Senior spring is a wonderful time at Harvard. Theses are done, coursework is light, and the weather has (finally) improved. I have enjoyed senior spring tremendously since turning in my thesis, and I am confident that it will be my best semester yet. But one thing still troubles me. As commencement nears, seniors are constantly subjected to the question, “What are you doing next year?” Many Harvard students have an answer by senior spring, even in this economic downturn, so perhaps the question does not bother them. For students like me, however, who can only answer with a shrug of the shoulders, the question can be a bit distressing.

Harvard students are neurotic, and so I attribute part of my unease to a crisis of confidence. If other students have successfully courted an employer or a graduate school, why haven’t I? And what does that say about me? This is indeed troubling, but I think something else is at work too. Lately I have started to think that I dislike the question not only because of the uncertainty in my future, but also because of what the question typically implies. When someone asks, “What are you doing next year?” at Harvard, there is a good chance the answer will be finance or consulting. In the last few years, anywhere from 20 percent to nearly half of all seniors entered one of those two professions.

Harvard students’ affinity for investment banks and consulting firms is unsettling because it suggests that the leaders of tomorrow are choosing their careers in a moral vacuum. The more we learn about the financial sector, in particular, the clearer it becomes that it is comprised largely of vulgar con artists. Matt Taibbi of Rolling Stone has written a number of damning exposés demonstrating that financial firms routinely resort to fraud, bribery, and anything else that increases their profits. Most recently, evidence is emerging that “synthetic rate swaps” by Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan are behind much of the crippling debt owed by cities, states, and countries, from Chicago to Mississippi to Greece.

I suspect that, by and large, the bankers and consultants of tomorrow are not asking themselves, “What can I do for my community?” They are instead asking, “How can I most profitably sell my labor?” Harvard students know that they have the skills that financial and consulting firms desire, and these companies spare no expense when courting in Cambridge.

As a result, for many of my peers their career choice is a decision between competing offers to do different versions of the same thing: make a very small group of extremely wealthy people even wealthier, often at the cost of everybody else.

Too many students are willing to ignore questions like “Is this ethical?” and “Who will benefit from my work?” They ignore these questions on the false premise that the private sphere is devoid of moral considerations. When I ask friends what they think about their future in banking or consulting, they typically acknowledge the improprieties while conceding that it does not bother them; it is as if the moral character of their work were irrelevant.

Yet your career choice is a moral decision, perhaps the most significant moral decision we will make. Students should reject the false notion that their career choices have no bearing on society and embrace the social responsibility that comes with the influence and prestige that a Harvard degree affords.

I have no doubt that my peers will be the leaders of tomorrow, but I worry about where they will lead us. Rather than lining up to serve those who need no assistance, my fellow seniors and I should search for where we can make the greatest difference. This will be difficult and will surely produce uncertainty, but I can live with uncertainty if it means I do not have to compromise my values. This comforts me every time I admit that I do not know what I am doing next year, and I hope that more of next year’s seniors will take comfort in it as well. Harvard students are diligent and talented, and the world can be a better place if we decide to make it so.

William Leiter ‘10 is the Editor-in-Chief Emeritus

Photo Credit: Flickr (laverrue)

In February, Newsweek‘s Lisa Miller argued that Harvard was doing its students a disservice by slighting religion in its curriculum. Louis Menand, the Harvard English professor and New Yorker writer, was one of Miller’s primary sources. On page 36, we have an interview with Menand, the full version of which is available on HarvardPoliticalReview.com.

As I wrote in response to Miller on the HPR blog, the HPRgument, I don’t see much evidence that Harvard, unlike many other schools, lacks a religion department. But I’m not sure how much this proves. Does it show that Harvard is uncompromisingly secularized, that its administrators don’t think religion is an important field of study? I don’t think so. And scholars like Diana Eck might be surprised to hear Menand imply that, if only we had a Religion Department, we would start to cultivate experts in that field. The Harvard Divinity School provides undergraduates with an ample supply of excellent scholars and courses in the study of religion.

Still, Miller and Menand’s argument is well-taken, even if some of their premises are questionable. Of course Harvard students should learn something about religion, whether by taking a class on Islamic history, European secularization, or American politics. Or, as Menand suggests, a class on religiously-inspired literature. The unifying aim of such classes would be to expose students to a way of thinking, a set of problems, a field of study, that they might not otherwise be exposed to.

That might not seem like much to the biggest proponents of a genuine Great Books curriculum. But it’s more than Harvard now offers, with its vaguely defined “Culture and Belief” field, in which students can take classes on subjects like photography and the Roman Games. Harvard needn’t define its task as narrowly as the Great Books fans do; it should not exclude all the historical, political, and sociological issues that the study of religion properly entails.There is a middle ground between Great Books chauvinism and Harvard’s current curricular laxity.

It is our hope that this issue of the HPR occupies that middle ground, examining issues like religious demographics, government aid to religious groups, and the rise of secularism. We think there is a role for campus publications, as well as classes and curricula, to play in students’ education.

Iraq’s parliamentary elections in March prompted a 62 percent voter turnout, with 12 million Iraqis voting for the next leaders of their fledgling democracy. For a country that has recently been dominated by sectarian conflict, the sight of millions of Iraqis going to the polls in spite of insurgent efforts is a promising sign. Iraq’s chance for unification under a stable government seems more feasible than ever because of its citizens’ calls for change and the U.S. timetable for withdrawal.

While the candidates of the five major coalitions represented significant political, religious, and ethnic differences, such a vast array of electoral choice points to a democratizing trend, an improvement over the one-party rule of Saddam Hussein’s Baath party. The fact that no candidate or party received a majority indicates that Iraq is on the path to becoming a vibrant democracy, or at least it will be if the parties are able to come together this summer to form a government. And if that happens, the Iraqi democracy’s success story could ultimately threaten the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes in the region.

A Competitive Race

Iraqis have widely embraced democracy over the last five years, showing their preference for unified nationalism over the sectarianism that the 2005 elections embodied. The 2010 parliamentary elections were the most contested in Iraqi history, as hundreds of parties fielded more than 6,000 candidates to compete for 325 seats. While there were difficulties in the process, including the barring of some Sunni candidates (a decision that was ultimately reversed), Western observers and Iraqi officials agree that the election results were legitimate and indicative of the country’s progress.

In an interview with the HPR, Ahmed Ali, an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that “the Independent High Electoral Commission, which executed the elections, demonstrated an increased and developed organizational capacity.” Compared to the 2005 elections, in which a closed-list party system was used, the 2010 elections were governed by “an open-list system, which gave the voters an opportunity to elect their representatives,” Ali said.

In addition, prominent candidates, such as former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and current Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, moved their campaigns away from sectarian undertones and towards secular positions on national security, resource allocation, and  infrastructure. An open discussion about the need for unity and electoral participation indicates that Iraqis believe the democratic process is worth their effort and sacrifice.

A Long Road Ahead

With a narrow plurality voting for Allawi and his Shiite Iraqiya coalition, the responsibility falls on him to forge a coalition government. Iraqiya received 91 seats and al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition came in a close second, gaining 89 seats. The Iraqi National Alliance, dominated by Shiite parties and led by the anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, got 70 seats, and the Kurdistan alliance took 43. No party won the 163 seats needed to independently create a government.

Iraq’s leaders must now “bring the country back together and form a government that is capable of governing and striking compromises,” Kenneth Pollack, a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution, told the HPR. But some fear that recent gains could be squandered by a constitutional framework that requires long deadlines and a lot of bureaucratic red tape before governments can be formed. It is a complicated process in which authority is transferred slowly, and there are multiple opportunities for the opposition to contest decisions.

Pollack explained, “The longer political parties bicker and negotiate, the more opportunities for militias, thugs, and purveyors of violence—all of which have been sidelined by the American security effort—to break the political wrangling on their own.” Roger Owen, a Harvard history professor, said that “the danger will come if certain groups of people feel they are excluded from the government formation.” Of particular concern are the Kurds, the most autonomous group within the Iraqi population. In the absence of compromises with the Kurds, violence could erupt again and derail the formation of a government.

American Withdrawal

Since sectarian conflict continues to divide political parties and citizens alike, the government formation process will last well into the summer of 2010, which challenges the Obama administration’s plan to withdraw the majority of combat troops by August 2010. Whether Iraq is capable of democratic sovereignty once American military troops are partially withdrawn is yet to be determined, but Ali said that the Iraqis “have demonstrated they want to be in the lead politically and militarily.”

Pollack acknowledged that “most Iraqis would like to see Americans out as quickly as possible, but are also terrified because they recognize all the fragilities and potential explosiveness of the political situation.” Their fear is due in part to the fact that the United States provides much more than just military assistance. Myriam Benraad, an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told the HPR that “people do not really realize what happens behind-the-scenes, such as the Americans supporting economic reform, rebuilding institutions, training magistrates and judges, and establishing the rule of law.” Still, the bulk of American troops are scheduled to leave in August. Whether the Iraqis form a government or not, U.S. troops will only be able to play a minor role in helping them recover from any deadlock or setback.

Keeping Up with the Iraqis

Another concern (or perhaps hope) is that Iraq’s neighbors, like Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, may be destabilized by a flourishing Iraqi democracy. Benraad suggested that “a more strongly democratic Iraq poses a threat to these authoritarian regimes because the progress of democracy weakens their legitimacy and interests.” For Iran in particular, Pollack noted that “as Iraq moves towards stability, democracy, and more prosperity, Iran will seem to be backwards as a police state, causing disgruntlement among Iranians.” Though it will take many years for Iraq to solidify its democratic political system, its progress will not go unnoticed by the region’s dictators.

Democratizing trends also promote economic reconstruction and efficient resource allocation. Owen said that Iraq’s oil production will benefit greatly from increased political stability. According to Pollack, “even most conservative estimates say Iraq can double their oil output in less than five years, going from two million barrels to four million barrels per day.” This growth will have a great impact on the global oil market and will only strengthen Iraq’s economy and give the nascent democracy some valuable revenue.

There is much at stake politically and economically in the Iraqi government’s formation process. It will be a messy, drawn-out process of dialogue, compromise, and, most likely and unfortunately, some continued violence. While the timeframe is painfully protracted, its very existence is a testament to the progress that Iraq has made and a promising indicator that Iraqis are moving towards a more stable and permanent democratic government. And it is no longer completely in vain to hope that Iraq might become a model and catalyst for change in the Middle East.

Victoria Hargis ’11 is a Staff Writer

Photo Credit: flickr (DVIDSHUB)

Since President Felipe Calderon took office in 2006 promising to end Mexico’s illicit drug trade, more than 18,000 people have been killed, and the death toll rises every month. In Ciudad Juarez, a border city and a primary smuggling point to the United States, 2,600 people were killed last year, making it a more dangerous city than Baghdad. The ferocity of violence in Juarez underscores the urgent need to shift the Calderon government’s strategy from one of drug-cartel decapitation, to one of strengthening law enforcement and building civil society with the aim of cutting off local support for cartels.

Drugs, Violence, and Fear

The Calderon government faces the daunting task of eliminating one of the most lucrative and entrenched drug networks in the world. The profitability of the Mexican drug trade is a result of both the insatiable American demand for illegal drugs and the cheap cost of producing marijuana and heroin in Mexico. And, though cocaine is not produced in Mexico, Viridiana Rios, a doctoral fellow in the Inequality and Social Justice Program at Harvard, explained, “As Colombian drug traffickers fled from law enforcement in Colombia, they reestablished themselves in Mexico.” Today, 90 percent of the cocaine entering the U.S. market is shipped through Mexico.

Calderon has relied heavily on the military to supplement police forces, given the military’s reputation for low levels of corruption. Since 2006, over 45,000 soldiers have been deployed into Mexico’s streets, but violence continues to increase. The Calderon government has used the troops to pursue a strategy of decapitation, targeting high-value cartel leaders. But this strategy seems to have failed. Vanda Felbab-Brown, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, told the HPR that “the current violence is partly a backlash to the decapitation policy, which actually generated new turf wars for smuggling routes of recently ‘decapitated’ rivals.”

Even though most of the violence is between drug traffickers and law enforcement officers, civilians are all too frequently killed. In March, an American consulate worker and her husband were murdered in Juarez. “People are scared to death,” said Rios. “By seven o’clock in the evening the city shuts down and everyone stays indoors.” And the economy of Juarez has been devastated because of plummeting rates of American tourism.

Calderon’s New Strategy

The perception of a failed war on drugs has sapped Mexicans’ patience for Calderon’s efforts. There are serious doubts that the Mexican government has the capacity to defeat the cartels. According to Steven Shavell, professor of law and economics at Harvard Law School, “the drug business is so lucrative that there is no way that the Mexican government can raise the level of deterrence high enough to stop the drug trade.” Shavell predicted that unless the government can seriously retool its strategy to move away from simple deterrence, “the Mexican government will likely make deals with the drug kingpins.”

But there is some hope in the revised Mexican drug policy that Calderon recently introduced. It looks holistically at entire trafficking networks, not just their leaders. New emphasis is being placed on properly training and vetting investigative police teams rather than relying solely on military forces. However, U.S. assistance is vital to execute the new strategy. Felbab-Brown explained, “Such a policy requires law-enforcement and intelligence apparatuses that have a robust investigative capacity and are reasonably free of corruption. While Mexico currently has neither, American assistance can help.”

Trafficking in Expertise

The United States has already provided Mexico with $700 million since 2008 through the Merida Initiative, a joint-security cooperative agreement. In a major policy reversal, the Obama administration has encouraged the Mexican government to use the Merida funds for institution-building rather than for arming the military. To that end, Calderon has announced a new set of social programs to strengthen civil society in Juarez by bringing jobs and education to marginalized communities.

But time is running out; it seems unlikely that the Mexican people will much longer tolerate a government that cannot provide basic security. Unless Calderon can implement his new strategy quickly and commit to it seriously for the next few years, he may have to cut deals with the cartels. That is, he might have to accept the Mexican drug trade in exchange for fewer deaths in the streets.

Taylor Lane ’11 and Mason Pesek ’12 are Staff Writers.

Photo Credit: Flickr (tiffa130)

On Feb. 25, 2010, some 40 top Turkish military officers were arrested for allegedly plotting a coup against Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (the AKP). The Islamic party had recently exacerbated its already strained relations with the military, which has long seen itself as the defender of Turkey’s secular traditions.

Some see the weakening power of the military, evidenced by the failure of its coup, as the harbinger of a genuinely strong Islamist movement in Turkey. However, the declining military does not foretell the renunciation of Turkish secularism, but instead signals Turkey’s maturation as a democracy. It seems increasingly likely that Islam and Turkish secular democracy will find a way to coexist, and that Turkey will continue to develop into a vital bridge between the West and the Muslim world.

Managing the Military

Ever since Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey, established the secular state, the military has seen itself as its guarantor against theocratic encroachment. In the past, the military gave itself the authority to depose regimes which it found too Islamist, an action it has taken or threatened four times since 1960. As Gerald Knaus, director of the European Stability Initiative, told the HPR, “What we really have is trouble over Turkey dealing with its authoritarian legacy,” represented by the outsized role of the military. “The military has intervened directly, by threatening coups, arresting politicians, and giving itself the legal powers and mandates to intervene at will in most aspects of Turkish political life,” Knaus explained.

Since the start of Turkey’s intensive campaign to gain admission to the European Union, it has taken steps to reform the role of the military in accordance with European standards. For instance, there has been an attempt to impose civilian control of the military’s National Security Council, a move heavily resisted by the military establishment and other Turkish conservatives.

The Turkish electorate seems to support limiting the influence of the military in politics. Stephen Kinzer, author of Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds, told the HPR, “People have lost faith in whether they need a guarantor of democracy. Turkish democracy is maturing.” He continued, “The idea that [the people] need some superior will from above is no longer true.” As such, the AKP crackdown on the military is more of an anti-authoritarian reform movement than an assault on the Turkish tradition of secularism.

Islamic Culture, Secular State

In fact, faith in both Islam and secular governance has always been widespread in Turkey. Baskin Oran, professor emeritus at the University of Ankara, told the HPR, “To be a Turk you have got to be a Muslim,” and the strict separation of religion from politics is a myth. In Turkey, Islam is and always will be an integral part of society. But that fact has not led easily or inevitably to theocracy.

The AKP’s agenda, for instance, is far from Islamist. Knaus noted, “Turkey has adopted under the current government a more progressive penal code reflecting Western practices. There has been no trend at all that would suggest that secularism is under threat.” Though the AKP did form from the remnants of the banned Islamist party Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party), Knaus said that today “there is no political force to introduce Sharia or Islamic law.” Turkey has finally found a comfortable equilibrium, accommodating both its long secular political tradition and its Islamic culture.

Moreover, Oran added, “As these people are getting rich, their sons will become bourgeois. Money has no ideology besides the maximization of profit.” The Turkish people already recognize that their secular government has allowed them to flourish economically. Kinzer said that while “the new elite is more devout than the old elite it is replacing … nevertheless, Turks are aware of how much success they’ve had with their [secular] government.”

As Turkey implements its Western-style reforms and tries to banish military authoritarianism, we see signs that its democracy is maturing. Turkey’s geographic location and its position as the most secular and democratic Islamic nation have lent it international influence as a bridge between the West and the Islamic world. Turkey will fine-tune its balance between secularist government and Islamic culture for years to come, but its flourishing democracy sets an example for Islamic governments in Iraq and elsewhere.

Jimmy Wu ’13 is Circulation Manager.

Photo Credits: flickr (Let Ideas Compete, chrisschuepp)

When Google stopped complying with China’s censorship laws, users could still access the Hong Kong site, where they could see unfiltered results, including ones about Tiananmen Square and Tibet. This was a victory for the former colony, a reminder of why Hong Kong still has much to offer even as its neighbors begin to catch up in economic growth. While China’s economy is still hampered by concerns about the rule of law, Hong Kong’s solid legal system and history of productivity sustain an environment that is ideal for attracting investment. But economic progress has not translated directly into political freedom, as many might have expected. Indeed, Hong Kong’s uniquely vibrant economy may be leading to excessive patience, or complacence, when it comes to political progress.

Freedom and Prosperity

Hong Kong has flourished as the economic crown jewel of the developing Chinese nation, with considerably higher income levels and standards of living than other Chinese cities. In 2007, Hong Kong’s GDP per capita reached $42,000, compared to the mainland’s $5,400. Still, China has enjoyed unprecedented growth rates since opening its markets, and recently some Chinese cities have been catching up to Hong Kong.

Shanghai, for instance, just surpassed Hong Kong’s economy in GDP. But, rather than creating a threat to Hong Kong’s dominance, this reflects little to no change in the economic landscape. As Harvard political scientist Roderick MacFarquhar explained, “The population of Shanghai—14 million—is almost exactly double that of Hong Kong. It was inevitable that it would overtake Hong Kong.”

Moreover, Hong Kong maintains a major advantage over Chinese cities: a reputation for quality control and safety that stems from its long history of British oversight and regulation. “China’s rich come down to HK to buy property because the property rights and laws are so clear. Chinese parents come to HK to buy milk powder because they know it’s not tainted here,” said Harvard senior and Hong Kong resident Alexandra Chen.

Furthermore, investors are confident that their assets will be secure in Hong Kong, given its British common law system and strong commitment to property rights. With these unique advantages, Hong Kong is seen as the default choice for hosting financial transactions. Until the mainland establishes an equally strong legal regime, it will forfeit to Hong Kong an advantage that will become increasingly significant as the Chinese economy becomes more complex and prone to legal disputes.

Long March to Democracy

Since decolonization in 1997, Hong Kong has been ruled as a “special administrative region” of China under a “one country, two systems” policy, which has granted Hong Kong considerable economic freedom and some political autonomy. Hong Kong’s political system retains its British traditions of semi-direct democracy, with an article in its constitution, the Basic Law, that promises universal suffrage at some point in the future.

But, as of now, that democratic promise is only partially realized. Half of the 60 seats in Hong Kong’s legislature are voted on by the population, and half are chosen by a smaller electorate of corporate bodies and special interest groups. And the election of Hong Kong’s chief executive is even less democratic—he or she is chosen by a 400-member election committee and then appointed by the Central People’s Government in Beijing.

Pressures to Democratize?

Although the central Chinese government promised universal suffrage in Hong Kong by 2007 under the original Basic Law, Beijing has not followed through. It has postponed direct elections twice, first to 2012, and then to 2017. Beijing also continues to condemn pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong residents have made some noise over this apparent failure to live up to the Basic Law. In 2005, some 80,000 citizens protested for direct elections outside the central government’s office. In February, hundreds of protestors flooded the streets to call for the release of pro-democracy activist Liu Xiaobo, convicted by the People’s Republic of China for “subverting the state.”

And in another dramatic push for democracy, legislators from each of Hong Kong’s five electoral districts resigned suddenly this past January, forcing special by-elections—a sort of referendum on universal suffrage—throughout Hong Kong by the end of the year. The protests on Liu’s behalf and the resignation of the five legislators earlier this year represent growing demands for Beijing to stop dragging its feet. But these rumblings of discontent hide a surprisingly widespread conservatism and cautiousness among the general population of Hong Kong.

Popular Contentment

Despite the agitation earlier this year, Hong Kong as a whole has been noticeably muted in calling for democracy. The referendum triggered by the five legislators will, in fact, turn out to be less of a statement than the pro-democracy parties had hoped: the moderate parties and the leading pro-Beijing party have refused to take part, rendering the election meaningless, as the pro-democracy candidates will retake their seats uncontested. Chief Executive Donald Tsang seems poised to strike a deal between all of the parties, not satisfying the pro-democracy legislators’ calls for immediate democracy.

Furthermore, the public seems to favor a gradual, cooperative approach to the implementation of reform. As Peng Qinghua, head of China’s liaison office in Hong Kong, said publicly, “This [referendum] is a total violation of mainstream public opinion that wants stability, harmony, and development.” Almost half of the elected officials in Hong Kong are from pro-Beijing parties, not the more staunchly pro-democracy parties. This representation reflects a fundamental contentment among the people of Hong Kong with their semi-democracy.  “As long as the government is relatively efficient and clean—which it is—most people are only concerned about their pocketbooks,” said Chen.

The gradualist sentiments expressed by government officials and by the public seem to indicate that popular attitudes towards democratization are far less urgent than recent events might suggest. Rather, calls for immediate democracy emanate from an activist political minority; the general attitude is more cooperative and even patient.

Growth Versus Rights

Although recent, highly publicized political events seemed to indicate full-throated support for democracy, many Hong Kong residents pay more attention to their economic well-being than to their political rights. Legal rights in the city provide a level of sufficiency for daily life, and citizens feel secure with their property and livelihoods. Combined with the promise of continually rising incomes and standards of living, the political status quo stalls any real push for free elections.

Given its legal structure and its tradition of freedom of expression, Hong Kong will continue to attract the businesses and investments that propel its economy. As long as the risk differential between the Chinese and Hong Kong economies exists, Hong Kong will flourish and its population, complacent with its relative wealth, will favor a gradualist approach toward democratization, waiting on promises of political freedom made years ago.

Tiffany Wen ’11 is a Staff Writer.

Photo Credits: Flickr (Trodel, Ed meister)

In 1993, President Bill Clinton pushed the last bill through Congress to increase the gas tax. Even this, however, was watered-down reform; the tax was not indexed to inflation and increased the price of gas by only 4.3 cents per gallon. The modesty of the increase should not be surprising: since 1993, no prominent American politician has seriously supported a major increase in the gas tax. Virtually everyone agrees that supporting the gas tax is political suicide. As Michael Cragg, an energy consultant at The Brattle Group, told the HPR, “It’s hard to see in this political environment how you’d get a gas tax passed.”

A similar consensus exists among economists, but on a different issue. According to a study in the Journal of Economic Literature, the vast majority of economists support a gas tax in order to make the private cost of driving a car reflect its actual social costs: global warming, air pollution, traffic congestion, and highway maintenance. Economists from across the political spectrum—Freakonomics author Steven Levitt, Nobel laureate and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, and even the chairman of George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors, N. Gregory Mankiw—have come out in support of raising the gas tax.

How can a policy make so much economic sense and garner so little political support? Significant obstacles, including the anti-tax movement, vested interests in low energy prices, regional differences, and America’s short election cycle, have historically made the gas tax unpopular and unfeasible. Our energy future and climate security depend on either tweaking the tax to make it more politically palatable, or exploring creative alternatives.

The Anti-Tax Establishment

Perhaps the most fundamental reason why a higher gas tax is so controversial is because it hits everybody, and hits them in a very public way. William Gale, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and co-director of the Tax Policy Center, told the HPR that the anti-tax movement “will seize on every tax,” and the gas tax is an easy target. Represented by vocal advocacy groups such as Americans for Tax Reform and the various Tea Parties, the anti-tax movement “does not make a distinction between distortionary and distortionary-correcting taxes,” Gale said.

“They just hate all taxes,” he continued, “and every attempt at an increase in taxes becomes an opportunity for [their] political gain.”

Looking closer at the particulars of the gas tax raises an equally problematic obstacle: the culture of low energy prices. According to Henry Lee, director of the Environment and Natural Resources Program at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, America’s energy policy has been governed by a single goal for the last 40 years. “Americans for almost two generations have lived under the idea of cheap energy,” he explained, making it almost impossible to pass laws involving price increases. At this point, such laws could seem almost un-American.

Democratic Divisions

The gas tax also raises a thorny question of fairness. Rural inhabitants, who drive farther and more often than do urban residents, would face steeper costs if the federal gas tax went up. Politicians that represent rural districts are simply responding to their constituents’ concerns by opposing the gas tax.

Gale identified this “urban-rural divide” as one of the two most salient obstacles to the gas tax, in addition to the anti-tax movement. Recognizing these regional disparities raises questions about institutional problems in American democracy. To say, as many do, that lack of progress on the gas tax is part of a Big Oil conspiracy ignores the ways in which representative democracy can often forestall consensus.

America’s short, two-year election cycle is a major barrier to passing a higher gas tax. Politicians tend to ignore proposals that involve an immediate, perceivable cost and provide less tangible, long-term benefits. Thomas Sterner, former president of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, told the HPR that this is the “big problem” of gas tax politics. In countries with short electoral cycles of two to four years, attempts to increase the gas tax “will only cause protests,” Sterner said. It can be very difficult to promote farsighted, technocratic solutions in a political environment defined by short-term gratification.

Tweaking the Gas Tax

Recognizing that political barriers will make increasing the gas tax difficult, policymakers need to start thinking outside the box. One possibility, Sterner proposed, is the “fuel price escalator,” raising the tax gradually over the course of many years. Sterner said that this is “the only workable model.”

By making the price increases less immediate, the fuel price escalator resolves some of the difficulty posed by an electoral system focused on short-term gain. This explains, in part, how the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher was able to move from a relatively low gas tax to one that charges over 300 percent of the retail price, the highest in Europe.

Efficient use of revenue from the gas tax, Sterner said, is also important. The careful use of rebates can correct the regressive elements of the tax and can also make the increase in fuel prices more palatable to rural residents. Furthermore, the gas tax is essential for deficit reduction. “It’s becoming abundantly evident that we need the money,” Gale said.

The current gas tax can no longer keep up with escalating road and highway spending; this year’s highway appropriations were made possible only by siphoning funds from the general budget, which, according to Lee, has never been done before. Lee noted, “You’re going to have to have a change in the system in the next five years,” because there is “no way” Congress can continue propping up the transportation budget with general funds.

A final component of a revised gas tax might be a price floor, which would keep the price of gas relatively stable by taxing the difference if the price dipped below a certain mark. This would create a predictable environment for long-term investment in new-energy technologies that hold the key to a low-carbon economy. As Lee explained, “[Oil price] volatility gets people to under-invest.” By giving investors a stable price they can use to gauge the cost-effectiveness of future energy sources, a price floor could contribute to innovation.

The disconnect between good policy and good politics is one of the most frustrating dilemmas of American democracy. Absent substantive change in the near future, the United States risks heightened fuel price volatility, decreased economic competitiveness, and the negative effects of climate change.

Policymakers will need to search for creative solutions that are both true to the spirit of economic efficiency and more palatable to constituents focused on short-term interests. If they are able to do this with the gas tax, they might learn lessons that can be applied in other difficult and thorny areas of public policy, like immigration and entitlement reform.

Will Rafey ‘13 is a Staff Writer.

Infographic: Neil Patel

Photo Credit: Flickr (Indy Charlie)

More than two-thirds of Americans are overweight or obese. Childhood obesity has tripled in the last thirty years. For the first time since the Civil War, Americans’ life expectancy may be declining. These facts paint a depressing, and by now familiar, picture.

After decades of failed attempts to convince individuals to make healthier eating choices, it is evident that reducing obesity will require changes in the food industry. Some recent initiatives undertaken by the Obama administration and the Food and Drug Administration will try to contribute to this effort by changing the way people think about food.

Forcing the Industry to Change

Many cities and states have taken the initiative in the fight against obesity by passing laws which put pressure on companies to make their food healthier. New York was the first major city to order a trans-fat ban in its restaurants, after a failed public education campaign. Other cities and states have followed suit and many are now also considering soda taxes and calling for reductions in salt content.

Kelly Brownell, director of Yale’s Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity, told the HPR, “You simply can’t do enough education to begin to compete with the food industry. We need to change the fundamental drivers of the obesity problem such as food marketing and the cost and content of food.” Local initiatives have been effective so far and have also had some positive unintended consequences: after facing trans-fat bans in major cities, nearly all fast food chains have removed trans fats from their national products. When faced with restrictions in large markets, it is often more efficient for companies to implement changes across the board.

But the most effective way to force the industry to change may be to create federal laws similar to those passed by lower levels of government. The food lobby, however, stands in the way. As Brownell explained, “The tobacco experience might be very informative here. The federal government had its hands tied because of lobbying by tobacco companies, and early on real action took place in cities and states.” But, she continued, “once enough victories occurred there, the federal government had cover and was able to take action.” Food companies will only change “if there is a threat of national government action or if these companies have to make changes for public relations reasons,” said Brownell.

Mobilizing the Public

The latter strategy is also being explored. The Obama administration has made fighting obesity a priority, with First Lady Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move” campaign encouraging young people to exercise. The First Lady has worked with the FDA to increase public awareness, and a major focus has been nutritional labeling.

Siobhan DeLancey, a spokeswoman for the FDA, explained in an interview with the HPR that the FDA “has partnered with the First Lady … to make sure nutrition labeling is accurate and informative for people to rely on and make healthy choices in their day-to-day lives.” But she also acknowledged that even with this improved information available, consumers may not necessarily follow it. “With a busy lifestyle, it is difficult to spend the necessary energy and time to really comprehend food labels,” DeLancey said.

While improved food labels and the First Lady’s information campaign are potentially parts of the solution, an important—and often overlooked—step in the fight against obesity is getting the public to understand how much power the food industry has. For example, Pepsi recently announced that it will remove all sugared beverages from secondary schools in the United States. While this is a welcome move, Brownell cautioned that we have to make sure companies “don’t simply take their marketing muscle and apply it elsewhere like the Internet or store displays through which they can still encourage children to drink sugared beverages.” In order to ensure that companies such as Pepsi make and market healthier products, the public will have to confront them head-on and pressure them to take the correct action.

With the support of the Obama administration, the fight against the obesity epidemic is making strides. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that continued progress depends on changing the culture of food in the United States. As Brownell concluded, “We need to create the public sentiment to encourage change and then force companies to change.”

Neil Patel ‘13 is the Graphics Editor.

Ultimately, the initiative process provides an important opportunity for Americans to participate in self-government. But flaws in its implementation have indicated the need for  checks on the system, such as higher thresholds for signatures and a role for the legislature in proposing competing initiatives.

The People Speak Too Easily?

Although most of the Founders did not favor direct democracy, initiatives were eventually incorporated into several states’ constitutions because citizens demanded more direct ways of enacting policy change. As Tom Harman, a California state senator, told the HPR, “Sometimes, the initiatives are a populist reaction to a legislature’s inactivity on issues of importance to the voters.” He continued, “I value the initiative process, and I totally support the people’s right to make decisions, especially when the legislature won’t.” But many critics contend that this is not always a healthy solution to legislative inactivity.

Many call for increased legislative checks on the initiative process, particularly during the signature-gathering process.  For an initiative to qualify for the ballot in California, the number of signatures supporting the measure must be at least five percent of the total votes cast in the last gubernatorial election if the initiative proposes a state statute, or eight percent if it proposes a state constitutional amendment. Some have suggested that these low thresholds make it too easy to place misunderstood or poorly thought-out measures on the ballot.

Several critics have also proposed banning the use of professional signature gatherers, who have little personal investment in the initiative and can persuade citizens to sign documents they do not understand. Nonetheless, reforming the signature-gathering process might not be constitutionally feasible. As Thad Kousser, a professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, told the HPR, “The courts have taken a clear line against restrictions on paid signature gathering since the 1920s.”

The Problem of Citizen-Legislators

Because there is often little transparency in the initiative-writing process, citizens with no legal expertise are able to draft poorly written laws, which sometimes come with unintended consequences. For example, Colorado’s so-called “English for the Children” initiative in 2002 sought to eliminate many bilingual programs from the public education curriculum. Due to the measure’s vague language, however, if the initiative had passed many experts believe that it would also have eliminated English as a Second Language. As Bruce Cain, a professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, told the HPR, “[We need] more transparency in the formulation phase. If that were a more public process that allowed for more input, it would improve the quality of measures.”

Additionally, many critics claim that initiatives do not provide voters with enough options. According to Kousser, “Once an initiative qualifies for the ballot, the legislature should be able to put a competing initiative on the ballot by a simple majority vote.” Joshua Pritikin, a volunteer for The Democracy Foundation, which aims to reform the initiative process, told the HPR, “Votes on initiatives are frequently very close. … One possible reason is that the electorate doesn’t really know which way to vote.” In other words, confusion over initiatives leads to a toss-up outcome that doesn’t reflect the voters’ true will. Pritikin suggested that making the initiative process into “a more deliberative procedure,” in which citizens can debate alternatives or participate in a “formal deliberative poll,” would help to alleviate some of these problems.

Reforming Implementation

Some critics of direct democracy also advocate more legislative oversight after initiatives are passed. One proposal Cain suggested was to “restrict the number of constitutional amendments or constitutional changes” that can be passed by initiative, and instead limit initiatives to “statutory changes that can be amended by the legislature after some period of time.”

Many critics also point to direct democracy’s potential to hurt minority groups, a concern that was borne out by Proposition 8 in California, which overturned the California Supreme Court’s decision allowing gay marriage. According to Pritikin, “Initiatives are drafted by their sponsors, and they tend to be drafted in a way that takes a one-sided position and doesn’t incorporate compromise by looking at solutions that are beneficial for all state residents.” In an environment of legislative debate, on the other hand, the need for compromise usually prevents legislators from proposing bills that restrict minority rights.

Initiatives are also a drain on state finances, since most mandate an increase in government spending, and voters often refuse to accept higher taxes to pay for them.  As State Sen. Harman said, “[We] need to get away from initiatives that earmark funding for certain programs. Right now, the bulk of California’s revenue is directly tied to programs via the initiatives process.” He continued, “This has really limited our ability to fairly rein in spending to deal with a multi-billion-dollar budget deficit.” For example, public education  in California faces drastic cuts because it is one of the few state programs from which legislators can remove funding.

Tensions in Direct Democracy

Steven Greenhut, director of the Pacific Research Institute’s Journalism Center, told the HPR that he agreed  with this assessment of  the “abuses” of the initiative system. But, said Greenhut, “I would hate to give up this tool for reform.” After all, he asked, “When the legislature fails, what do you do for reform?”

In many cases, the only way to get the change that people desire is through the initiative process. Reforming the initiative process might have the unintended effect of removing a valuable avenue for the public to exercise its will. As Greenhut concluded, “With initiatives, you get the good, and the bad, and the ugly.”

According to Cain, distinguishing between populist and progressive reforms can resolve some of the problems with initiatives. The ballot initiative itself emerged from populist ideals that sought to bypass the legislature in favor of the people’s will. In contrast, progressive reforms sought to “complement the legislature” rather than “supplant” it, resulting in institutions like referenda and recalls that give citizens more input into the legislative process without undermining independence completely. Fixing the initiative process will require reconciling the tension between populism and progressivism and preserving the initiative’s underlying purpose: in Kousser’s words, to “give voters a little bit more of what they want.”

Peter Bozzo ’12 is a Staff Writer and Andrew Irvine ’12 is a Contributing Writer.

Photo Credit: Flickr (procomkelly)

The Tea Party movement attracted a lot of attention with its vocal opposition to the Democratic health care legislation, but it took shape at the very beginning of the Obama presidency. It arose out of widespread libertarian and populist outrage over the federal government’s intervention in the economy. While opposing the Obama administration, the Tea Party movement has remained independent from the Republican Party, sometimes openly confronting the GOP establishment. Yet the two organizations are united by their opposition to the Democratic agenda. What will ultimately determine the future of the Tea Party movement, then, is how successfully Republicans can incorporate elements of the Tea Party’s doctrine into their party platform. And how effectively they can prevent the Tea Party from bringing down more electable, establishment candidates.

The Origins of the Tea Party

When CNBC commentator Rick Santelli railed against the “homeowner bailout” at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in February 2009, he tapped into a widespread frustration with government “handouts.” Santelli famously declared that he wanted to oppose Obama’s economic agenda with a “Chicago Tea Party” in July. Within weeks, anti-tax groups had sprung up across the country. Zephyr Teachout, a professor of public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, emphasized the importance of these early events in an interview with the HPR. “While right-wing media and politicians fueled the anger around health care reform and other programs,” she said, “I suspect that some of the organic growth of the Tea Party movement came from extraordinary anger at the bank bailouts.” Indeed, the bailouts—combined with the stimulus package’s $787 billion price tag—were major instigators for the Tea Party movement.

Kate Zernike, national correspondent for the New York Times, told the HPR that “the motivating grievance for most [Tea Partiers] was when Congress passed TARP—under President Bush.” TARP, which provided emergency assistance for major financial institutions, was maligned by populists on both the left and right. Furthermore, many Ron Paul supporters, devoted libertarians, provided an organizational structure for the nascent movement. A loose populist-libertarian coalition arose that sought to limit federal spending and roll back newly acquired government powers. The stimulus bill, Zernike said, was just fuel on the fire.

Tea and GOP

The Tea Party movement has repeatedly rebuffed the GOP establishment’s attempts to co-opt it, which has alarmed some Republicans. Richard Parker, a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, observed, “The RNC remains concerned about three things: the impact of Tea Party primary challengers on the electability of general election candidates, how Tea Party voters will vote in November, and the potential political damage that negative perception of the Tea Party can cause.”

Overall, though, the Tea Party movement has chosen to operate as a wing within the Republican Party in the upcoming midterms, recognizing that fielding candidates against Republicans in general elections would be counterproductive. Indeed, Rasmussen Reports has found that in three-way contests between Democrats, Republicans, and Tea Party candidates, the anti-Democratic vote is split down the middle. Zernike explained, “Tea Party leaders generally boil their issues down to three things: fiscal responsibility, constitutionally limited government, and free markets.” These issues comprise the core values of fiscal conservatives, and Tea Partiers generally recognize that Republicans are better aligned with their interests than Democrats. Still, there is no doubt that the Republican establishment should be concerned, as it has seen a number of preferred candidates receive strong challenges from the Tea Party movement.

Tea Futures

As the economy recovers, the anger and frustration driving the Tea Party could abate. The principles behind the movement, however, will survive. If the Republican establishment adopts Tea Party planks and refrains from voting for new spending programs, Tea Party leaders will feel more incorporated into the political mainstream. The Republican caucus has already unanimously opposed numerous Democratic proposals, most notably President Obama’s health care initiative. As long as Tea Partiers believe that Republicans are listening to their concerns, the Tea Party is likely to function as “an outside advocacy group” that “works for Republican candidates, but does not uniformly support them,” Zernike predicted.

The Tea Party, originally a reactionary movement against what was perceived as unnecessary federal intervention in the nation’s economy, has become an organized political force. Although the Tea Party movement has not outright endorsed the Republican Party, it can exert significant pressure on the GOP to maintain a platform of strict fiscal conservatism, as seen in such primary challenges as Marco Rubio’s in Florida or J.D. Hayworth’s in Arizona. Though the economic conditions fueling the Tea Party’s growth will dissipate, the movement itself may have a long-term impact on American politics.

Alexander Chen ’13 is a Staff Writer.

Photo Credits: Flickr (Caveman 92223 and bisongirl)