World — October 20, 2011 10:58 pm

Qaddafi: Right Casualty, Wrong War

By Joshua Lipson

The man of a thousand orthographies is dead. Not surprisingly, the political-cultural commentariat has been abuzz with lurid stories of Qaddafi’s last minutes in Sirte – raising, albeit more graphically, the same litany of hackneyed questions that came with the killing of Osama bin Laden. This is a complete waste of time: the Libyan leader is irreversibly dead, there’s no reason to feel bad for him, and even if killing is invariably bad, this killing surely can’t be that bad.

We should applaud Qaddafi’s death at the hands of NTC fighters, just as we should have applauded Saddam Hussein’s execution in 2006. When a leader decides to imprison, torture, and massacre his country’s population into submission, he tacitly consents in the event of upheaval to become the cathartic target of their pent-up frustration.

That said, the end of Qaddafi does not justify the Obama administration’s foolhardy intervention in Libya any more than the end of Saddam justified the Bush administration’s downright disastrous invasion of Iraq. Muammar Qaddafi was a mass-murderer – but retributive justice is not a valid premise for foreign policy. If it were, we’d be wrong not to use all the might we have to topple the unforgivable likes of Kim Jong-Il, Omar al-Bashir, and Bashar al-Assad.

Compared to any of the aforementioned despots, Qaddafi posed hardly any threat to American or international security. Granted, this was hardly the case in the 1980s, when Qaddafi pursued a muscular pro-terror policy and targeted international civilians shamelessly. But in the wake of September 11th and under the increasing influence of his Western-educated son, Saif al-Islam, Qaddafi abandoned his pursuit of nuclear weapons, pursued a broad-based rapprochement with the West, and wrote moderate (if ill-conceived) editorials in the New York Times about a one-state solution for Israel and Palestine.

Like many of our friends over the years, he remained quite authoritarian. However, it says a lot that Qaddafi’s worst provocation of the last decade amounted to a call for the partition of Switzerland – a zany, but totally irrelevant challenge to the international order.

I don’t plan to elaborate much on why the Libya intervention was a bad idea – articulate arguments from strategic irrelevance, cost, and concern for the NTC’s affinities have been made several times over. I would particularly suggest the argument that, in light of the US’ post-disarmament ouster of Qaddafi, no rogue leader will dare to give up his nuclear arms ever again.

In short, the Obama administration’s invocation of ‘responsibility to protect’ in Libya is both intellectually flimsy and frighteningly pliable. However, credit is due to Obama for conducting the cleanest, safest, and most respectful intervention of choice in recent memory. By ‘leading from behind’, the president has steered effortlessly clear of another Iraq – zero American lives lost, no long slog of an occupation.

But let’s not be distracted by the just killing of Muammar Qaddafi or the surgical precision of NATO’s intervention – regime change in Libya is destabilizing. Despite some signs of promise from the NTC, it is hard to take seriously the promises for liberal democracy of a group that has accused Qaddafi of being a Jew, in a country without a civil society or readily defensible borders.

Let’s hope for the best. After all, we asked for it.

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Bosnia & Herzegovina: Forgotten, But Not Yet Fixed
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After Kim Jong-il: The Chinese Take
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  • Paul Schied

    Josh, you’re completely ignoring the main counter-argument against the conventional “intervening was a bad idea” opinion, and the stated reason for NATO’s intervention in Libya: preventing genocide. Sure, the Obama administration put forth rather flimsy arguments about preventing floods of refugees and other US and international foreign policy interests, but the main purpose of the intervention was to prevent those who challenged Qaddafi’s rule from being massacred. Qaddafi’s worst provocation of the last decade wasn’t suggesting the division of Sweden, it was threatening to go house to house killing people. Retributive justice wasn’t the motive here. Prevention of mass death was.

    You’re right that this moralistic reasoning is pliable, and could be used for many other interventions, but when balanced with strategic considerations (the likely effectiveness of non-infantry support for a reasonably well organized and well equipped resistance), it amounts to a coherent justification for intervention.

    And it worked.

    Suggesting that “regime change is destabilizing,” is pretty silly. Stability in the Arab world went out the window when Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire. Implying that Libya would have been a nice, stable vacation spot if NATO had stayed out of it is ridiculous.

    You can certainly disagree with the intervention, but failing to acknowledge that there were legitimate reasons for it is foolish, and unlike you, Josh.

  • Nick R

    Josh, finally this (dated) superpower, the United States, accepted its new position in the world and took a step back. Bravo to the Obama administration for handing the reigns of this mission to NATO and European forces. (Even if American military support was substantial). And whether or not one believes the means justified this end, the end was reached. In these very cloudy foreign policy days, particularly in the chaos that is the Middle East, this success should be applauded. 

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