Albert Greenwood Brown, who was convicted of the rape and murder of 15-year-old Susan Louise Jordan in 1982, was scheduled for execution in California at the end of September. But a last-minute court ruling and an unexpected expiration of sodium thiopental, the drug used for lethal injection, indefinitely delayed all executions in the Golden State. With this temporary moratorium on capital punishment, California became the latest state to reevaluate its use of the death penalty. But while many Americans and several state legislatures have expressed increased skepticism of capital punishment in recent years, it remains an entrenched and popular policy in many regions of the country. Nothing short of a sweeping decision from the Supreme Court will bring about its abolition in the near future.

Public Opinion and State Moratoria

According to an October 2010 Gallup poll, 64 percent of Americans support the death penalty. While this may initially seem like an overwhelming majority, it is important to consider this statistic in context. First, Americans’ support of the death penalty has been trending downward since a peak in 1994, when 80 percent of respondents supported it. The manner in which the question is asked is also important. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, Americans are about evenly split between life in prison without possibility of parole and the death penalty when those two options are presented to them.

Declining public support for the death penalty over the last decade may be related to the proliferation of state moratoria on capital punishment in recent years. In January 2006, the New Jersey legislature voted to abolish the death penalty. Several states soon followed suit, including Missouri in 2006, Nebraska in 2008, and Kentucky in 2009. In North Carolina, a de facto moratorium has been imposed after a decision passed by the state medical board disallowed physicians from participating in executions.

Ready for Abolition?

While the death penalty has become less prevalent in the United States as a whole, there are still regions of the country where it remains a very popular and often utilized policy. Ruth Friedman, director of the Federal Capital Habeas Project, told the HPR that ambitious politicians often exploit the issue of capital punishment for political gain. . “The death penalty is a political issue wielded by people who want to further their political aims,” Friedman said. Candidates for district attorney, for instance, often advocate greater use of the death penalty in order to appear tough on crime—especially in the South, which according to the Death Penalty Information Center accounts for a majority of the national death row population. As long as people associate the death penalty with law and order, there will be politicians who capitalize on the policy for political gain, which makes nationwide abolition unlikely.

An outright ban of the death penalty, then, would most likely be accomplished through a sweeping decision from the Supreme Court. But given the Court’s current conservative slant, such a decision is unlikely to come soon. Still, Richard Dieter, executive director of the Death Penalty Information Center, told the HPR that he believes “America is in the latter stages of the demise of the death penalty.” According to Dieter, “Exoneration through DNA testing has shaken the confidence of the American public” in the death penalty. While advances in forensic technology have made it easier to identify guilty culprits, they have also made it easier to identify errors in the administration of justice. As the public increasingly realizes the non-trivial possibility that it has executed or will execute an individual who is not guilty, Dieter believes it will become more skeptical of the death penalty—and that this change in opinion could eventually provide the impetus for the Supreme Court to rule capital punishment unconstitutional.

Until that time, if it ever arrives, the death penalty will continue to be decided on the state level. Increasing public support of alternative policies will make the death penalty less prevalent in some areas of the country, while it will remain popular in other regions. The country’s growing skepticism of the death penalty may be an indicator that the Supreme Court will one day decide to abolish capital punishment, but such a decision is most likely many years away.

Brian Burton ’13 and Michael Lai ’14 are Staff Writers.

Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons

The Fear of Barbarians, by Tzvetan Todorov. Translated by Andrew Brown.

University of Chicago Press, 2010. $27.50, 200 pp.

On Nov. 1, gunmen affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq, an al Qaeda umbrella group, massacred over 58 worshipers and police in an attack on a Catholic church in Baghdad. They reportedly called their victims “infidels” and taunted, “We’re going to heaven, you’re going to hell.”

Incidents like this make it tempting to see all conflict in the Middle East as part of a centuries-old religious war. In The Fear of Barbarians, Tzvetan Todorov, a Franco-Bulgarian philosopher, challenges this view. Todorov makes a compelling case that the West’s inclination to see a monolithic Islam promotes fear that hampers American strategic interests and undermines democratic values. Even if the practical import of his book may be hard to gauge, Todorov offers a fresh perspective on Western relations with the Islamic world.

Todorov enters the debate on Western-Islamic relations by challenging the views of Samuel P. Huntington, whose 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations argued that the fault lines of conflict in the 21^st century would form around cultural differences. Many saw September 11, and the American response, as proof for Huntington’s thesis. Todorov acknowledges that many people oversimplify Huntington’s ideas, but he faults Huntington for laying the groundwork for an “us vs. them” mentality.

Todorov mounts his challenge to the “clash of civilizations” thesis with a criticism of Huntington’s concept of collective identity. Huntington famously argued that all inhabitants of Western civilization share a common heritage. Features of this heritage include Christian religious traditions and an emphasis on human rights and the rule of law. In Todorov’s view, this is an oversimplification. Even within supposed “civilizations,” there are often clear differences of cultural traditions and political values. The individual is born into a particular culture, and exposed to its various traditions, but this individual can make independent judgments in the case of moral or political ideals. For this reason, though democracy may have matured during the Western Enlightenment, it is not, Todorov thinks, exclusive to Western civilization.

A Moral Civilization

Todorov instead describes civilizations in moral terms that are universally accessible. A “civilized” person is one who fully recognizes the humanity of others, achieving a level of empathy that allows for the interpersonal cooperation necessary for a peaceful society. A barbarian, meanwhile, denies the humanity of those around him. Todorov classifies acts such as murder, genocide, and torture as barbaric acts.

In Todorov’s mind, what distinguishes the West from the rest of the world is not a political ideology or a persistent cultural identity. It is fear. Western Europe and America, which dominated the world for centuries, now cling to a diminishing base of political and economic power. As a result, the West has become suspicious in its dealings with outsiders. For Todorov, Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations is a manifestation of this fear.

After the September 11 attacks, fear seemed to be a perfectly rational response for the West. But Todorov argues that fear made us fight barbarism with barbarism. Like many before him, Todorov notes the contradiction of promoting democracy by force of arms. And in prosecuting our wars, the “fear of barbarians” has led us to adopt barbaric practices ourselves, in the form of torture.

An Outsider’s Perspective

The Fear of Barbarians comes from a distinctly European perspective. In the face of xenophobia and fear of Muslim immigration, Todorov proposes a radical solution: a restructuring of Europe’s collective identity. Europeans should assign less importance to tradition, and more to moral values such as tolerance and equality. By granting equal status to other cultures, Europe can be a leader in acting out the ideals of liberal democracy. With high immigration rates and high Muslim birthrates, finding a workable common ground is not just morally right, Todorov thinks, but increasingly urgent.

While these views are logical and eloquent, their practicality is uncertain. True, collective identity is in a constant state of flux. However, centuries of tradition and cultural heritage are hard to cast aside. In 2007, French President Nicolas Sarkozy established the Ministry of National Identity, partly in response to growing fear of France’s increasingly visible Muslim minority. Nationalism is still a potent force across Europe, perhaps stronger than Todorov acknowledges.

Still, this English translation deserves attention just for its view on one of the most controversial issues of the day: the Islamic world’s relationship with the West. American political discourse is rarely affected by outsiders in this manner, which is a shame.

Todorov intends for this book’s themes to transcend the question of toleration of Islam. He sees the current challenge as a test of the values of democracy. A proper management of this conflict, in his view, could solve many of the more general challenges of multiculturalism.

Eric Hendey ’14 is a Staff Writer.

COVERS SECTION: The Obama Doctrine: Does America Have a Foreign Policy?

The Reset with Russia: Two years of “da” to a new partnership. By Joshua Lipson.

Obama’s Blank Check: The tone of America’s national security policy has changed, but the substance is similar.
By Peter Bozzo and Henry Shull.

Remaking America’s Image: Leveraging Obama’s popularity abroad. By Beatrice Walton.

A Less-Than-Happy Anniversary: The recent hiccups in U.S.-Japan relations. By Alastair Su.

Old Neighbors in a New World: The United States and Latin America need more high-level engagement. By Matthew Bewley.

Strategic Disengagement: Non-interventionism makes a comeback. By Kaiyang Huang.

Obama in the Peace Process: The improbability of comprehensive peace between Israel and Palestine. By Thomas Gaudett.

Emergency to Efficiency: The silver lining of shortfalls in PEPFAR funding. By Neil Patel.

Dealing with the Trade Deficit: Fighting U.S.-China trade imbalance demands long-term strategy. By Jimmy Wu.

International Implications of Our National Debt: Paying off creditors the right way.
By Aditi Ghai.

UNITED STATES

Left Behind: Liberal frustration with Obama’s politics-as-usual. By Jeffrey Kalmus.

Primary Reform: Roadblocks to Change: Why the current primary system, imperfect as it is, is here to stay. By Alexander Chen and Daniel Granoff.

Turning Towards Newt: How Gingrich should navigate the 2012 elections.
By Lucas Swisher.

Reevaluating the Death Penalty: A look at the future of capital punishment in America.
By Brian Burton and Michael Lai.

Voting Rights: Earned or Entitled?: Suffrage for non-citizens raises fundamental questions. By Simon Thompson.

WORLD

A Sinking Feeling: Pacific islands take global warming into their own hands. By Alec Barrett.

A Government of Spies : How Russia’s political culture has failed to escape from the KGB. By Jessica Stein.

Germany’s Third Unification: The Merkel government should nip growing xenophobia in the bud. By Martin Steinbauer.

Mubarak for Life?: Egyptian president’s desire to remain in power complicates the succession process. By Andrew Seo.


BOOKS & ARTS

Review of The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party’s Revolution and the Battle over American History. By Taylor Helgren.

Review of The Chosen Peoples: America, Israel, and the Ordeals of Divine Elections.
By Raul Quintana.

Review of The Presidency of George W. Bush: A First Historical Assessment.
By Arjun Mody.

Review of The Death of the Liberal Class. By Caroline Cox.

Review of The Fear of Barbarians: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations. By Eric Hendey.

INTERVIEWS

Paul Farmer: The co-founder of Partners in Health on PEPFAR and Haiti. By Lily Ostrer.

Rep. Robert Andrews: The New Jersey Democrat on health care and immigration reform. By Simon Thompson.

Cecile Richards: The president of Planned Parenthood on reproductive rights under Obama. By Lily Ostrer.

ENDPAPER

Last Chopper Out of Kabul: What ails our foreign policy establishment?. By Daniel Barbero.

We called this report “annual” because we hope to repeat it every year, so that readers can be updated on policymakers’ management of the federal budget. Citizens are going to have to be vigilant, because nothing is easier than for politicians to jack up spending and cut taxes. At this point, with the economy still languishing, that isn’t the worst thing in the world. But it’s unsustainable in the long run, and we need to demand better of our leaders.

The insurance industry, for example, is mobilizing to dial back the Affordable Care Act’s cuts to lavish Medicare Advantage plans and to do away with the tax on insurance premiums. If health care costs, which are the biggest driver of our long-term fiscal imbalance, are ever to be bent downwards, these are the kind of politically expedient decisions our politicians will have to avoid.

Social Security is another issue where it’s too easy for politicians to skirt hard choices. Luckily the choices that must be made are not as difficult as the ones that face us when it comes to making our mammoth health care system more efficient. A modest increase in the amount of income subject to the Social Security payroll tax would ensure the program’s long-term solvency.

Finally, there is the oft-overlooked issue of defense spending. Earlier this year, the Sustainable Defense Task Force, organized by Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA), identified almost $1 trillion that could be cut from the defense budget, ostensibly without harming military preparedness. The Republicans, whose pre-election pledge to cut spending included a farcical exception for “seniors, veterans, and our troops,” might have some mavericks in their ranks who are willing to put the Pentagon on the table. Newly elected Sens. Kirk, Paul, and Toomey have all indicated openness to the idea.

Such cross-party collaboration on common-sense budget solutions is what the HPR’s Annual Report is all about. In that same spirit, I hope that the deficit-reduction proposals put forward by Erskine Bowles and Alan Simpson, and by Alice Rivlin and Pete Domenici, will receive due consideration from both sides of the aisle. The public would benefit from an honest debate about the tough choices that face us.

For most of the first hundred years of America’s history, foreign policy was not a primary concern. Even today, with some notable exceptions, foreign policy rarely animates the American electorate. Exit polls from the most recent election show that a mere one in ten voters based their vote primarily on foreign policy issues.

But President Obama has made his foreign policy a major priority. The president has surged in Afghanistan, negotiated with China, begun a new partnership with Russia , and attempted to engage in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. As the new Republican Congress imperils any major domestic initiatives, the next two years may be characterized by even greater attention to foreign policy.

Yet the extent to which Obama’s efforts add up to a coherent “doctrine” remains an open question. Doctrines are based on a fundamental, systematically applied ideology or set of rules. It is difficult to judge doctrine from results. While the past two years have seen many increased efforts at engagement, there have been notable exceptions, particularly in Latin America. A president who entered office pledging dramatic change at home and abroad has also accepted many of his predecessor’s national security policies. Perhaps the Obama doctrine is what it is, except when it’s not.

That’s understandable, given that America’s relations with the world are more complex than ever before. As a result of high levels of debt, the United States may witness decreasing influence on the world stage. And the mood in the country appears to be increasingly non-interventionist. As such, it should be no surprise that even a president as internationally popular as Obama has run into trouble enacting his foreign policy agenda . The apparent lack of an “Obama doctrine” may speak less about the man than the political context in which he operates.

A pragmatic approach may be just what is needed. Traditional alliances are experiencing strain, as the American relationship with Japan illustrates. Likewise, even in an era of tight budgets, more can be done with less, for instance in the realm of foreign aid. These issues do not necessarily fit into an overarching doctrine, but consistency is not what presidents are ultimately judged on. Whether or not a true “doctrine” emerges, then, the Obama administration will have many opportunities to craft a successful foreign policy.

Chris Danello ’12 is the Covers Editor.

Recently, President Obama has been severely tested in his conduct of the Afghan war, battered by his own party for his escalation of George W. Bush’s quagmire. Insurgents seem to be surging in province after province. Washington’s man on the ground, President Hamid Karzai, continues to siphon American aid and his own national treasury into his nepotistic coterie, and his people seems to be disaffected, to say the least, from his incompetent government. The national army is no match on its own for the insurgency, which makes American withdrawal either less likely or more costly. At home, speculation is rising that those mercurial “hearts and minds” have been won by the enemy.

Substitute Obama for Kennedy, and Afghanistan for Vietnam, and so forth, and you’ve got a near perfect match. In Vietnam, as in Afghanistan, the U.S. government and the press were enthusiastic about bringing human rights and democratic institutions to backwards Asia. But traditional anti-communist figures such as the Vietnamese emperor, Bao Dai, and tribal and religious leaders of the Cao Dai or Hoa Ho wouldn’t deliver on those goals. Instead, the U.S. preferred a well-spoken leader who could communicate with the West and assure us that political and social modernization would transform Vietnam. This new president, Ngo Dinh Diem, directly received millions of dollars in aid, enough to make up a majority of the national budget of the newly created South Vietnam. Mysteriously, to Americans anyway, the South Vietnamese despised their president almost as much as Afghans today detest Hamid Karzai. As Harvard seniors think about careers in journalism or the foreign service, it might be useful to think about America’s continuing problems with picking its friends abroad.

The last period of security and development in Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, was under the monarchy. Both Ngo Dinh Diem and Hamid Karzai started as loyal ministers to deposed monarchs, but went for the role of top dog once America decided democracy had arrived to stay. In this new iteration, the CIA has taken up the task of keeping the Karzai family well-funded. Hamid’s brother Mahmood, who has extensive experience as a Boston restaurateur, now holds down the national security council and oversees Afghanistan’s heavy industry. Afghans are so confused by our attachment to this corrupt government and by our tightly-written rules of engagement that rumors abound to the effect that the Americans must actually be aiding the Taliban insurgency. Afghan hearts and minds turn out to prefer Taliban law and order to Karzai corruption and inconsistent American protection.

Though there are fewer foreign desks these days, the media’s boosting of democracy and Karzai as the solutions to our problems in Afghanistan follows the same script as the one they followed when it came to Diem and South Vietnam. In 2004, the New York Times proclaimed Karzai the man to bring a “new chapter” to Afghanistan, the man who would eliminate the poppy fields within two years and set up schools for girls. In October of this year, American readers learned from the same source that Karzai depends not only on the American military presence, but on Iranian money. Most of the Afghan cabinet remains unfilled after the last shady election.

Are we at the end of the beginning, or the beginning of the end? Long years might await our soldiers in Afghanistan and our “non-combat troops” in Iraq, as they did for Kennedy’s so-called “advisors” in South Vietnam. Perhaps we have learned how to speed up history, and perhaps soon we can expect the last chopper from Kabul that Obama has promised. But he question of American military involvement in democracy-building and humanitarian intervention won’t go away: The executive director of Human Rights Watch proposed recently in Foreign Policy decisive action against rebels from the Lord’s Resistance Army, in Uganda.

If you’re a Harvard student interested in foreign affairs, the good news is that the ranks of the political and journalistic establishment have never been more in need of well-educated young people interested in foreign policy—well, perhaps not since the ’60s, anyway. The bad news is that it’s up to you to think about the fruits of  promoting democracy abroad at the tip of a sword, to investigate our refusal to think about priorities, and to find out a way for us to pick better friends the next time boots hit the ground.

Daniel Barbero ’11 is a former Books & Arts Editor.

Photo Credit: Flickr – Steve Evans

In the 2004 Supreme Court decision Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote for the plurality: “A state of war is not a blank check for the president when it comes to the rights of the nation’s citizens.” Justice O’Connor’s words marked a turning point in the Bush administration, putting an end to the executive’s unilateral control of American national security policy.

Two years into President Obama’s tenure, however, his administration has come under fire from the left for staying Bush’s course when it comes to national security. These critiques do miss important differences, particularly the fact that President Obama has avoided the sweeping statements of unitary executive power which his predecessor made. But it is nonetheless true that the Obama administration has been defined more by continuity than change in this area of policy.

This continuity has more to do with the experience of the executive in wartime than the president’s personal character or beliefs. While Obama has attempted to emphasize detainee rights and checks and balances on the executive, his administration remains constrained by the political, legal, and decision-making requirements inherent in running the modern national security state.

President Obama signs the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act with Rep. Robert Andrews (D-NJ,) then-Rep. John McHigh (R-NY), Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), and Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO).

Continuity of Policy

To say that President Obama has largely followed in the footsteps of President Bush, one must first establish which Bush one is talking about. As Tung Yin, a professor at the Lewis and Clark School of Law, told the HPR, the first-term Bush administration acted with unilateral authority in developing national security measures. But, following Supreme Court decisions in 2004, “public disclosure and public outcry about things like warrantless wiretapping” compelled the Bush administration to permit increased judicial review of national security measures like the enemy combatants held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

Obama has by and large accepted the limits placed on his predecessor, but civil libertarians complain that he has not chosen to impose more rigorous ones. Instead, Obama has failed to close the detention camp at Guantánamo Bay and launched increased drone strikes and targeted assassinations. Assessing what he sees as disappointments, Christian Parenti of The Nation has argued that there is “a tradition of extralegal behavior by the executive during war,” which President Obama has largely continued. Obama’s actions have been a far cry from his assertions on the campaign trail that he would close Guantánamo immediately and definitively reject President Bush’s legacy.

The Consensus-Driven President

Despite the substantial similarities between the policies of Obama and Bush, the presidents do differ in their approach to executive power. As David Harris, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, told the HPR, the Supreme Court’s 1952 decision in the Steel Seizure Case outlined a balance of power between the president and Congress during wartime, one that Obama has largely followed. Bush, at least in his first term, did not.

“If the president is exercising his power in areas of foreign policy during wartime, and the Congress has ceded that power to him… then the president’s power is at its greatest point,” Harris explained. “But where Congress and the president both have power, and the Congress has exercised some of it, Congress is clearly a player, and Congressional action can limit what the president does,” he continued. Harris juxtaposed the limitations imposed by the Steel Seizure paradigm with the “basically unlimited” scope of executive power envisioned by the Bush administration. By stepping away from such ambitious claims to executive power, then, Obama has moved away from his predecessor.

Likewise, supporters credit Obama with attempting to introduce some form of consensus-driven politics, based on a system of checks and balances, into the national security decision-making process. Peter Raven-Hansen, a professor at George Washington Law School, told the HPR that while Bush’s main decisions “were made in a small group… and not vetted outside the White House,” the Obama administration “has instituted a broader process in which the Office of Legal Services and legal advisors play a more traditional and broader role in the administration.” Advocates praise such consensus-driven politics for its greater rigor and legalism, as well its ability to expose the president to a more diverse set of views. While this sort of procedural advancement is certainly not the ultimate goal of national security policy, Raven-Hansen praises it as a step in the right direction.

Being the Boss

Yet for all of Obama’s good intentions, Harris noted, “The Obama administration has continued some of the same policies [as Bush].” Harris cited the example of Guantánamo Bay: President Obama pledged to close the facility during his campaign and signed an executive order to that effect, but Guantánamo remains open. Harris claimed that the president’s failure to implement his order resulted from “intense political opposition” to the proposed plan to transfer the detainees to an Illinois prison. Indeed, the assertion that Obama has been constrained more by politics than by legalities is a common one. According to Parenti, “The spin doctors around Obama, most personified by David Axelrod, live in pathological fear of being seen as weak and losing swing voters.”

Nonetheless, the most compelling explanation of Obama’s actions in this area may lie in the inherent nature of the executive, rather than any lack of political courage on Obama’s part. As Yin noted, “The president is the unilateral head of the executive branch, [but] Congress has 535 different masters.” This centralization of power gives the president a major advantage in accessing information and developing policy regarding national security, which no system of checks and balances can fully overcome. Furthermore, Yin pointed out that only “the House and Senate leaders of both parties and heads of the intelligence committees get detailed briefings on classified material, so it’s fairly easy for the president to create conditions in crisis where the president gets his way.” Despite some efforts to adopt a consensus-based approach, then, structural impediments and historical precedents give the executive the prerogative to more or less control national security policy.

Understanding National Security

President Obama has attempted to reform his decision-making process when it comes to national security, but he remains ultimately constrained by the necessity of executive prerogative in wartime. One might not have expected it to be this way. As Harris noted, “The Obama administration is in a different period on the scale of time.” President Obama enjoys the luxury of reflection on the events of 9/11 and the subsequent experiences of fighting the war on terror.

Yet for all these advantages, Obama has been little able to improve on President Bush’s efforts or to alter his national-security policy framework. More than anything else, this is a reflection of the nature of the executive branch. As Harris put it, “There aren’t a lot of good alternatives” to the concentration of power in the executive during wartime.

Peter Bozzo ’12 is a Staff Writer and Henry Shull ’13 is the Business Manager.

Photo Credit: Wikimedia

Paying off creditors the right way

“Blessed are the young,” Herbert Hoover quipped, “for they shall inherit the national debt.” With the national debt approaching $14 trillion, however, policymakers are looking to deal with the debt sooner rather than later. As the global economy recovers, they may decide to depreciate the dollar in order to lower the burden of America’s national debt. While seemingly an attractive option, the policy offers as much peril as possibility. Debt repayment through dollar devaluation would pose a serious threat to American foreign policy.

The Debt Dilemma

America’s huge debt is often seen as a problem that only concerns America itself. But as Jeffery Frieden, professor of government at Harvard, told the HPR, America’s creditors should really be the ones to worry. Said Frieden, “When you have loans that are as large as they are now, they are a problem both for those who have to pay them back and those who want to get paid back.” Frieden continued, “Given that every penny we pay back is a cost to us and a benefit to them, and every penny we don’t pay back is a benefit to us and a cost to them, there’s going to be conflict.”

In particular, the United States enjoys the advantage that its debt is owed in U.S. dollars, which allows the government to ultimately determine the debt’s real value. As Frieden noted, “We can do a variety of things to reduce the real burden of the debt, but everything we do to reduce the real burden of the debt, reduces the real value of it to our creditors.” Frieden points to the ability of inflationary policies to reduce the real burden of the debt, decreasing the value of the dollar and effectively paying off less than was lent.

Such a solution to our debt problem would have political implications, though. As Frieden said, “Many would argue that the United States takes advantage of its unique position to get treated in ways that no one else gets treated.”

A Mixed Picture

Ultimately, America’s debt dilemma boils down to a question of priorities. As Frieden explained, “If America’s main concern is managing the money it owes the rest of the world, then the nation should orient relations and policy toward reducing the burden of the debt” through inflationary policies. If, on the other hand, the United States wants to create opportunities for investors overseas, then it should “concern itself with opening new markets and improving relations with other nations,” which currency devaluation would make more difficult.

The two goals may be mutually exclusive. Any attempt to effectively inflate away America’s debt could devastate relationships with the rest of the world. So the United States may soon face a crucial choice. America’s debt poses serious problems, but paying it off the wrong way might curtail America’s continued effectiveness on the world stage.

Aditi Ghai ’14 is a Staff Writer.

In the wake of President Obama’s 2008 election, approval of the United States in the rest of the world shot through the roof. Americans and foreigners alike hailed the beginning of a new era for the United States on the international stage. Yet, two years later, while Obama himself remains popular in the world, opinions about his actual foreign policies are much more negative. Though the president still attracts people abroad, the United States lacks a cohesive public-diplomacy doctrine that would turn Obama’s popularity to American advantage.

Obama visited students in India as part of a 10-day Asia trip

Between 2003 and 2008, America suffered substantial declines in its popularity abroad, most notably because of disapproval of the war in Iraq. By June 2010, however, the Pew Global Attitudes Survey of 22 nations showed that opinions of the United States had reversed. In Western Europe in particular, pro-American sentiments markedly increased, with France and Germany each showing 33 percent improvements in favorability ratings. As the survey noted, the most plausible explanation for this warming towards America is the significantly higher approval of President Obama relative to his predecessor.

Nonetheless, the revival of America’s popularity in the abstract seems to have more to do with Obama’s personal image than any surge in support for particular U.S. foreign policies. While the 2010 Pew study found that 64 percent of those surveyed had confidence that President Obama would do the “right thing in world affairs,” only 32 percent agreed that the United States considers their interests in making its foreign policy decisions.

In many countries, Obama's popularity far outstrips that of the United States

Richard Wike, associate director of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, told the HPR that in “dealing with particular global hot spots, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel, [Obama] tends to get much more mixed reviews.” The German Marshall Fund’s annual transatlantic survey found Obama to be a popular leader with unpopular policies. While 78 percent of Europeans approved of Obama’s handling of international policies in general, only 49 percent approved of his handling of Afghanistan and only 49 percent approved of his handling of Iran.

Wike also drew attention to the limits of the purported reversal in foreign opinion of the United States, noting that it has not occurred to the same extent everywhere. “Particularly, [in] Muslim countries… Obama is more popular than Bush, but not by a whole lot,” he said.

The gap between the president’s personal popularity and the popularity of his government’s policies is a major challenge for American public diplomacy. “Having a president that is widely admired and respected in the world is very important to the success of public diplomacy,” Lisa Curtis, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, told the HPR. “Yet at the same time, it takes far more than a popular president. One of the failures of U.S. public diplomacy… is that sometimes it becomes too tied to the leader.” It seems that Obama’s popularity can only carry America’s image so far.

Where’s the New Doctrine?

Despite Obama’s positive public image, U.S. public diplomacy has enjoyed little progress. Philip Seib, director of the Center on Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California, points to a disconnect between Obama’s speeches and his followup. Seib told the HPR that the biggest problem with American public diplomacy is that it is “not in sync with American foreign policy.” For instance, Seib explained, “If, after the Cairo speech, [Obama] had unveiled a plan,” something like “the Marshall Plan for Palestine,” then “that would have been something concrete.” But, Seib continued, “The world is a sophisticated enough place that words by themselves will not suffice.”

Despite anticipation of a new State Department approach to this problem, the “Strategic Framework” of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale has received a tepid response. It failed to mark a significant departure from the Bush administration’s policies, which remain unpopular globally. According to Curtis, “When that [plan] came out, many contemplated it by asking, ‘Where’s the new here? This sounds very familiar.’”

Ultimately, the lack of strong public diplomacy will negatively affect America’s ability to advance its foreign policy objectives. “Rhetoric is one thing, but your actions must follow your words,” said Curtis. If America’s credibility suffers, even the high approval ratings of President Obama will not be enough to carry America’s foreign policies forward.

Beatrice Walton ’14 is a Staff Writer.

2010 marks the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. Born out of the Cold War, the agreement provided a framework under which the United States gave Japan economic opportunities and military protection in exchange for Japanese alignment with the anti-Communist bloc. Though initially met with controversy, the treaty gave rise to one of the most successful alliances in post-war history, labeled “the most important relationship in the world, bar none” by former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield.

A military exercise is held offshore at the American air base on Okinawa

The anniversary was very nearly a dour one. Over the past two years, the relationship had suffered from former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s perceived shift away from the United States and from controversy over American military bases on the island of Okinawa. With Hatoyama out of office and his successor pledging to resolve the Okinawa issue, the alliance seems to be on the mend. Nonetheless, the cooling and apparent restoration of relations are only small parts of a more complicated picture. While Prime Minister Naoto Kan has pledged a renewal of the alliance, relations may falter from lack of high-level engagement or from mutual complacency. In order to extend the American-Japanese alliance, then, U.S. and Japanese leaders must still reposition the alliance to adapt to a multilateral, globalizing world.

New Leadership

After the election of the DPJ last year, analysts feared that the party would abandon Japan’s tradition of alignment with the United States, in favor of renewed engagement with Asia. For the better part of last year, before Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s fall from power, those worries seemed justified. When he was in the opposition, Hatoyama had fought Japanese support of American military missions; in office, he pledged to move the American base off the island of Okinawa entirely. Since Hatoyama’s departure, however, the relationship has largely warmed. New Prime Minister Naoto Kan has sought rapprochement with Washington, asserting that the bilateral relationship remains “extremely important.” More substantively, Kan has pledged support for Japanese collaboration with the American military and sought U.S. backing over Japan’s claims for the Senkaku Islands.

The DPJ’s sudden turnaround in foreign policy is not as surprising as it may seem. Susan Pharr, a professor of Japanese politics at Harvard, told the HPR, “Within the DPJ are politicians who have come from the LDP, so this is a party that isn’t coming from the left, but a middle-of-the-road party that resembles the LDP over a broad range of policy issues.” Pharr continued, “They’ve been trying to differentiate themselves in the area of security and foreign policy, but they’re naturally finding it very difficult.” As the DPJ grows more comfortable in office, then, tensions with the United States that resulted on account of Hatoyama’s actions should dissipate.

The Okinawa Factor

The renewal of the alliance most clearly shines through over the issue of the American bases on Okinawa. Since the Clinton-Hashimoto summit of 1996, the United States has pledged to reduce its military presence on the island by relocating the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station from its position in the middle of the city and withdrawing 8,000 American marines to Guam. Hatoyama had pledged to shutter the base, and his opposition opened a Pandora’s box, as many Okinawans demanded that U.S. forces leave the island entirely. By contrast, Prime Minister Kan has pledged support for an orderly relocation process, announcing, “We have no intention whatsoever to change Japan’s current foreign policy.”

The issue may still flare up again after the Nov. 28th Okinawa gubernatorial elections, when Okinawans will decide between Hirokazu Nakaima, a supporter of the U.S. bases, and Yoichi Iha, a vehement opponent. According to Yukinori Komine, an associate with the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, the Okinawan elections will have important ramifications for the rest of Japan. “Unlike other prefectures, Okinawa affects the political scene at three levels—local, regional and national—so its outcome will be crucial in seeing whether things between the United States and Japan will move forward,” Komine told the HPR.

Nonetheless, the base’s importance to the overall American-Japanese relationship may be overstated. Joseph Nye, a professor of international relations at the Harvard Kennedy School, described the Futenma base as “a second-order issue which has grown out of proportion to its importance.” Nye argued that America and Japan should emphasize the greater part of their agenda, “working in partnership to build a stable and prosperous East Asia,” and that Okinawa remains a mere side-issue.
The Complacency Threat

While the U.S.-Japanese relationship is stronger than it was a year ago, its long-term health still depends on the extent to which the alliance can reposition itself to meet new demands. Richard Samuels, director of the Center for International Studies at MIT, told the HPR that the two nations have utterly failed to engage each other about contemporary challenges. “The last high-level meeting between the U.S. and Japan was back in 1996, during the Clinton-Hashimoto summit. Since then, almost 15 years have elapsed and the world is very different now. It surprises me that both countries haven’t organized anything on the same level since.”

Kent Calder, director of the Japan Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, told the HPR that the problem was one of complacency. Calder called it the “quiet crisis” of the alliance. “The most important deficiency is ironically the fruit of recent apparent success. It is the lack of crisis consciousness, the perverse spirit of mutual self-congratulation, that pervades U.S.-Japan relations today.”

One sees proof of this complacency in the fact that only 39 American legislators visited Japan between 2000 and 2005, compared with 113 to China, 79 to India, and 68 to Taiwan. Such trends may be worrying for the future of the U.S.-Japan relationship.

A Renewed Alliance

There remain grounds for optimism going forward. America and Japan possess similar democratic values and the goal of seeing a peaceful, responsible China. With these shared interests, the nations are natural allies. Indeed, if both nations recognize the underlying threat of complacency and begin to conduct relations in a more deliberate manner, any threats to the alliance will subside.

As former U.S. ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer wrote in his autobiography, “I was particularly anxious to have the Japanese stop thinking of the American military as being the real United States, and the relationship between the two countries as being primarily military rather than a matter of shared ideals and common interests.” The issue of Okinawa may still flare up, and Hatoyama’s lasting influence remains to be seen. Yet if President Obama and Prime Minister Kan are able to find new means of cooperation, then the turbulence of the past year’s relations will have been a forgettable detour.

Alastair Su ’14 is a Staff Writer

Photo Credit: Flickr – M. Ashley Morgen