, from being bridge between two continents, to being a leader in its own right. This shift means that Turkey’s decisions will not be based on currying favor with any bloc, but rather focused on expanding its influence. As such, while revolutionaries in Egypt and Tunisia look to Turkey as a leader, Iran is threatening to cancel vital trade agreements with Turkey because of its NATO Early Detection missile defense systems and Turkey’s threat to sanction Syria.

A Turkish official told the HPR, “[Turkey wants] a stable, secure, and prosperous Middle East”. Yet neither stability nor prosperity can be achieved without collaboration between Israel and Turkey. Collaboration existed for sixty years, proving that political shifts, not enduring ideology, have caused the present rift. If these two nations wish to be leaders of a secure region, they must be prepared to compromise, with the understanding that the Arab Spring has reshaped their geopolitical calculations.

Ali Nuri Bayar ‘15 and Mikhaila Fogel ’15 are Contributing Writers

Stuxnet: Anatomy of a Computer Virus from Patrick Clair on Vimeo.

This article is the first in a collaboration between the Harvard Political Review and the Harvard College Tech Review designed to jointly publish the best collegiate writing at the intersection of technology and politics. Visit the HCTR here.

The Duqu worm, recently discovered in Iran and reported to resemble last year’s Stuxnet attack, which exploded Iranian nuclear facilities, may be a brilliant tactical move by the United States and Israel that damages Iran’s nuclear program at low cost. At the same time, Duqu raises deeply troubling questions about the future of public control over foreign policy. As a recent article shows, ordinary citizens cannot even find the facts about ongoing cyber conflict in the pages of The New York Times. It seems plausible that the United States is connected to the worm, but no one can say so for certain.

David Sanger’s account in the Times avoids clearly stating the situation. It does not mention Duqu by name, and relies on information from an American official who denies American involvement in Stuxnet: “Some recently discovered new computer worms suggest that a new, improved Stuxnet 2.0 may be in the works for Iran. ‘There were a lot of mistakes made the first time,’ said an American official, avoiding any acknowledgment that the United States played a role in the cyber attack on Iran. ‘This was a first-generation product. Think of Edison’s initial light bulbs, or the Apple II.’” This coverage leaves readers guessing at the nature of the new worm and confused about their government’s foreign policy.

Duqu shares many lines of code with the earlier Stuxnet attack. The new worm, however, does not attack industrial equipment but instead spreads via Microsoft Word email attachments, and seems mainly aimed at data mining. Given Duqu’s sophistication and resemblance to Stuxnet, which is widely thought to have been written by the United States and Israel, some security experts have concluded that the American government is probably also behind the new worm.

In some ways, a computer worm is an ideal way to stymie the Iranian nuclear program. A conventional military attack might be disastrous, and the United States excels at cyber offense.

But Stuxnet and Duqu may usher in a new era of constant cyber conflict that could be devastating in the long term for the open and wired United States. America’s enemies may reverse engineer Stuxnet and create a weapon that could threaten the United States. The long-simmering struggle between the United States and Iran is intensifying, and cyber weapons could escalate the conflict. As Sanger writes, “Not surprisingly, the Iranians are refusing to sit back and take it — which is one reason many believe the long shadow war with Iran is about to ramp up dramatically.” The anonymous nature of the Internet and the supremacy of cyber offense over cyber defense make attacks more likely.

Though possibly brilliant as military strategy, Stuxnet and Duqu may threaten American democracy. Most Americans know nothing about cyber security, and their government, which refuses to acknowledge creating Stuxnet, is not teaching them anything. Ideally, foreign policy would be carried out with public oversight, but the new shadowy world of perpetual cyber conflict makes that impossible. Essentially, important battles are now being fought in secret.

A tour of the blogosphere reveals the problems cyber conflict poses for public dialogue. Through Google, one can find the opinions of numerous cyber security experts on Duqu. But for an ordinary citizen, it would hard to know whom to trust. Cyber security firms, many of which are little-known, offer readers analyses that are conflicting and speculative. Does Duqu resemble Stuxnet? Are the United States and Israel behind the attacks? Is the purpose of the worms to destroy the Iranian nuclear program? The answer to all three questions may be yes. But citizens will not easily find any certain truths on the web, or, as shown above, in the Times.

Americans should be both scared of what Stuxnet and Duqu may herald and grateful for the power of their government’s cyber offense. Concerned citizens ought to press the United States to become more transparent about its foreign policy choices, to ensure civilian control over cyber security, and to invest not only in cyber offense but also in cyber defense. If we prepare well enough, we may be able to stop the Iranian nuclear program while defending our own cyber infrastructure.

HPR:

Shariar Mandanipour: I’m not a political man. I studied Political Science, and maybe because I know something about politics, I hate politics. I’m a writer, but, unfortunately, in a country like Iran, being a writer, not a governmental writer…being a sort of dissident or a writer that you write for the freedom of writing, that you want to write beautiful stories. At first…they look at you as a political or as an opposition person, opposition of the regime. There are times that Iranian writers, we announce that we are not…a political party, we just need freedom of expression, and, because of it, some Iranian good writers, some Iranian good translators were assassinated. They didn’t involve [themselves] in any politic[al] matter, and a few of them [were] sentenced to prison. So the way that a dictatorial regime looks at you as a writer, they see you as an opposition [figure]. And you have no choice…even if you announce it, if you declare it, that I’m not involved in politics, they can’t believe it, and I think they are right. Because when you write against censorship, and you write about freedom and freedom of writing, freedom of expression, it is something against the dictator.

HPR: As a writer, in that sort of environment, what sort of authority or responsibility do you have to convey stories that might not otherwise be told?

SM: You know, the history of literature…engaged literature or even socialist realism literature. And I’m sure that these kind of stories, they will kill stories, they will [be] against art. You are a writer, and your job is to write a beautiful sory. You shouldn’t say to yourself that you’re going to write about the suffering that a good man is taking in a prison…If I decide to write this story…that the regime imprisons our good students…it wouldn’t be a good story. You just want to write a good story. If you are living there, if you are a human being in a country like Iran, at last it comes to your story, if you want to write a love story. The suffer[ing] of people will come into your story somehow. I’m talking about the art, not any political engagement..or any sort of socialist realism that you will feel. In Russia, before the revolution, they had great writers. After the revolution, because there were purely socialist realism stories, you don’t see any good writers. [They] were censored and [had] to publish their work underground…I know that my engagement is to write a good story. If I suffer with my people..their happiness, the beauties, or the evils that they make will all be reflected in my story.

HPR: Many of your stories address major events in Iranian history, such as the Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. Is there any context or background that you would want or expect readers to bring to your work?

SM: Of course, you know that I was at the war, for my armed service. For ten months, I was at the front lines in such an absurd, maybe foolish war between Iran and Iraq—two dictators, it was a war between two dictators. I went there to experience the war, and, as a writer, it was so dark and bitter, as a human being, being in war was so dark and bitter for me, but, as a writer, it was good for me because I could write about it…I think it’s so natural. It was so painful, being there, seeing your best soldiers killed, it comes to my nightmares here, even after many years, and it comes into my stories. Right now my story, the novel that I’m writing, it is just about the war, so I can’t get rid of it.

HPR: Would you describe your work as rooted in distinctly Iranian themes and experiences, or do you intend for it to have a certain universality that appeals to all readers, regardless of their backgrounds?

SM: Each writer is standing on his or her culture, is standing on his or her country, and there are writers that are looking maybe to the sky or their head over the clouds. It depends on how they write, it depends on how much artsier they are, or how much better writers they are. So no matter if, for instance, a writer is writing about a small village in his country,  his novel is a universal novel. For instance, let’s look at Faulkner. He’s an American writer, he made a sort of imaginary state…so he’s writing about maybe southwest Americans or somewhere there, but he’s everywhere. For instance in Iran, in an Arabian country, people understand him. So no matter [whether] a writer wants to write for the world or just for his or for her people, it depends on his art of writing. If he writes well, if the story works well, everybody could be his or her reader.

HPR: What elements of your work do you think were seen as objectionable or as challenging the authority of the regime by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance? To what extent would you consider yourself a political activist?

SM: I am a member of Iranian writers association, but it [was] banned after the Revolution. We didn’t have an office, the regime [said] that this association [was] dead, they denied it. We believe that, as much as we are writing, our association or organization is alive, even if we don’t have any publishing or magazine or even a room where we can get together to choose, for instance, our editors. Because of it and because of my talks here and there, against censorship, of course they picture me as a poitical writer. Although I don’t believe in any ideology, I’m not a religious writer, but this is the way that censors look at you. There were times that I couldn’t publish my book because censorship [became] worse and worse in that era. There were times when the censorship machine was a little bit better—then someone like me could publish his books. They didn’t even let me continue my studies in the university. I wasn’t somehow…at their standards. But it was wonderful that there were times when Iranian students could have a sort of NGO, and they invited somebody like me. And 700 students were sitting in the cellar listening to someone like me. After Ahmadinejad…came to power…or [was] elected in a fake election, they banned 99% of students or NGOs. They banned independent magazines. I was chief editor of one of them [and] they banned it. Right now in Iran, Iranian writers hardly could publish their books. But someone like me, I’m here. Of course it’s my job to maybe shout against censorship, write about censorship in my essays. If I get a good idea for a story, like what I got in my last novel, I write about it. Censoring an Iranian Love story…I’m a writer in this novel, or the writer would be a sort of alter ego of me. He wants just to write a love story, and he starts to say [why]  he can’t write just a small, simple love story in Iran…and he writes about censorship, how much it corrupts the language even. If you write a beautiful sentence, it would be against censorship, it would be against censorship. You know how dictators use language, to fool people, to fool their followers. Iran is a religious regime…the clerics [and] the supreme leader of Iran—they fool people with language..They use language in a way that I call corruption of language. They use the best words. For instance, Ahmadinejad …claims that Iran is the freest country in] the world. Imagine it—he is using the word of freedom. Someone like him. Thousands of students were arrested. Two of them were sentenced to [be] lashed. One of them just wrote a light [criticism] against Ahmadinejad. People [were in] the streets because they asked “Where is my vote?” in a peaceful protest…When somebody like him talks about freedom, it is the corruption of language. So, for writers, maybe it is their best job to make the language clean.

HPR: Identity and its mutability seems to be a prevalent theme in your writing. You are from Iran but have been living in the U.S. How has this change of setting impacted your sense of yourself as a writer and the focus of your work?

SM: Because of my style of writing, my stories, as the critics call it, it is complicated, and my problem of censorship in Iran was less tham my friends, because censorship couldn’t understand what I was writing about. Although there were stories, …that they didn’t let me publish in my books. For four or five years, I couldn’t publish any books in Iran. There were stories that at last you can get permission to publish. I tried not to make a sort of self-censorship…like a sort of virus that it lives in your body, in your mind, and you think that you are writing freely. Censorship controls your mind at last. That was my situation in Iran, to try not to self-censor, although I cannot claim that I was not under the influence of censors. I was born in a country [with a tradition of] censorship. I grew up with censorship, many kinds of censorship. When I came to the United States, I knew that …there aren’t any censors here. The first months, I was looking, ‘Who am I here?’ In Iran, it is a pleasure…it is just like fighting with dictatorship…you are on the front line when you are writing. They when I came to the U.S., I said ‘okay, who am I here?’ …For six or seven months, I was looking for what I could] write to find the passion of writing.. Then I found out that I was going to lie here, so I can write whatever I want to write, so I started to write Censoring an Iranian Love Story…Just reading fifty pages of it, a publisher accepted the book. Then I felt [that] yes, I can be a writer here as well. If I try to write well, it will help my culture. Although I couldn’t publish the Persian version of this novel in Iran—it is impossible—but it is published in eleven countries and in fourteen or fifteen languages—it is a message of literature. There are people who are reading about the the message of Iranian literature and about censorship…so I found my way here to write [and] I found the way that I can write. Alhough I miss my country so much…I can go [back], but there is no guarantee [that I wouldn’t] be arrested at the airport.  Some scholars and reporters…they arrest them at the airport, just when they arrive in Iran…And right now, they ban people to leave Iran—filmmakers, writeirs, reporters, journalists—it is a new kind of way to make dissidents suffer.

HPR: Where do you want to go next with your writing?

SM: Right now…I’m writing about the war. It is a man who lost his left hand at the war and even his memory. And he is going back after the war is finished, after many years, he is trying to get back to that place where he lost his hand…And it comes to me…I started to write this novel two times before, when I was in Iran. I started writing it. The first time I wrote about 100 pages, and then I found it doesn’t work…Two years later, I tried again…At last I found the form of narrating this story in America. Of course I found that it is from my experience in the war. It comes from me.

This interview has been edited and condensed.

Freest—in the Middle East

At Columbia University in 2007, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad infamously claimed that there were no gays in his country, setting off a global firestorm. Yet what he said next might seem equally puzzling: that Iranian women were among the freest in the world. By Western standards, Ahmadinejad’s declaration may seem a stretch. However, Iranian women, though not the freest in the world, enjoy more liberties than most women in the Middle East. Iranian women are permitted to drive, and, while Saudi women just received the right to vote and run for municipal councils this year, Iranian women have been speaking through the ballot box since 1963. Two women have been vice presidents: Masoumeh Ebtekar from 1997 to 2005 and Fatemeh Javadi from 2005 to 2009. The 2010 Gender Gap Index, which measures equality between men and women in the 134 nations, gave Iran an overall score of 123, compared to Turkey at 126, Saudi Arabia at 129, Pakistan at 132, and Yemen at 134.

As Arzoo Osanloo, an expert on the Iranian women’s movement and professor at the University of Washington, told the HPR, the relative success of women in Iran might be attributed to the fact that “Iranians are the least religious of people living in Muslim-majority societies.” Osanloo points to the nation’s “high ratio of female literacy, education, and women in the work force.” Iranian women are also more involved in politics than their counterparts in other states, perhaps because of what Osanloo describes as a “long history of public activism for rights going back to before Iran’s Constitutional Revolution,” and an Iranian desire to be “well-versed in the language of democracy, equality, and civil liberty.”

A History of Action

The advances of the Iranian women’s rights movement spring from a variety of factors. The movement began at the inception of the twentieth century and grew steadily more prominent over the next seventy-five years. Focusing on education, specifically the literacy rate of Iranian girls, activists expanded in number and achievements, relatively unhindered by the government restrictions that hampered similar movements in other Muslim states.

Until the 1979 Iranian Revolution, women had improved their opportunities in employment, especially in politics, family law, and education, supported by initiatives from groups like the Women’s Organization of Iran. The revolution nonetheless reversed several of these advancements. A 2007 article for the Journal of International Women’s Studies by Iranian author Majid Mohammadi showed that the revolution saw representation in parliament drop from 7 to 1.5 percent; employment of women diminished by 4.3 percentage points to 6.8 percent, and the legal age of marriage plummet to nine years old from the previous sixteen. Interestingly, women may have benefitted from the revolution in other respects; Osanloo suggests that conservative families “felt they could let their female kin enter public fora,” given the new dress restrictions, perversely giving feminists a greater voice.

Regardless, circumstances have improved since reformist Mohammad Khatami’s presidency from 1997 to 2005. Though the laws of the 1979-1997 period imposed greater limitations on women, especially those advocating for more rights, the movement survived and evolved into its modern form, despite the turmoil that exists in Iran today. Said Osanloo, “Although the last eight years have been difficult for women’s rights advocates, it has been equally difficult to turn back the social, legal, and political reforms that have given women greater voice, visibility, and status in social life.” Her words echoed those of Nobel Peace Prize recipient Shirin Ebadi, who stated in a 2006 interview that Ahmadinejad “cannot actually reverse the rights that women have achieved, because the feminist movement inside Iran is very strong. Women will resist any attempt to reverse their rights.”

Calm Before the Storm
The widely disputed presidential election between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi in June 2009 sent Iran into political convulsions. But before countless cell phone videos were capturing the hundreds of thousands of protesters, Iran had already experienced surprising reformist strides, aiding the women’s movement.

Though past campaigns, including Ahmadinejad’s, neglected the issue of women’s rights, Mousavi’s embraced the subject. Where Ahmadinejad expanded the role of the morality police during his first term as president, Mousavi pledged to disband it outright, while speaking to female supporters in Tehran in May 2009. “We should reform laws that are unfair to women,” he added. Mousavi’s wife, Zahra Rahnavard, exhibited a similar form of tenacity, surprising political analysts by vocally campaigning alongside her husband in a display atypical of most spouses of Iranian political figures.

The volatile post-election fervor further catapulted women to the forefront of Iranian news. Pictures of protests disseminated via Twitter and Facebook showed women at the front-lines of the demonstrations, marching not behind men, but alongside them. The unprecedented visibility of Iranian women, from the artist and politician Zahra Rahnavard, to the world-renowned martyr Neda Agha-Soltan, may have signaled a long-awaited shift in Iranian politics.

“[B]oth in symbolism and content, the tenth presidential elections [in 2009] signified considerable progress in gender politics in Iran,” Nayereh Tohidi, Chair of the Gender and Women’s Studies Department at California State University, wrote in a 2009 paper. But the sudden burst of progress, she argues, was not spontaneous. It was the result of years of slow but persistent activism, including the work of numerous feminists and feminist organizations—the most famous being the One Million Signatures Campaign against discriminatory laws—that persisted despite state repression and threats.
Exporting Feminism?
Even if the protests had highlighted the active role of women in Iranian politics, the dedication and vitality of the women’s rights movement over more than a century of activism remains of interest more broadly. Indeed, the experiences of the women’s rights movement in Iran illustrate how social movements can survive even the most repressive regimes. After all, Iranian women represent a prime example of organized yet effective protest. Today, through film and Facebook, television and Twitter, they have managed to make their message compelling and their work incessant. Through their dedication and persistence, the Iranian feminists have become the inspiration for protesters in not only the Middle East, but around the world.

President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao

China is fairly skilled at managing contradictions – especially since its foreign policies in the Middle East and United States are one.

So said Dr. John Garver, an eminent scholar of Chinese foreign policy, in his lecture at the Center for Government and International Studies on Monday afternoon. In a lecture hall of about 30 quiet graduate students, Garver delivered an hour and a half of lecturing that bordered on prophetic.

The lecture’s thesis was that Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East is fueled by two opposing objectives. On one hand, China – with an eye toward the future – wants to build friendly relationships with all countries in Middle East. Economics is the crux: China is on a quest to expand its export markets and find sources to fuel its “wasteful” energy consumption. Reaching out to the Middle East to satisfy that consumption, Garver said, is inevitable.

“The reality of the global oil market is that if a nation wants to increase its consumption of energy, it needs to go to the Middle East,” Garver said before singling out Iran as an important supplier. Within ten minutes of the lecture, Garver had already gotten it right: Two days later, Iran announced that its natural gas will be transferred to China via pipelines to help China meet its growing energy needs.

The other hand unveils the policy contradiction and explains why China does not give Middle Eastern nations unlimited support in the political realm.  Drawing from his experience over the years with top-level political think tanks in China, Garver said the message is clear: Despite viewing American policies as “ill-considered” and “imprudent,” China will not and does not want to confront the United States in the Middle East.

China’s Open Hand to Libya

Garver predicted that China’s compliance with perceived American arrogance will continue well into the future. China strives to shape the international system in way to pursue its own interests, but not with policies that openly confront the West and threatens China’s access to American markets. “The success of such policies depends ultimately on China’s correct managing of its foreign policy contradictions,” Garver said.

These contradictions will weather any changes provoked by the Arab Spring. “China is fundamentally agnostic about the internal configuration of these countries. In Pakistan, in Iran, in Saudi Arabia, it doesn’t matter whether they are Islamic or secular,” Garver said. “The mindset is, ‘We’ll take these countries as a given. We’ll work with it.’”

Once again, Garver’s prediction is ringing true: China has already begun to reach out to and accept a post-Qaddafi Libya. With Libya as a precedent, it appears that China’s desire to establish relationships will indeed transcend such changes in regime.

A Nuclear Cover-Up

During a very brief question-and-answer session, a student asked if Iran’s alleged nuclear program was a cause of concern to China. Garver didn’t hesitate in saying no — and blaming the U.S. “The real reason why Iran wants a nuclear option is because Americans are unable to come to terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, sanction after sanction. If Iran really wants nuclear weapons, it’s because of American policies,” he answered. And the biggest factor in Iran’s nuclear aspirations, he added, was the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

My one disagreement with Garver was here. An increased American presence in the Middle East certainly did nothing to quell Iranian fears. But factors other than America have influenced Iran as well, which Garver failed to mention either because of oversight or limited time. Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohammed ElBaradei said in 2009 that countries with nuclear capabilities are treated more seriously than those without – a tantalizing bonus for an Iran that wishes to establish itself as the indisputable dominant power in the Middle East, above even its neighbors. And if threats of war and tensions with other nations can compel Iran to want to produce a nuclear weapon, then Saudi Arabia has played a prominent role as well.

Despite that disagreement, Garver’s lecture was memorable not only for its prophetic accuracy but also for the viewpoint in which he gave it. The media’s attention to American actions in the Middle East can easily eclipse how other nations approach the region, which is a shame. Hearing from China’s point of view in a lecture pervaded with accuracy offered an invaluable perspective, and it’s one that, unfortunately, Americans often go without.

Photo Credit:  Official White House Photo 

Reports of Vafamehr’s sentence surfaced on the Iranian opposition website Kalameh.com on October 10. The Iranian government has yet to release an official report detailing Vafamehr’s punishment, but it seems that the rest of the world is too wary of Iran’s draconian human rights record to wait for one. Outrage at Vafamehr’s sentence quickly sparked far beyond the nation’s border. Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd lambasted the sentence. Perez Hilton blogged about it.  Media coverage has spanned major news outlets like The Huffington Post and the BBC.

The film’s co-producers, Julie Ryan and Kate Croser, have speculated that the government will attribute Vafamehr’s sentence to her appearance in scenes without the mandatory headscarf; Vafamehr’s character also appears to consume alcohol, which is generally worth 80 lashes for the first offense. They predict that another possible government accusation could be that My Tehran for Sale did not have the required permits to shoot the movie – a charge that director Granaz Moussavi and Croser both deny. But regardless of the official reason for her arrest, Westerners who enshrine ideals of freedom of speech and, by extension, of film are bound to seethe.

Ostensibly, anger has never seemed so hopeless. Beyond general complaints from Iran about the decadence of the Western world, recent allegations of an Iranian assassination attempt on U.S. soil will continue to weaken the already crippled diplomatic relations between Iran and the U.S., regardless of the accusation’s validity. So if Iran has little more than contempt for the West, why would it respond to pressure from it? Despite rhetoric from Iranian political leaders that casts the Islamic nation as an uncompromising moral stronghold, Iran has proven that it can be swayed – but only if it is pressured by more than the U.S. alone.

Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, a 43-year-old mother of two, was sentenced to death by stoning for adultery in May 2006. After intense international outcry, she now faces ten years in prison – not for adultery, but for her alleged role in her husband’s murder. The murder charge was added after the case began receiving international attention, most likely as a ploy for the government to justify her death sentence. Western backlash against Ashtiani’s punishment was amplified not only because of the death penalty itself, but also because of the form of execution. The Iranian penal code is morbidly specific about the types of stones that should be used: Article 104 of the Iranian penal code states that the ideal stone is “not be large enough to kill the person by one or two strikes; nor should they be so small that they could not be defined as stones.”

The international outcry was relatively effective in this case because the U.S., obviously still diplomatically estranged from Iran, was not the only nation openly fighting to save Ashtiani. Remarkable among condemnatory statements from other governments was an offer of asylum by Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who had developed comparatively friendly ties with Iran at the time. But just as the U.S. government was backed by Americans protesting Ashtiani’s sentence, Mr. da Silva also witnessed protests from Brazilians themselves, including a document that drew 114,000 signatures (signed, notably, by a hodgepodge of Brazilian celebrities). It is also likely that Iran faced pressures from within. Stoning itself is far from accepted as a reasonable punishment for any crime; Iranian leaders, including several ayatollahs, believe that the practice is inhumane and outdated.

But the struggle to free Ashtiani was not waged by governments – American, Iranian, or otherwise – alone. Non-governmental organizations also strongly influenced the campaign. Mina Ahadi, head of the International Committee Against Stoning and the Death Penalty, said in 2010 that NGOs play an indispensible role in the process of pressuring Iran to recant sentences like Ashtiani’s. Only “a very broad, international public movement… can help” Ashtiani, she said, adding that “experience shows… when the pressure gets very high, the Islamic government starts to say something different.”

Saving Vafamehr from the initial punishment may not be as painstakingly difficult as it was to save Ashtiani from hers if the appropriate mix of governmental and non-governmental pressure is exerted again. While flogging is not an unheard of or particularly extraordinary punishment in Iran, it is also not universally supported by Iranian leaders either. When student activist Peyman Aref received 74 lashes on October 8 for “insulting” Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his handling of the 2009 protests in a letter, Ahmadinejad himself decried Aref’s flogging.

For all its talk hinting at the contrary, the Iranian government is not immovable when governments, citizens, and NGOs push strongly. With the world angrily and anxiously watching, the Iranian government strives to save face. Acquiescing to the demands of America alone jeopardizes the image that Iranian leaders wish to convey to their citizens: that of Iran as the indisputable, morally superior nation. But if these demands are made by other nations and entities as well, the pressure mounts. For Westerners, this means throwing support behind more than just governments and into Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, to name a few. Vafamehr is undoubtedly neither the first nor the last to suffer at the hands of Iran’s strict penal code – hands that, though inflexible, can indeed be forced to bend.

Photo credit: The Global Film Initiative

The National Security Policy Group of the IOP Policy Program had much to say on the approach the U.S. must adopt to calm the situation between Turkey and Israel.  The group chair and overseer, sophomore Jean-Philippe Gauthier, outlined a conciliatory approach based on the economic and diplomatic importance of ties to both countries for the U.S. This, however, procrastinates mediating the opposing views of the two countries over the Palestinian state, which threaten to clash so stridently.

From left to right: Colby Wilkason, Andrew Seo, Jean-Philippe Gauthier, Ken Liu, and Tyler Keefe

Although relations with both countries are important, Turkey is on the rise and distancing itself from the U.S. politically. Action that favors Turkey to prevent the loss of an increasingly crucial ally and punishes Israel for refusing to apologize for the attack is needed. The strongest method of expressing this is to vote for Palestinian statehood.

Now supporters of Israel will protest, and Obama pragmatists will point to the loss of the weighty Jewish interest groups essential to his campaign in 2008. Observers of the Israeli parliament will point to the heavy influence of the Orthodox community in Israeli politics and possible violent backlash from Israel. But, with the disintegration of Egypt, a global majority in favor of Palestine, and Israel’s dependence of the United States, it seems Israel has only been getting heavier to hold up. Additionally, not voting for Palestine portrays Obama as hypocritical given his claimed policy and shows that his foreign policy is built around failing to take a stance.

Then there’s Turkey! Increasingly, it’s becoming important for the United States to solidify ties to take advantage of trade and to save a secular state. Sizeable growth (Tukey’s GDP grew 8 percent in 2010) arose with the emergence of a powerful entrepreneurial class, nicknamed the Anatolian Tigers.  Turkey’s state also generates wealth from the oil pipeline it installed in 2006. Sophomore Andrew Seo, the policy group’s specialist on US long-term goals concerning Iran and Turkey, described Turkey’s ambition as a desire to become an “energy hub.”

The economic prosperity has coupled economic instability. Prime Minister Erdogan, a cunning politician, has pandered to rising Islamic groups in Turkey and played up anger at the West. For instance, Erdogan has utilized the “provocative” statements about the flotilla incident “to generate considerable political capital domestically and in the region.” Alpkaan Celik, a Turkish native and freshman, say the Turkish people view the sinking as “unacceptable.”  Although Alpkaan also stressed that the Turkish people still want a Turkish state, the continued rise of Islam may prevent Turkey from remaining a “0 problem neighbor” and tilt it towards Iran.

As Turkish politics distances itself, U.S. ties to the military have also undergone substantive shocks. Several of the key generals resigned from their posts. Additional disgruntled feelings over the Iraq and Afghanistan in Turkey have added fuel to the fire that is Turkish anger at the West.  While Alpkaan disagreed with the idea that Turks think of the U.S. as a “bad guy,” he concurred that opinion is becoming “more negative.”

A final issue lodged in Turkish anger at the West is the Palestine’s right to statehood. Furthermore, this predicament may put the nail in Turkish-Israeli relations.

America must remove worries of Islam becoming tied to Turkey’s state and cement Turkey as a nation which, “unlike most of the other countries in the Middle East…has actually shown its willingness to take the lead on the region’s most difficult problems in a sensible and responsible way.” While some dissension could break loose over the U.S. “betraying” Israel, the vote by no means rejects Israel as an ally, but merely casts America as a strong arbitrator over an issue it has tried to resolve repeatedly through civilized means. As Alpkaan said, US is “trying to stay in a central area and is avoiding taking action. You have to take definite action.” Voting in an internationally recognized institution still constitutes a “civilized” and decisive approach.

And doing so would help American relations with more than just Turkey, but with the entire Arab Spring. With America on better terms with predominantly Muslim countries, who knows? Perhaps post-spring, it may be better disposed to successfully negotiate in the Middle East…

Yesterday, Hezbollah precipitated a collapse of the current coalition by withdrawing eleven of the ruling cabinet’s thirty ministers. While representatives of the Shiite paramilitary-cum-party declined to comment on the action, top American officials affirmed their support for embattled Prime Minister Saad Hariri – a noted break from the Obama administration’s limited-priority approach to Lebanese affairs.

For those who deny the authenticity of Obama’s change mantra, the administration’s policy on Lebanon stands as a marked counterexample. One of the most salient criticisms of Obama’s foreign policy is its tendency toward realism, the school of Kennan and Kissinger which holds that fostering relationships of powerful, reliable states should be the first priority of policymakers. Although few popular critics of ‘hope and change’ would criticize Obama for being too much of a realist, his focus on heavy-handed, authoritarian powers like Russia and Syria makes democracy crusader George W. Bush look positively pollyannaish.

More concerned with securing Syria’s cooperation on regional security and orchestrating the peace to end all peace processes between Israel and the Palestinians, however, the Obama administration seems to have dismissed Lebanon as largely ornamental. The consequences of neglect threaten to subvert the cause of regional stability: lodged precariously in the verdant nook between Israel and Syria, the Middle East’s most pluralistic society is not to be taken for granted.

To be sure, the Obama administration is partly responsible for the collapse of the Hariri government. But Washington is following in the age-old tradition of regarding Lebanon as nothing but a small, semi-Christian extension of the Levantine Arab world. Until 1943, Lebanon was but a district of French-mandate Syria – established as an independent state after some years of identity politics gone awry. Since, the international community has not yet gotten used to the idea of Lebanon being anything more than a political compromise.

Its neighbors haven’t either. From 1976 to 2005, Syria occupied the balance of Lebanese territory, maintaining a virtual monopoly on power; since then, Syria’s control over Lebanon’s internal affairs has changed little. In response to Syria’s power plays, Israel intervened in 1978, 1982, and 2006 – in the name of protecting the interests of Maronite Christians and beating back Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah militants. In the crosshairs lie cosmopolitan Beirut, religious pluralism, and any remaining trappings of Lebanese sovereignty.

Everybody feels bad enough about the destruction, lamenting the former cultural haven’s descent into violence and insolvency. But in the ‘global age’, it’s easy to be apologetic about the collapse of the nation-state’s power. Foreign Affairs is quick to note Hezbollah’s contributions to law and order on a local level, and regional specialists never seemed too disturbed by Israel and Syria’s quarter-century partition of Lebanon’s fragmented 4,000 square miles of territory. After all, Lebanon’s sovereignty was simply not as important as the cooperation of larger neighbors.

Foreign policy realism is useful to the extent that it allows the United States to choose helpful partners. But in practice, it can be perilously blinding. The abandonment of Lebanon, compact but hardly irrelevant, is a case in point: Obama and company’s focus on Syria has led to the collapse of Hariri’s coalition government. The rise of Hezbollah’s paramilitary brigades in its place could draw Israel away from the negotiating table, undo Syria’s incentive to cooperate with American diplomacy, and shift the regional balance of power away from Arab moderates and toward the Shiite partisans of Iran.

In light of the ongoing parliamentary crisis, the realistic case for a genuinely independent Lebanon proves summarily clear. Some Lebanese nationalists drive at the point just a bit too hard (Phoenicia, as glorious as it was, no longer exists). But with Hezbollah on the radical upswing, who wouldn’t agree with the case for a new tone in the babble about Lebanon?

To its credit, this quasi-European, quasi-Middle Eastern regional bridge state has been able to do what no other country has done sustainably: maintain friendship and cooperation with the likes of America, Iran, and every kind of state in between.

In the face of global recession, Turkey’s economy has proven to be robust and ascendant. Despite fears of a traditionalist redefinition of the Turkish system, politics has remained as vibrant and pluralistic an arena as ever.

In what’s perhaps most novel to observers, Turkey’s reputation for global neutrality and cultural centralism is even allowing Turkey to reimagine its role in the world’s increasingly multipolar power structure. Citing US and EU preoccupation with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Turkey has made ostensible successes in calling for new negotiations between Israel and Syria. And with established powers bound to inaction by old policy precedents, Turkey paired with Brazil to agree to certify a non-weapons Iranian nuclear program.

In short, Turkey’s new reputation as a player with a vision definitely holds some water. Just ask master publicist Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.

Then again, he’d be leaving out a lot. Like most new darlings of the political community, Turkey’s image in the press has rarely strayed from stirling. It’d be fairly willing to believe it, but for the unlikely warning of my one Turkish friend at Harvard, Can Soylu ’14 – who agrees with the general trend, but offers some opposing insights.

According to Can, who describes himself as “neither fully Middle Eastern and nor fully European,” the Western media are systematically unaware that “Turkey’s not just [shifting to the East] for a better foreign policy.” Rather, the ruling Justice and Development party has tried to play on its conservative Islamist base in accordance with the idea that “it’s always easy to bash on Israel is to gain popularity as a leader.”

He continued to explain that often, Turkey’s new alignment with powers in the Islamic world makes less practical sense than imagined. I’m reminded that Turkey’s most vibrant trade regime is conducted with the West, and yet the current government of “Turkey has voted no on the resolution that imposed sanctions on Iran even when China and Russia have joined with the US.”

I’m finally told that the most instructive example of Turkey’s shift can be found in the notorious Mavi Marmara flotilla incident, in which Turkish activists were killed in an attempt to breach the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza. Can takes no issue with Turkey’s demand for an apology from the Israeli government, but explained to me that he’s sometimes disturbed by Prime Minister Erdogan’s “unnecessarily emotional rhetoric.”

Not so different from how Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu framed it to us a few weeks ago. But Can tells me that beyond the reach of Western media sources, Davutoglu’s message isn’t so agreeable. Turkish media outlets, however, do seem to have picked up on the takeaway of his post-flotilla meeting with a conference of Arab foreign ministers: “Jerusalem will be our capital.”

Hardly sounds like the guy offering to mediate Israeli-Syrian peace talks.

As it is, many in foreign policy have long suspected that the Turkish flotilla event was, at the very least, enabled by the Turkish government for reasons other than the humanitarian. Can lets me know that the fracas erupted almost in perfect coincidence with a national opposition leader’s peak in the polls. To the natural benefit of conservative incumbents, the next few days saw protestors in Istanbul benefit using “Islamic rhetoric rather than talking about humanitarian concerns.”

Hardly sounds like the media darling at harmony with its motley crew of neighbors. Yes, Turkey’s doing quite well. The one-time “pivotal state” has indeed grown and networked its way to “emergent power.” But until the Turkish state can begin to divest its foreign policy from domestic apprehensions about Israel and imperialism, the world would do best to stop fawning so hard.

After all, Turkey might not be quite as hot as we thought.