Credit: Gil Yohanan

Religious plurality comes in many shapes and sizes. Take the case of Israel, often dismissed by foreign observers as simply ‘the Jewish state’. The lion’s share of international focus on Israel stems from conflict between the Jewish majority and an Arab minority.

Yet outside mixed-ethnic areas like Jerusalem and the Upper Galilee, most Israelis don’t deal with Jewish-Arab problems on a daily basis. Rather, the schism on everyone’s mind is playing out between a secular Jewish majority (Israel is considerably more atheist than the US) and a vocal Orthodox Jewish minority – two full-fledged sectors of society. Besides having different concepts of God and the Jewish tradition, they tend to live in separate neighborhoods and cities, vote for different political parties, and have totally different ideas for the civilizational identity of Israel.

As interest in the peace process wears down, the secular-religious divide is making a media comeback. With PM Netanyahu’s coalition dependent on the cooperation of religious parties, the ultra-Orthodox Shas party is attempting to pass through Knesset a $30 million worth of stipends for students at yeshivas – religious institutes of Torah and Talmud study. And secular university students are up in arms.

Coming on the heels of a court ruling that provided for equality of funding, the stipend bill led on Monday to a general strike of students and professors at Hebrew University, Israel’s premier secular university. To the surprise of many demonstrators, university president Menachem Ben-Sasson offered his support for protests, offering, “the university management shares the students’ concern.”

The Hebrew University protests remind us that within Israel, the ethnic Jewish community is cloven between some who think that yeshiva study is a waste of resources, and some who believe that it’s the only way to keep God on the embattled country’s side.

America isn’t totally foreign to this dichotomy, but a key difference is in play: unlike the US government, which is uninvolved in religious matters, Israel’s government maintains an official status on religion. Though all of Israel’s prime ministers, left or right, have been secular, they’ve participated since a 1949 compromise in a system that recognizes Orthodox Judaism as the state religion. Political quid pro quo at its finest, no doubt. The Orthodox give up their dreams of a theocracy in exchange for a theocratically-inflected democracy. But over the past half-century, the consequences have been devastating for all but the most extreme on both sides.

First, the government essentially recognizes the secular and the religious as separate social classes – constructing different welfare policies, school systems, and military obligations to suit each. To its credit, it allows atheists to imagine they live in Northern Europe and gives Hassidic Jews the illusion of personal theocracy. But it’s tragically polarizing. Over the past few decades, religious Jews have fled Tel Aviv and secular Jews have fled Jerusalem, creating two opposite cultural poles only 36 miles apart. That’s less than the distance between San Francisco and San Jose: imagine if they were that starkly different!

As a result, the two sides are essentially able to create two very different cultural landscapes on the face of the same land.

Neither has to deal with the other very often. Predictably, this can entail a great deal of misunderstanding and mutual resentment. Religious Israelis often blast secular Israelis for ignoring the reality of living in the Middle East, and secular Israelis have been known to lambast religious Israelis for not participating in a twenty-first-century economy.

Unlike the Israeli-Palestinian divide as envisioned by Jimmy Carter, this sounds like state-supported apartheid to me. And more, though it’s actually well-meaning, it needs to go: Israel can’t afford any more polarization.

While no answer is perfect, the first step is clear to a majority of Israelis and Western observers alike: separate church and state! In a society where most Jews are not Orthodox at all, it makes little sense for all marriages and divorces to be conducted through an Orthodox Jewish civil legal system. Separating it from the government would do nothing to change the lives of believing Orthodox Jews – with the possible exception of making secular Jews less resentful of them.

Moreover, the very acknowledgement of a state religion instigates all sorts of undemocratic behavior on behalf of the religious minority. Ofrit Liviatan, a professor of government at Harvard, notes “Orthodox legislative success on the question of ‘who is a Jew’, the placement of non-Orthodox individuals on religious councils, the importation of non-Kosher meat, [and] the distribution of funds to non-Orthodox religious institutions.”

Functionally, these decisions have meant that religious moderates, a la America’s Conservative Jews, have been shut out of the social dialogue. As a direct result of government policy, most Israelis have to choose between religious and secular, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, theocracy and democracy. The society that grows up is fragmented, unsure of its identity, and decidedly not what the first Zionists envisioned.

It has even reached the point where ultra-Orthodox Jews, expecting the entire country to abide by their social dictates, have rioted against parking garages that stay open on the Sabbath. This is a society that a majority of Israelis are unhappy to countenance. As a secular Jew, I would be, too.

A couple weeks ago the ADL came out with a statement recommending that “a different location be found” for the Cordoba House, the Muslim community center, similar to the YMCA and JCC, that is being promoted by a Manhattan imam with a long record of ecumenicism and moderation. (One of his books is called “What’s Right With Islam Is What’s Right With America.” Really.)

The ADL argued that “ultimately this is not a question of rights, but a question of what is right.  In our judgment, building an Islamic Center in the shadow of the World Trade Center will cause some victims more pain – unnecessarily – and that is not right.” The principle at work here seems to be, “Whatever the victims of September 11th don’t like, isn’t right.” It reminds me of the idea that we should support the death penalty because the families of murder victims tend to want murderers executed.

What I found even more astounding was the ADL’s notion that this is “not a question of rights.” The group calls itself “the nation’s premier civil rights/human relations agency,” and it’s sniffing at the idea that Muslims have a right to build mosques (not to mention swimming pools, restaurants, and the rest of the Cordoba House’s features) wherever they please. The ADL has argued in court against the use of zoning laws to restrict the construction of houses of worship, but apparently “sensitivity” is more important than religious freedom.

Don’t get me wrong, sensitivity is important. But in order to demand that one party be more sensitive, there has to be some rational basis for another party’s feeling offended. If I cursed loudly and deliberately in the vicinity of schoolchildren, you would say, I may have a right to do that, but I should have been more sensitive because there’s a legitimate interest in protecting children from dirty words. Maybe I believe that children don’t need to be protected from curse words, but still, sensitivity to the sincere beliefs of others requires me, morally if not legally, to hold my tongue.

The Cordoba House situation isn’t like that at all. The only reason to take offense at a Muslim community center built two blocks north of the World Trade Center is the assumption that all Muslims have some connection with, and responsibility for, the actions of the 9/11 terrorists. That’s why we have seen politicians and other commentators blur the difference between moderate and jihadist Muslims and imply that we are at war with Islam per se. Carl Paladino, a Republican running for NY governor, says the proposed community center would be a “monument to those who attacked our country.” Newt Gingrich points out that there are “no churches or synagogues in Saudi Arabia,” as if the center were sponsored by the Saudi government, not a moderate Sufi Muslim leader about as far, spiritually speaking, from radical Sunni Islam as any Jew or Christian. Pat Buchanan says building a mosque near Ground Zero would be like “building a Shinto shrine” at Pearl Harbor. Because, you see, we’re at war with Muslims just as we were at war with the Japanese. It really is that simple for them. But it’s wrong, not to mention painfully counter-productive, and the ADL should have so and left it at that.

As Peter Beinart says, “Would the ADL for one second suggest that sensitivity toward people victimized by members of a certain religion or race justifies discriminating against other, completely innocent, members of that religion or race? Of course not. But when it comes to Muslims, the standards are different.” Exactly, because they don’t see Muslims like Feisal Abdul Rauf as “completely innocent.” This is collective guilt, pure and simple.

The whole sad affair with the ADL reminds me of Beinart’s great article a couple months back about how American Jewish organizations have sacrificed their human-rights liberalism on the altar of Zionism, in the process losing the allegiance of many younger American Jews. Beinart wrote, “These groups would never say, as do some in Netanyahu’s coalition, that Israeli Arabs don’t deserve full citizenship and West Bank Palestinians don’t deserve human rights. But in practice, by defending virtually anything any Israeli government does, they make themselves intellectual bodyguards for Israeli leaders who threaten the very liberal values they profess to admire.”

Now the threat to liberal values has come to New York, and the ADL has blown a major opportunity to stand up for them.

Photo credit: Wikipedia

America’s current relationship with Israel threatens America abroad and domestically. First, a critical element of American soft power is an appeal to basic norms of justice. But the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a conflict between equal powers; U.S. backing of Israeli hegemony weakens American influence. When America supports a state that violates international law, as seen in the construction of the Israeli separation barrier and settlements in the West Bank, the world shakes its head in despair. “The world” is an appropriate term here, as America stands alone in the extent of its assistance to Israel. Historically, it has been the lone supporter of Israel, apart for a few Pacific island nations, in General Assembly votes (two of the many examples can be found here and here). In short, American credibility is crippled.

Second, millions of Muslims around the world perceive the U.S. as leading a war on Islam because of its aid to Israel, a view which prompted President Obama to declare that “the United States is not and will never be at war with Islam.” This view of the U.S. strengthens the ranks of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda,  Al-Shabaab, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Of course terrorists do not hear of U.S. support for Israel and immediately strap on explosives. But American-Israeli relations do provide extremists with easy evidence for their radical doctrines. Engaging with individuals who believe you are out to exterminate their religion is not a constructive road to peace.

Third, it is a waste of money. America provides Israel with roughly $3 billion each year, about one-fifth of the American foreign aid budget. The vast majority of this ends up as Israeli military expenditures, including on the separation wall built in the West Bank. I cannot help but think what $3 billion would do for rebuilding Haiti or creating disease-prevention programs in Central Africa, or reviving the Palestinian economy and infrastructure. (Just for comparison’s sake, U.S. aid to the Palestinians since 2004 has averaged $400 million a year.)

But most importantly, U.S. aid to Israel is an obstacle to an Israeli-Palestinian peace. With American backing, Israel has no incentive to negotiate with Palestinian authorities, and the announcement, during Biden’s visit, of 1600 new homes in East Jerusalem simply demonstrates how careless Israel has become with U.S. backing. The West Bank is being progressively disabled through the gradual land consfiscations, and Gaza is completely incapacitated in its current position. Israel could not maintain the status quo without American assistance.

The great American paradox is that its support for Israel is contradictory to American interests. But there is a second paradox in American-Israeli relations: the majority of American Jews are liberal Democrats who support a two-state solution and feel frustration with the conduct of the Israeli government. This poll shows that 70% of American Jews believe Israel should support the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

Unfortunately, the majority is no match for the loud and powerful. An alliance of Jewish neoconservatives, officially represented in AIPAC and supported by influential academics such as Alan Dershowitz from Harvard University, have managed to take over the discussion. There is a tremendous gap between the average American Jew and his or her lobbyist on Capitol Hill.

American support for Israel has created two paradoxes. Its foreign policy does not serve its national interests, but only threatens American security, as well as peace in the Middle East. This is partly due to the fact that the American Jewish lobby has a perverted sense of its own interests in Israel.

What should be done? Ideally, American military assistance to Israel should end. Israel needs to take responsibility for its actions, instead of having financial assistance to do whatever it pleases. Realistically, this means American aid to Israel must become more nuanced. But more importantly, politicians and lobbyists need to understand that their decisions are hindering any possibility of an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Unquestioning support is damaging precisely because it is unquestioning. Israel should remain an ally, but for an end to the conflict, we also need Palestinians as friends.

The question of Jewish liberalism

Why Are Jews Liberals?, by Norman Podhoretz, Doubleday, 2009. $27, 295 pp.

The story of Norman Podhoretz is as complicated as the political history he examines in Why are Jews Liberals? Once a leftist, he moved rightwards in the 1960s to become one of the great voices of neoconservatism. In Why Are Jews Liberals?, Podhoretz asks why the rest of the Jewish community hasn’t followed suit. Along the search for a satisfactory explanation, the reader is continually reminded of the author’s agenda:  to show that the centuries-old connection between Judaism and liberalism is no longer a sensible alliance, and never was. This agenda constantly undermines Podhoretz’s attempt to establish a convincing history of the relation of Judaism and Western politics.

Old Habits Die Hard

Podhoretz’s case against the alliance of Judaism and leftism begins in the time of Jesus Christ, passes through Europe and the enlightenment, and ends with the 2008 presidential election in the United States.  As a history of the Jewish people, his scholarship is solid.  Soon, however, the narrative develops several antagonists – Enlightenment thinkers like Voltaire, socialist leaders like Karl Marx, and American 20^th-century progressives.  In the case of the first, philosophes encouraged conversion to the “Religion of Reason” to escape anti-Semitism. The socialists in turn won over Jews with the “Marxist promise of a world in which there would be ‘neither a Jew nor Greek.”In both cases, however, Podhoretz argues Jewish joiners were ill-served by their new alliance. Finally, from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Carter, Democratic presidents have managed to make Jews part of their coalitions while being less-than-faithful friends of the Jews or Israel abroad.  Not least of these fair-weather friends was Roosevelt himself, who “made little effort…to help Hitler’s Jewish victims.”

Starting from the last, Podhoretz bluntly claims that Jews of each place and era should have seen these groups as enemies, asserting that it is self-defeating to support a cause, group, or party that does not support you in return, framing this assumption in oppositional, simplistic terms such as, “…all animals, including humans, are equipped by nature with an instinct for telling the difference between friends and enemies…”Absent from Podhoretz’s analysis is a prescription for getting along with groups with differing interests. Instead, he focuses on an abhorrent rapport, “partaking of the pathological,” between Jews and their supposed enemies.

Various leftist movements may have been ideological “enemies” of the Jews, but Podhoretz fails to examine the anti-Semitism of traditional societies or right-wing movements across European and American history. Restricting social and political interaction only to those groups that bore no animosity or ill will toward the Jewish community does not seem a convincing strategy, and what “animal”, put in Podhoretz’s terms, surrounded by predators and faced with the possibility of destruction, would not make sacrifices in exchange for continued existence?

An analogous struggle applies to the debate over Israel. Just as a Jew might share political beliefs with an anti-Semite, so too could a Jew agree with someone opposed to Israel. The author disagrees with both assertions, and views anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism as points along the same spectrum: “hostility [toward Israel] has by now metastasized to the point where the difference between ‘anti-Zionism’ and anti-Semitism has become almost invisible to the naked eye.” Podhoretz unfairly conflates the political issues surrounding Israel and the existential issue of Jewish continuity. Yet policy on Israel does not imply disagreement on all political issues, or contradiction of Jewish interests elsewhere.

A Convincing Alternative?

Podhoretz does address more popular explanations for Jewish liberalism. In the case of the most common – the shared values between Judaism and liberalism – he fails to convincingly rebut the argument. He claims that if Jewish teachings, namely “the Bible and…the Talmud” were the source of liberalism, Orthodox Jews, those most adherent to religious tradition, would be the most liberal. Indeed, he is correct to say that they are the “least liberal of all their fellow Jews,” and that “Orthodox enclaves are the only Jewish neighborhoods where conservative candidates get any votes to speak of.” Podhoretz is correct that Orthodox Jews might align with American conservative causes like the protection of Israel or the preservation of religious displays, but fails to establish that religious texts are the only source of Jewish values; holidays, stories, and the community-constructed fabric of Jewish life are an equally powerful source of the Jewish perspective.

Second, the fact that Orthodox are, on average, more conservative than less religious Jews elides the point that they are still more liberal than the average American. Furthermore, Podhoretz describes the conservative religious rules to which Orthodox Jews tend to adhere, and describes a set of purely social principles – on subjects like gay marriage and abortion – that make Orthodox Jews more conservative. However, there are just as many progressive principles on socioeconomic matters, like the advancement of social justice and compassion for the disadvantaged, which inform the political views of both religious and secular Jews.  The fact that Orthodox Jews tend to be more conservative reflects their stronger adherence to religious principles on social issues, but the economic ideas that Judaism imparts might well be liberal ones.

Synagogue and State

In his historical narrative, Podhoretz endeavors to demonstrate that contemporary Jewish liberalism traces back to years of poor decision-making that have become engrained in the contemporary Jewish psyche, implying that Jews have lost their agency over their own political choices. The authentic political choice for Jews seems to be conservatism, yet Podhoretz’s story is a story of a people balancing their political interests with their religious interests, revealing the fact that most Jews, like most people of any faith, do not lead their lives strictly according to religious commands, and cannot be reduced to their faith when at the ballot box.

Podhoretz is frustrated with fellow members of his own faith, and the story becomes very personal at times. Any bitterness that shows through the pages, as it clearly does in the chapters covering contemporary American politics, ultimately does a disservice to the pursuit of an honest answer to the question of Jewish leftism.  By claiming that Jews should not be liberals before investigating why they are, Podhoretz closes himself off to a number of explanations that seem both logical and compelling. The explanation at which he finally arrives – that Jewish liberalism has replaced actual Judaism as its adherents’ religion – forces a division between liberal values and Jewish values that is hard to believe. Millennia of Jewish history have encompassed much; why not liberalism?